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The Ius Commune Casebook on European Law and Private Law – edited by Arthur
Hartkamp, Carla Sieburgh and Wouter Devroe – was published in March 2017 as a volume
of the well-known Ius Commune Casebook series started by the highly respected Walter van
Gerven. These casebooks are all the fruits of sound cooperation among European legal
scholars and they all try to attract attention to the common components of the European
legal orders by bringing to surface the common or overlapping elements in various areas of
private law. However, this newest Ius Commune Casebook has a somewhat different character
from the previous ones. First, while the previous volumes were mostly devoted to the
comparison of various European jurisdictions, this Casebook concentrated on both EU law,
mostly on primary, but at some point on secondary EU legal sources and national private law
provisions and cases. It therefore considerably broadened the room for scholarly study and
analysis, as it aimed at discovering whether and to what extent EU primary law has exercised
its influence on national case law in private law matters. Second, different from the former
volumes that tried to present the actual state of a given private law doctrine – for instance tort
law, non-discrimination law or consumer law – in a detailed comparative way, this Casebook
puts a serious emphasis on analysing both the interactions between EU law as a source of
supranational law and national private law, as well as the interaction between various national
private law doctrines when the interpretation of a given EU law provision is at stake. As such,
the vision behind the Casebook implied a broader and more dynamic approach of the legal
issues discussed.
Because of this innovative character, the Casebook intends to stimulate a more profound
academic exchange between EU law and private laws studies. Moreover, it aims to inspire
judges, lawyers, scholars, students and other legal professionals, when they prepare a new
problem or plead relevant cases in courts.
Carla Sieburgh* – Balázs Fekete**
Guest Editorial Preface:
Symposium of The Ius Commune Casebook 
on European Law and Private Law
7 n
*   Carla Sieburgh is justice in the civil senate of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands and professor of Private
Law, in particular the influences of European Law on national private law at Radboud University, Nijmegen 
(e-mail: c.sieburgh@jur.ru.nl).
** Balázs Fekete is senior lecturer in law at ELTE University, Faculty of Law, Centre for Theory of Law and Society
(e-mail: fekete.balazs@ajk.elte.hu).
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To make the Casebook known to the potentially interested audience, three symposia were
held as soon as the first months of 2017; the first one in April in The Peace Palace, The Hague,
the Netherlands; while the second one was in May in the Palazzo Aldobrandini, Unidroit,
Rome, Italy. Finally, the idea of promoting the Casebook in Central Europe was an important
motivation for the editors and the authors, too. We were therefore very happy when the
Eötvös Loránd University Law Faculty invited us to organise a similar symposium dedicated
to the Casebook. This book-promotion conference, more than four hours long, was held on
19 June 2017 and it proved to be a great success from the aspect of both academic discussion
and the involvement of national professionals. In the first four sections of the event, some of
the editors and the authors (Arthur Hartkamp, Carla Sieburgh, Wouter Devroe and Balázs
Fekete) presented the main points of their chapters and each presentation was followed by the
comments of a Hungarian expert (Attila Menyhárd, Réka Somssich, Gábor Fejes and Miklós
Boronkay) and an intensive discussion. The closing section of the conference was a roundtable
talk on the Casebook as such, with the participation of Hungarian professionals (Róbert
Dezső, attorney; Veronika Guba, judge; Anikó Kátai, head of department at the Ministry of
Justice; Endre Orbán, law clerk at the Constitutional Court; and Márton Varju, EU law expert
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), who welcomed the book and explained its utility for
their respective fields. This discussion revealed important professional insights and confirmed
the original intent of the editors to targeting practising professionals besides the academic
community.
As a main point, the participants and the audience learnt, at the end of the conference,
that Western and Central-European lawyers struggle with the same problems when dealing
with the national cases in which EU law provisions are involved. And, this seems to be equally
important, too, one of the conclusions was that ‘we now know that we are not alone’ when
improving and refining the European legal community when dealing with individual and
country-specific cases.
We are very pleased that some participants prepared their contributions or interventions
in a written form for those who could not attend the event. We are also very grateful to the
Editorial Board and the Editors of the ELTE Law Journal who made it possible to publish
these pieces in this journal as a separate section. This section contains seven shorter pieces
and each of them is dedicated to one specific aspect of the Casebook. However, they cannot
be regarded as mechanical recapitulations of certain chapters. They all give rise to new
questions, ideas or doubts. That is, they all contribute to the discourse on the common law
of Europe and, thereby, they also enhance and strengthen it – in line with the original intent
behind the birth of the series of Ius Commune Casebooks.
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • CARLA SIEBURGH – BALÁZS FEKETE
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* Prof. dr. Arthur S. Hartkamp is professor of European Private Law at Radboud University, Nijmegen, The
Netherlands (e-mail: a.hartkamp@jur.ru.nl).
During a symposium at ELTE University in Budapest in June 2017, we celebrated the launch
of the Casebook on European Law and Private Law. This book has appeared with Hart
Publishing, Oxford (now an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing). It is a volume in the well-
known Series Ius Commune Casebooks for the common law of Europe, and that is correct
because it is a book on comparative law; however, it differs in some respects from other
volumes in the Series.
The book has been written by an international group of some fifteen jurists covering ten
legal systems of EU member states, who originate from Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. I may say that we have worked
quickly: between 2012 and 2015 we had seven plenary meetings of two days and one meeting
of a week’s length on the chapters to be edited by Carla Sieburgh, Wouter Devroe and me, and
the secretary of our Group, Roel van Leuken. The real work, namely the writing of the
chapters, occurred between those sessions. It was a most interesting experience, in particular
because we had to find our way along paths largely untrodden between the lands of European
law and national private law.  
The book is about the influence of European Union Law on national private law. It is
based on four choices.
I. We have been concerned with the law in force, not with law in the making; with soft law,
with principles of European contract law and the like. Studies in those fields are often
conducted under the flag of European private law. They are a part of comparative law, based
on the comparison of the different systems of private law in force in Europe and they sketch
a  possible future common private law across Europe. In our endeavour, we were not
concerned with that type of European private law. We decided to give preference to European
law in force, the law of the European Union, and the ways in which that law interacts with the
private law in force in the EU member states. 
II. Most private law of European origin is condensed in secondary law, in particular direc -
tives. Think of consumer law, of labour law, of company law, of copyright law. Those directives
are implemented in national laws in the member States of the Union. After that
implementation they may also be called European private law, but in a sense different from
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the previous one, because they are European private law in force. In principle, this Casebook
does not deal with directives and implementing national laws, although subject to some
features that are interesting precisely because these laws find their origin in EU law. Those
interesting features belong to the realm of primary EU law, e.g. harmonious interpretation,
references by national Courts to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) and Francovich liability.
III. Now we hit the mark: the third and most basic choice is that this book is concerned with
primary EU law and its interactions with national private law. In our view, European private
law in force is not only private law governed by sources of European secondary law. Primary
law must also be taken into account when studying the impact of EU law on national private
law. Restricting ourselves to primary EU law is the most original choice: describing the
application of primary European law to private law relationships.
The objective pursued by this book is to show the community of lawyers, especially
private lawyers, what they too often omit in their analyses, the application of primary EU law
in a horizontal situation. This omission is quite understandable. Primary European law is
nearly exclusively public law. Its effects on private law are uncertain and obscure, as they are
predominantly laid down in the case law of the CJEU. That case law is often unclear and
unsystematic. And there are hardly any systematic books on the subject. 
IV. And there is a fourth choice. As I mentioned, the interactions between primary EU law and
private law are dealt with in the case law of the EU Court of Justice in judgments that provide
answers to questions referred to the CJEU by national courts. After the CJEU has issued its
answers, the case continues in the member state from where the preliminary question
originated. Strange as it may seem, many of the follow-up cases in the national jurisdictions are
not published, at any rate not across the EU in accessible languages, and consequently they
are not studied in other member states. And what is true for the follow-up cases is even more
true for other national case law, applying EU law without a reference to the CJEU. Frankly
speaking, we do not know much about how EU law is applied by national courts across member
states. From a recent comparative study with a limited scope – between Dutch and Belgian case
law – it became clear that national courts deal with EU law in quite different manners. So the
final choice was to concentrate on national case law and study the differences between civil
courts applying EU law in EU member states  
For that reason we choose the formula of a casebook and we were very happy to find
a place in the famous Series of Casebooks on the Common Law of Europe founded by
Professor Walter van Gerven, until 2015 the living example of a felicitous combination of EU
law and private law scholarship. He passed away while we were making this book ready for
the press. So in the end this is a book of comparative law, but not based on a comparison of
national private law systems, but (starting from EU primary law as a point of reference) finding
out the ways national private law courts deal with EU primary law.
Each chapter starts with a brief description of the actual state of affairs in the case law of
the CJEU. Then, in order to find a common approach to deal with the national cases, we
proceeded on the basis of a distinction made between a number of ways in which a rule of EU
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ARTHUR HARTKAMP
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law may impact on a national private law situation. This distinction is set out in Chapter 1 of
the Casebook. We distinguish between direct horizontal effect and various types of indirect
horizontal effects. By direct horizontal effect, we mean that a rule of EU law directly impacts
on the content of a relationship between individuals, creating, modifying or extinguishing
rights or obligations between those individuals. By indirect horizontal effects we mean several
distinct types of impact, which should be carefully distinguished, e.g. interpreting concepts
or rules of national private law in conformity with EU law or by assessing the compatibility
of national legislative rules with rules of EU law, the result of which may affect the relationship
between individuals. These concepts of direct and indirect horizontal effect are not cast in
stone; everyone may categorise them according to his or her own preferences, but the message
here is that there must be some kind of categorisation, otherwise it will be much more difficult
to understand how the impact of EU law on private law is structured and which different
types of impact exist.
After this introductory first chapter there are six chapters dealing with the major building
blocks of which primary EU law is composed (from the perspective of our field of research).
These chapters deal with
– competition law (art 101 ff TFEU) (Chapter 2);
– horizontal effects of the fundamental freedoms (Chapter 3);
– the Treaty rules on non-discrimination, in particular art. 18 (nationality) and 157 TFEU
(equal pay for men and woman) (Chapter 4);
– the general principles of EU law (effectiveness, legal certainty, proportionality, non-
discrimination, abuse of rights, unjust enrichment etc., which – insofar as they cover
fundamental rights – must nowadays be viewed in relationship with the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Rights ECHR) (Chapter 5);
– rules of EU primary law relating to the implementation, interpretation and effects of
private law directives (Chapter 6); and 
– the ex officio interpretation of rules of EU law by national courts (Chapter 7). Here, for
systematic reasons, we deal both with primary law (art. 101 TFEU) and directives, in
particular the well-known case law of the CJEU on consumer protection directives. We think
that, in order to understand the phenomenon of ex officio interpretation, it is helpful to
consider the connection between primary and secondary EU law.
What this book wants to convey is our view that it is important for private law jurists to
familiarise themselves with at least part of primary EU law. That knowledge is important for
lawyers working in the practice of the law as well as for judges. Any lawyer and any court
dealing with private law cases may come across problems of EU law reaching out well beyond
the clearly defined domains of private law directives. 
I would like to add that it works also the other way round: EU lawyers would be well
advised to become more acquainted with private law. On the one hand, private law arguments
can contribute to the development of EU law. On the other, the effectiveness of EU law can
be enhanced by using the instruments and remedies of private law. 
INTRODUCTION n
11 n
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During the symposium we have tried to elucidate these propositions in three programme
parts on fundamental freedoms, competition law and ex officio application in relation to the
implementation of directives. Each of these parts consisted of an introduction given by
a member of our group, followed by a reaction from one or several experts from outside the
group.
It is the intention of the editors to continue to follow the developments addressed in this
book. Users of the Casebook are invited to get in contact with us, either directly or through
the website of the Casebook Project (www.casebooks.eu), to share with us the developments
in the case law of their national jurisdictions which might be interesting for a second edition
of this book.
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ARTHUR HARTKAMP
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Attila Menyhárd*
Taking European (Private) Law Seriously
13 n
* Attila Menyhárd (PhD, Dr. habil.) is professor of law at the Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law, Department
of Civil Law (e-mail: menyhard@ajk.elte.hu).
1 Walter Wilburg, Entwicklung eines beweglichen Systems im Bürgerlichen Recht (Rede gehalten bei der Inauguration
als Rector Magnificus der Karl-Franzens-Universität in Graz am 22 November 1950) (Karl-Franzens-Universität
1950, Graz) and Walter Wilburg, ‘Zusammenspiel der Kräfte im Aufbau des Schuldrechts’ (1964) 163 AcP 346–
379, 364ff.; B. A. Koch, ‘Wilburg’s Flexible System in a Nutshell’ in H. Koziol, B. C. Steininger (eds), European Tort
Law 2001 – Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook (ECTIL 2002, Wien, 545–548) 545ff.
I The Flexible System of Private Law
Normally, we divide our legal systems into public law and private law. Although the public-
private divide as a conceptual framework for law may be held artificial and obsolete, the
structural distinction of legal relationships between individuals on the one hand and legal
relationships of individuals and public authorities on the other hand is useful from a didactic
point of view and also because the relationships of the individual vis-à-vis the legislator
and administrative bodies are certainly different than those toward other individuals.
Conceptualising, as the book does, legal relationships that establish rights and obligations
between individuals as ‘horizontal relationships’, contrasted with ‘vertical relationships’
between individuals and public authorities avoids the difficulties emerging from the public-
private divide. I find the conceptual framework of the book, distinguishing direct and indirect
effects of European law in a horizontal legal relationship, as a crucial and far-reaching one,
especially because it allows private law to be approached as a flexible system. As it has been
described by Walter Wilburg, private law is a system built upon open rules,1 which leave
a wide power to the courts and allow them to establish and use their proper guidelines to
adjudicate cases and adapt the practice to changing social circumstances. Private law, as a law
in action, is a flexible system in which the courts apply complex criteria in the course of
deciding cases. This flexible system of open rules allows the courts to assess the case by
weighing the underlying and relevant social values as well. In this model, the judgements of
the courts are the result of weighing the relevant evaluation factors. The values that are to be
considered under the given circumstances have different weights in each case. The basic
evaluation, which is provided normally (but not necessarily) by the legislator, can be overruled
by the courts on the basis of other relevant values if they outweigh the basic evaluation. The
abstract rules, wide concepts and general clauses of private law make it possible to apply this
flexible system while maintaining consistency in the conceptual framework of written law.
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II Legislation vs Court Practice
Scholarship mostly limits itself to analysing directives and relevant regulations while
addressing the effects of European law in private law. Many times, this approach prevents the
professional community not only from coming to useful conclusions regarding the impact of
European law on private law but also from understanding the nature of private law and the
mechanisms that shape it. Such a limited approach also would prevent us from understanding
what European law is. Understanding the nature of indirect effects in horizontal relationship
opens the way for mapping such effects, not only over an unusually wide range (covering such
general and central elements of private law as abuse of rights or unjust enrichment, and going
beyond competition law, contract law and non-discrimination) but it also opens the way for
an in-depth analysis as well. Although we normally focus on what the content of law is, it is
also important what the content isn’t. The preparatory phase of the Anti-Trust Damages
Directive revealed that introducing punitive damages was rejected by the European
jurisdictions. Such a  measure of enforcement is incompatible with national laws. The
Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules adopted
on 2 April 20082 explicitly abandoned the idea of introducing multiple damages, which had
been suggested in the Commission Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC
antitrust rules,3 as a result of consultation because, under the consultation procedure, most
of the respondents suggested that damages should be regarded as a compensatory instrument.4
Having regard to the model of the flexible system in private law, the private law of the
European law cannot be assessed without analysing the relevant court practice of the CJEU
and the national courts. That is why the impacts of the practice of the CJEU can be extremely
far-reaching; for example, in Hungary, the liability for damages of the Member State for failure
to implement directives, established in the Francovich case,5 is the strongest argument in
professional discussions for establishing the liability of the State for damages for improper
legislation.6 From this angle, the practice of the CJEU is an important factor in revisiting state
immunity doctrines at national level, pointing at the substance of the rule of law and
sovereignty, which is the raison d’être for the European Union too. As the result of the in-
depth analysis attempted by the editors and the contributors, the book aims to reveal the
impacts of European legislative measures at the level of national law as well. This approach is
of fundamental importance as well: if one assumes that European law is the law of the
European community, which definitely is how we would like to see it and which implies that
Europe is a community, European law is not to be contrasted with national laws but national
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ATTILA MENYHÁRD
n 14
2 COM (2008) 165, 2.4.2008.
3 COM (2005) 672, 19.12.2005.
4 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2008) 404, 2.4.2008 nr. 182.
5 Case C-6 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357.
6 Fülöp Györgyi, ‘Az állam kártérítési felelőssége a közösségi jog megsértése esetén’ (2003) 5 (5) Polgári Jogi
Kodifikáció 18–23.
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law and community laws are to be seen as constituting European law. In other words, national
law is not outside European law but is part of it. From the internal logic of European law, it
would even follow that national laws create European law.
III The Limits of Harmonisation
Harmonisation with legislative measures certainly has its limits, as is clearly presented in
company law. The Company Law Directives attempt to harmonise company law without
providing a normative concept of company, which results in fragmented regulation on the
national level, as different rules are to apply to public limited companies (or companies limited
by shares) and private limited companies (or limited liability companies), even on aspects
where the differences are not justified by the legal nature of these types of company. Such
inconsistency could be avoided at national level, simply by extending the harmonised rules to
other company forms, too. The Rabobank case also shed a light upon the relationship between
national court practice and European legislation. One of the primary aims of the First
Company Law Directive was to adopt the German model of unrestricted power of
representation of the members of the board (in Art. 9.) by making a distinction between third
party relationships and the internal regime. The First Directive did not provide European
regulation for the existence of the power of representation but gave protection to third parties.
The Directive could not, however, cover abuse of the power of representation or similar
concepts under national laws if the third party was aware of the violation of a standard
applicable to the company and acted against the interest of the company. In the Rabobank
case, the CJEU accepted that member states may provide exceptions for cases on conflicts of
interest and believed that there is a lacuna concerning those situations where the third party
knew or should have known of the conflict of interest (e.g. violation of an internal standard
or prohibition).7
IV The Role of Indirect Convergence — a Method for Harmonisation?
I think that it is a very important insight that while it is basically the CJEU that shapes private
law at European level, it however also depends on how we conceptualise ‘European Law’. If we
do it as a bundle of legislative instruments produced by the regulatory bodies of the European
Union, including the Treaties, this is correct. However, if we take the phenomenon of indirect
convergence into account as well, the landscape is much more complex. National courts as
well as national legislators follow the answers given to the same problem in other jurisdictions
in Europe and try to adjust themselves to the mainstream. A good example could be the
TAKING EUROPEAN (PRIVATE) LAW SERIOUSLY n
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7 Case C-104/96 Coöperatieve Rabobank “Vecht en Plassengebied” BA v Erik Aarnoud Minderhoud [1997] ECR I-
7211.
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change of the Hungarian court practice on wrongful life claims: the claims of the handicapped
child vis-à-vis the doctors for failure to reveal the genetic or teratological harm were accepted
in Hungary, but when the Supreme Court realised that such claims, especially after the Loi
Perruche in France, are rejected in almost all European jurisdictions, it declared that it revised
its practice and such claims are no longer accepted in Hungary.8 Another example could be
the liability for ‘wrongful trading’ in company law and bankruptcy law. While lifting the
corporate veil referring to the general clause of prohibition of abuse of rights, the Hungarian
Supreme Court explicitly pointed to the relevant practice of German courts and the German
doctrine of Durchgriffshaftung.9 By introducing the liability of de facto or ‘shadow’ directors
for the debts of an insolvent company, the Hungarian legislator followed the European
models.10
Sometimes it is rather difficult to establish if results in national law are the impacts of
European law or the situation is the reverse. The content of most of the directives addressing
private law is the result of compromises on the ground of solutions already established in
national laws. Harmonisation is not about innovation but it is about looking for a common
denominator in the European legal systems. The 13/1993 EEC Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts has been adopted after the AGB-Gesetz in Germany (1976), the Unfair
Contract Terms Act (1977) in the UK, the ‘Scrivener’ Act in France (1978) introduced
protection against abusive contract terms in the main national legal systems of the European
Community. The approach of the German, the French and the British legislator were not the
same: there were significant differences on whether protection was limited to consumers
contracts or not, protection was extended to contract terms that were individually negotiated
or restricted to standard contract terms and if the main test of unenforceability was
unreasonableness or non-compliance with the principle of good faith and fair dealing (Treu
und Glauben). The intersection of these legislations was the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
(1993), except the choice of adopting the German test of good faith and fair dealing instead
of the reasonableness test of the British solution. Although the reasonableness test could be
seen as considerably different to that of the German ‘good faith and fair dealing’ one, strong
arguments were formulated that this would not have brought significant changes in practice.11
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ATTILA MENYHÁRD
n 16
8 Supreme Court, Unificatory Resolution no. 1/2008, 12 March 2008.
9 Supreme Court, Legf. Bír. Gfv. II. 31.962/1998. sz., EBH 1999. 118.
10 On the ground of § 33/A subs. (1)–(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, persons who actually influenced the resolutions of
the company may be held liable for the company’s debts towards the creditors in the event of insolvency.
11 Elizabeth Macdonald, ‘Mapping the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts’ [1994] Journal of Business Law 441–462.
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V Deep Impacts of European Private Law
I agree that a  shortage of knowledge concerning European law can be an obstacle to
implementing and enforcing it. A good example could be product liability, where national
courts are obviously reluctant to draw the consequences of the maximum harmonisation
established by the CJEU.12 According to the CJEU, if the claim falls under the scope of product
liability, the national court is prevented from applying parallel regimes of national law, even
if the alternative could be more beneficial for the victim. If one takes the conclusion of the
judgements handed down by the CJEU seriously, this certainly overwrites the liability regimes
of all of the European jurisdictions, even if such far-reaching consequences would presumably
go beyond the aims of the European legislator. Such impacts are hardly recognisable in
European jurisdictions.
Another important deep impact on national law was the CJEU judgement in the landmark
Courage v Crehan case.13 The CJEU in this case established that enforcement of European
competition law has a priority over a doctrine preventing the party from giving voluntary
consent to a contract that violated public policy. European courts normally maintain doctrines
that prevent the party from referring to the invalidity of the contract if the party was aware
of the ground of invalidity at time of contracting. As it has been formulated in the famous
sentence of Lord Chief Justice Wilmot in a beautiful way, ‘all writers upon our law agree in this,
no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice’ (Collins v Blantern, 1767). The
CJEU, in Courage v Crehan, clearly established that this doctrine is called in pari delicto in
English contract law but such doctrines are inherent parts of most European jurisdictions
under the scope of application of the general clause of ‘good faith and fair dealing’. Overruling
national public policy with Community public policy, the CJEU clearly established that
English courts (and, consequently, the courts of other Member States) are prevented from
referring to this doctrine. If the consequences of the CJEU judgement in Courage v Crehan
were drawn consistently in Europe, it certainly would have resulted in a fundamental change
to an important pillar of contract law in national laws. This did not happen and I don’t think
that the reason for the reluctance of national courts to implement the consequences of
Courage v Crehan is simply a lack of awareness of the community of legal professionals. 
I think that the basic question here is whether the European Union does have the authority to
introduce such fundamental changes in private law or to destroy the consistency of private law
by creating ad hoc exceptions to fundamental doctrines of private law. That is, the boundaries
of legitimacy of CJEU judgements influencing private law are unclear. The same question of
legitimacy concerning compensable non-pecuniary loss was at stake in the Leitner case14 but
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the consequences of accepting lost holiday experiences as a compensable non-pecuniary loss
were much more limited and presumably less important.
For me, one of the most important messages of the approach presented in the book is the
importance of interpretation. I believe that interpreting the norm cannot be distinguished
from making it. Interpretation is about establishing the content of the norm, which is the
same as creating it. That is, the requirement of interpretation of national law in conformity
with a directive can also be seen as a direct application and a direct effect. The specific role
of open norms of national law in this respect, addressed by the contributors as well, is
a complex issue and still open for further analyses. 
If the norms of European law are of a mandatory nature, is a difficult issue and drives us
back to the ‘opening’, i.e., European law is not private law but public law. Norms of public law
are mandatory in nature. They are not default rules. If provisions defining default rules in
national law are, however, unclear from this point of view, the internal logic does not help,
because default rules are also created by the same legislative power as for mandatory rules.
For instance, according to the relevant rule of the Hungarian Civil Code, the parties are free
to establish rights and obligations in their contract within the limits of mandatory rules of
contract law. We also think that a rule establishing rights and obligations between the parties
is of a mandatory nature only if the law provides so. The European legislator does not provide
such qualifications. That is, it is the task of the national legislator to make sure that European
rules would not be interpreted as default rules but as mandatory norms.
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Equality goes to the heart of the law. It is a prescript that has to be observed in order to reach
a level of justice that citizens indeed perceive as justice.
Many perceive non-discrimination as a ‘soft’, social value: discrimination is its hard-core
restriction. It therefore does not come as a surprise that equality grew into a core element of
EU law in general and of the decisions of the European Court of Justice in particular.
Conscious creatures like human beings1 have a perfect intuition for equality – which goes
with an intuition for discrimination. As long as they perceive a relevant difference, they accept
differences in treatment. Such treatment is not perceived as being unequal. As soon as the
relevance of a difference fades, the acceptance of differences in treatment equally fades. The
situation becomes instable. It’s the end of peaceful coexistence.
The story of equality discussed in this contribution anchors with Chapters 4 and 5.II of
the Casebook. Besides, it shows the structure of the other chapters and ways to make use of
their content.
The casebook presents what national judges manage to construct with the building blocks
provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the case law of the
Court of Justice, the General Principles of EU law, the Charter, the directives, national private
law, the arguments of the private parties involved and their own well-informed common
sense. Case law is reported in terms of facts, the legal relationship concerned, the techniques
and mechanisms of EU law and national law, the substance of rules of EU law and national law
and the substantive implications for the horizontal relationships, including the available
remedies.
As equality directly relates to the intuition of citizens, judges receive much help from the
private parties involved. As an example, in EU law, free movement is perceived as funda -
mental. The awakening of freedom of movement provisions in the sphere of private law
directly relates to private parties being discriminated against by other private parties.
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Regarding the free movement of workers being an essential part of EU law in general,
Angonese and Köbler did not care a  straw. Angonese grew angry for not being equally
acknowledged as a person who was fluent in German,2 and the Austrian citizen Köbler could
not stand that his teaching experience acquired at a German university was not of similar
value as the teaching experience his colleagues had acquired in Austrian universities.3 The
intuition of private parties for equality has always been a powerful motor for the development
of EU private law.
I Article 18 TFEU
One of the findings presented in the Casebook is that Article 18 TFEU has practical relevance.
Judges apply Article 18 TFEU, the general prohibition to discriminate on grounds of
nationality, independently from provisions on free movement. They do so more often than
expected. Moreover, we found that judges employ the direct horizontal effect produced by
Articles 18 and 157 TFEU. In the hands of individuals and judges, these provisions serve as
an excellent crowbar.
Regarding Article 18 TFEU, a  basketball player from Greece came to Belgium and
concluded a contract with a Belgian basketball club. Under this contract, the player was obliged
to play basketball. Besides however, the regulations of the Belgian basketball federation formed
part of the contract. One of its provisions excluded non-Belgian basketball players from
national and provincial basketball divisions. Nevertheless, the Greek basketball player wanted
to perform his contractual obligations. He managed to rely on his right provided for by Article
18 TFEU. The Belgian court applied Article 18 TFEU directly to the horizontal relationship
between the Greek player and the Belgian club, as well as to the horizontal relationship be -
tween the Greek player and the Belgian federation.
The discriminatory contractual clause (flowing from the regulations of the federation)
between the player and the club was set aside, so the basketball player could perform his
obligations. Moreover the judge stressed the importance of the prescripts of Article 18 TFEU
by granting an injunction against the Belgian basketball federation. Granting this injunction
meant that the federation would act unlawfully if it maintained the provision in its regulation
concerning non-Belgian citizens.4
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II Article 157 TFEU
It is well known that, disregarding the literary text of Article 157 TFEU, private parties can
directly rely on Article 157 TFEU and invoke the right to be equally paid. They can enforce
that right before the national judge in a dispute with another private party, their employer.
Men may equally be protected as women. If the collective agreement concluded between
an employer and an employee contains a  provision granting single mothers a  nursery
allowance, Article 157 TFEU gives a single father the right to the same nursery allowance.
That such ab allowance goes against the text of the provision in the collective agreement
means that this clause is violating Article 157 TFEU. The French national court, applying
general private law, declared the provision null and void for that reason. The next step was to
fill the gap created by the nullity. The national court substituted the invalid provision by
operation of law, so that in similar situations male employees are paid the same allowance as
enjoyed by female employees.5
III The Principle of Non-discrimination
The next observation is to be found in the field of the principle of non-discrimination as
a general principle of EU law. The CJEU devised, in its Mangold and Kücücdeveci decisions,
a way that avoids problems encountered in the event that a relationship between private
parties is governed by a provision of national law while this provision is not in conformity with
a directive. The CJEU consistently held that in a relationship between individuals, the national
judge is not allowed to review the provision of national law against the directive. This implies
that private parties in a dispute with other private parties may rely on their national law –
whether it is in conformity with the directive or not. Their expectations based on current
national law are protected. The other side of the coin is that they lack the protection granted
by the directive.
Regarding the prohibition to discriminate on the grounds of age however, the CJEU
created the possibility to review the national provision against this general principle of EU law.
If the national provision is at variance with the general principle of non-discrimination on the
grounds of age, the national provision has to be set aside. The first question is how national
judges manage to apply the remaining provisions and to reach a result that is in conformity
with the prescripts of equality. They appear to manage beautifully by applying subtle private
law doctrines as partial nullity, geltungserhaltende Reduktion, substitution and reasonableness
and fairness. I refer to the casebook for details.6
The second question is how they deal with protecting the legitimate expectations of the
private party that faces duties under the new legal situation – for example the duty of 
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the employer to employ an employee five years longer than expected. National judges take the
legitimate expectations into consideration but this interest outweighed the interest of
upholding non-discrimination in none of the reported cases. To justify this result, judges refer
to the majority in legal doctrine. Legal scholarship explained, during the national legislative
process, why the designed national provision was obviously violating the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age. Employers are therefore expected to be aware of the legal
literature. Even more importantly, they are expected to anticipate national law not being in
conformity with EU law and to observe EU law while entering into a horizontal relationship,
for example a labour contract.7
IV Making Use of the Sources
There are many more interesting, enticing and amusing results to report. In almost all cases
it has been a difficult job to collect them, and in many cases it was even harder to construe
them. The editors and authors of the Casebook explored new ground. My final observation
elaborates on the question of who may make use of the treasures hidden in this book. My
answer is anyone: private parties, lawyers, judges, legislators, legal scholars and students who
are interested in or obliged to deal with EU law and private law or who are looking for
innovative arguments. The book presents cases followed by analyses and general observations
in the fields of competition, free movement, non-discrimination, general principles of EU law
and ex officio application. Who is looking for new arguments may start from the general
observations to find steppingstones in the related cases and to apply insights in the case at
hand.
V Example: Ways to Avoid Discrimination of Nationals 
of Other Member States
I give an example. Questions that in practice have arisen rather frequently are how to deal with
national law that results in treating nationals of the own Member State more favourably than
nationals of other Member States, and, the other way around, how to deal with EU law that
results in treating nationals of other Member States more favourably compared to nationals
of the judges’ own Member State.
National law that treats its own nationals more favourably than nationals of other
Member States clearly infringes EU law. That is a fact. But do national systems adjust? And,
if so, how do they?
They do. The German judge, for example, was not afraid to broaden the application of
Article 19 of the German Constitution, granting ‘domestic legal persons’ basic rights (in this
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • CARLA SIEBURGH
n 22
7 See Hartkamp, Sieburgh, Devroe (n 4), Case 5.9 (GERM).
ELJ_2017-1__0  2018.06.07.  16:48  Page 22
case the right of ownership). The judge relied on the technique of ‘extended application’ to
have an Italian company protected by this provision. The concept of ‘domestic legal person’
in Germany thus covers legal persons from other Member States.8 The Belgian judge faced
comparable problems in relation to the term ‘foreigner’. If he were to apply the provisions of
national law to all foreigners then he would treat citizens of other Member States less
favourably than Belgian citizens. The judge therefore excluded nationals of other Member
States from the definition of ‘foreigner’.9
Both judges explicitly referred to the requirements set by EU law and neither of them
considered the EU law-friendly extended application or exclusion to be contra legem. Parties
and lawyers may bring such findings to the attention of judges from other Member States.
Judges may feel reassured if they themselves try to mould the law as it stands in conformity
with the requirements set by EU law.
VI Example: Ways to Avoid Reverse Discrimination
I want to pay attention to one other possibility for national law to be developed by all legal
actors on the basis of findings in this casebook. EU law does not prevent nationals of
a Member State from being treated under their national laws less favourably than nationals
of other Member States under EU law and national law. The problem of reverse discrimination
is a matter of internal law of each Member State. In Austria, Belgium and Italy, nationals are
protected against reverse discrimination by the national constitution or by the case law of
the constitutional court.10 The effect is that a private party may enjoy similar protection under
national law as nationals of other Member States would derive from EU law.
These practices may be a mirror for other Member States that, until now, have kept on
applying less favourable rules to purely internal situations. Readers of the Ius Commune
Casebook on EU law and Private Law – students, individuals, practitioners and scholars – can
rely on such findings to invite national legal systems to take the next step towards more
equality.
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I On the Outstanding Role of Ius Commune Casebooks in General 
and on Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. II. of the Ius Commune
Casebook on European Law and Private Law in Particular
Most of the law books and academic works on EU law focus on the evolving case-law of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the interpretation it gives in its
preliminary rulings on certain provisions of primary or secondary legislation. Less attention
has been given to what happens behind the scenes, at the level of national litigation, where
EU law is in fact in action and is applied and interpreted by the national jurisdictions. That is
why Ius Commune casebooks are peculiar, because they look behind and provide a compara -
tive view of national case-law and this particular volume does it with regard to the inter -
pretation and application of EU provisions influencing private law relationships. This
comparative approach gives a new insight into EU law because we have little knowledge of
cases where national judges were confident enough to interpret EU law themselves without
seeking preliminary ruling and we do not really see either what happens in follow-up cases
at national level after the judgment of the CJEU was delivered. National judges are however
important actors in the European judicial framework because they are fully-fledged
interpreters of EU law: at the level of non-last instance courts, definitely, while at the level of
last instance courts, when invoking and applying the CILFIT criteria. The publicity and
availability of national court decisions interpreting EU law is however restricted, they seldom
cross the country borders, although they could serve as further inspiration for other Member
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States’ courts, which, instead of seizing the CJEU, would follow them if agreeing with the
interpretation provided.2
This is why this book is of major importance because it leads us to a partly undiscovered
and hidden horizon of EU law, a horizon which however is the closest to us, to our everyday
legal dealings at national level. 
In order to illustrate that peculiar aspect, of national case law applying EU law in private
law relationships, the very first national case reported under Chapter 4 on ‘Non-discrimination
provisions in the TFEU’ could already be raised. The reader might easily be shocked to find
out that the Court of First Instance of Brussels in a decision of 19923 already ruled that the
regulations of the Belgian basketball federation not to allow non-Belgian citizens to
participate at national and provincial basketball divisions are against the principle of non-
discrimination and this, three years earlier than when the Court delivered its famous
judgment in the Bosman case,4 triggering an overwhelming change in the world of sports
based on the principle on non-discrimination. It is true that the Dona judgment5 of the CJEU
of 20 years earlier already found national quotas in sport federation regulations as non-
conform with the Treaty provisions; that decision still left the door open for exceptions with
vague and confusing wording referring to non-economic reasons. The Court of First Instance
of Brussels was however quite explicit to blame national quotas. It was as explicit as the
CJEU some years later.
A question therefore logically arises: was the Brussels court right not to ask the CJEU
about the interpretation of the non-discrimination principle in the given case? The answer is
debatable. Yes, of course it was right, because it could arrive at a correct and valid interpretation
by itself, which was later even confirmed at the level of the CJEU in the Bosman judgment and
other subsequent cases that fine-tuned the principle. On the other hand, however the reported
case demonstrates that interpretations of national courts – even if correct – remain isolated
until they are confirmed by the CJEU, the decisions of which are erga omnes with binding
effect all over the EU. It means that if the Brussels court had referred its questions on the
interpretation of the non-discrimination principle with regard to the national quotas to the
CJEU, the clarification of the Dona judgment could have happened somewhat earlier.
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The importance of national cases cannot and should not therefore be underestimated. As
the relevant chapters of the book clearly demonstrate, they show the national courts’ general
attitude in the application of EU law: they might echo CJEU interpretations in a faithful
manner, with a confident interpretation, they might advance later decisions of the CJEU and
in some cases they broaden or tighten the limits of EU law. 
The way the cases are presented in the book helps a lot in discovering this attitude: the
targeted summary of the national cases reported is accompanied by the notes of the author, giving
a focused analysis on the national courts’ reasoning and findings, underlined why the decision
influenced the private law relationship at hand. Cross references in the notes showing parallelism
or even contradiction between national case-law further contributes to seeing the interrelations
and interactions at the level of the Member States’ jurisdictions. Each case has a short but very
targeted ‘nickname’ which not only brings the cases closer to the reader but also makes recalling
them easier. Reading through the cases is even more interesting, because they embrace several
decades, from the late 70s until the most recent judgments delivered in the 2010s.
It is self-evident that the principle of non-discrimination – being one of the major guiding
principles of EU law – has an important role in the structure of the Book. It is analysed in two
different chapters, both written by Professor Carla Sieburgh. Chapter 4 is devoted entirely to
the application of the explicit non-discrimination principles enshrined in the Treaty, in Article
18 TFEU (the general prohibition clause on any discrimination based on nationality) and
Article 157 TFEU (on equal pay for men and women). While part II of Chapter 5 deals with
the non-discrimination as a general principle of EU law and as a provision of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. 
This deliberate choice of the author, of treating the different incarnations of the principle
in distinct places helps a  lot in understanding the real nature and complexity of non-
discrimination as it appears under EU law and will be of great help to university lecturers
when teaching about the principle.
II The Structure, Approach and Conclusions of Chapter 4
Right at the very beginning of Chapter 4, the author makes it clear what the chapter is about
and what it does not cover, and why the non-discrimination principle matters in private law
relationships. This very lucid and targeted approach of the author is of great help to the reader
in understanding the logic of the different non-discrimination provisions and in following
the national cases, which are split into four categories depending on the mechanism used by
the national judge concerning the given horizontal relationship.6 The national decisions
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analysed in the chapter are cases where the non-discrimination principle had a considerable
influence on private law relationships but without the support of any other EU law provision,
whether on a free movement provision or a directive. In order to understand the real nature
of the TFEU articles concerned, the Chapter starts with a focused presentation of Article 18
TFEU, Article 157 TEFU (and, to the extent necessary, Article 19 TFEU) by citing the relevant
legal literature and outlining the CJEU case-law.
The different legal effect of the non-discrimination provisions is underlined throughout
the chapters. While Article 18 and 157 TFEU do have a horizontal direct effect, i.e. they can
have a direct impact on private law relationships between individuals, the principle of non-
discrimination, as a general principle of EU law, does not have such an effect but in no way it
does mean that it cannot have an impact on private law relationships: if national law is found
in conflict with the principle and is disapplied by the national court then it may alter
horizontal relationships too: contractual clauses can be set aside, injunctions can be ordered,
damages might be awarded or employment contracts of a fixed period should be turned into
contracts of indefinite period and employees must be allowed to continue working. 
In fact, the analysis of national case-law very much focuses on the different types of
consequences resulting from the application of the non-discrimination principle in a private
law context. That is because it is at the level of legal consequences where national case-law
really matters, as the sanctions to be imposed or the remedies to be applied in the event of
violating the non-discrimination principle are always in the hands of national courts. The
CJEU provides an interpretation and it is the national judge who is in charge of giving full
effect to the norm as interpreted by the CJEU within the limits of its own legal system. The
question of whether the consequences and remedies are adequate and effective from an EU
law perspective and whether they pass the filter of EU law can be the subject of subsequent
appeals at national level or even of new preliminary references. 
The analysis and evaluation of the legal consequences applied by national courts is
without any doubt the most unique and exciting aspect of the chapter. The author approaches
these sanctions, remedies and consequences from this specific perspective. The mere non-
application of contractual terms or collective agreements violating EU law does not always
amount to appropriate remedies at the level of individuals. In certain cases they are not
effective. When analysing a decision of 2007 by the Cour de cassation,7 which found that
denying male workers who were in a similar situation as single women raising a child from
taking up permanent employment was against EU law, the author herself questions whether
disapplying the rule should be seen as an effective remedy in the absence of a vacancy for
posts that a male employee could fill. In such cases, awarding damages should be seen as an
effective complementary remedy at the level of individuals.8
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Another interesting example of this kind outlined in the chapter is the follow-up of the
Angonese case.9 Who would have thought that the decision of the CJEU had been followed
by two appeals bringing the case up to the Corte di Cassazione in Italy and these appeals were
about the adequate consequences? In the original case, the CJEU stated that proof of the
linguistic skills required for a job should also be accepted by other means than a certificate
from a specific language centre and thus the recruitment requirement of an Italian bank that
accepted only certificates from a single centre had to be assessed in the light of this judgment.
In the follow-up cases reported in the book, the issue was the appropriateness of the legal
consequences of CJEU’s judgment. Should the employer’s recruitment term on the specific
language diploma be declared null and void and should at the same time Mr. Angonese be
awarded damages for the loss of opportunity and, if yes, how much? The Corte di Cassazione
of Italy upheld both remedies10 seeing nullity as a logical consequence of non-conformity
with absolute effect and awarding damages – even if the amount was mitigated compared to
what had been decided by the first instance court – as an effective remedy for losses resulting
from the infringement of EU law at the level of the individual concerned, that is Mr. Angonese.
Without awarding damages, the remedies would not have been fully effective.11
The national case law presented is classified in the chapter into four different categories,
depending on the mechanism used by the judge to give effect to EU rules.
The first category embraces cases where the direct effect of the Treaty provision was
invoked. Four cases are reported concerning Article 18 TFEU. The number is somewhat
higher (six) with regard to Article 157 TFEU, where most cases reported concern unlawful
discrimination against men and unjustified benefits for women.
The second category is broader than the first one: it identifies cases where conformity
with EU law was achieved through interpretation, either by the harmonious interpretation of
national law or by the review (often accompanied by non-application) of the national rule in
conflict with EU legislation. 
The author of course refers to the limits and difficulties of harmonious interpretation in
the case of non-conform provisions, underlining that they can in no way lead to a contra
legem interpretation of the national provision concerned. A positive example is a decision of
2007 of the Court of Appeal of Antwerp,12 in which it excluded from the concept of
‘foreigners’ – from whom a surety for legal costs in judicial proceedings could be required –
any EU citizen or company.
Where the limit of contra legem interpretation is reached, other techniques are to be used.
The counterpart of the above Belgian case is a judgment by the German Verfassungsgerichtshof,
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where protection granted to ‘domestic’ legal persons should have to be extended to any legal
person domiciled in other Member State. As the scope of the term ‘domestic’ could not be
altered by harmonious interpretation in the strict sense of the word, the German
Constitutional Court referred to the positive obligation of the Member State to comply with
EU law under the principle of sincere cooperation and extended the scope of the provision.13
The author sees this kind of case as belonging to the third category of cases.
The parallelism drawn between the two cases is remarkable, because it shows how
different Member States’ courts could arrive, in very similar cases, at an EU-conform
interpretation using somewhat different techniques in order not to pass the borders of contra
legem interpretation. 
And finally, reading cases in which already existing or pre-existing national provisions
were interpreted in line with EU law and seeing the ease with which the British courts had
already invoked the supremacy of EU law to reinterpret their Equal Pay Act to give effect to
Article 157 TFEU in the 70s14 we cannot but realise again and again how much we will miss
the UK and its courts from the Union.
Other cases presented in the Chapter demonstrate the flexible interpretation of the
principle at national level. As is emphasised by the author, Article 18 TFEU progressively
became a self-standing provision, independent from the articles on free movement, not only
at the level of CJEU but even at national level. Of course, it can only be applied if the subject-
matter concerned falls within the scope of EU law. Some of the judgements strictly scrutinise
these preconditions (e.g. judgment of the Cour de Cassation of 2008).15 However, national
case law demonstrates in certain cases a sort of spill-over effect of Article 18 TFEU: courts
are in general willing to apply Article 18, even if in situations where it is difficult to see why
they believe that EU law can come into the picture. The same can witnessed in the case of
non-discrimination as a general principle of EU law, as presented later in Chapter 5: in a 2012
decision, the Tribunale di Roma invoked the principle of equality in a situation lacking any
cross-border element.16
Another interesting aspect of the analysis is how national courts handled cases of reverse
discrimination, i.e. cases where national legislation resulted in treating non-nationals in
a more favourable manner than nationals. Here the problem is that EU law evidently does
not provide protection against reverse discrimination and therefore national courts must
either accept and confirm this lack of protection – as did the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands17 – or find a hint in their own legislation or constitution in order to have a way-
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out.18 It is stated that in some cases these interpretations by national courts result in
erroneous decisions.19
It is worth noting that, from the judgments analysed in Chapter 4, the majority (10 out
of 17) were taken by national supreme courts (six by the French Cour de Cassation, two by
the Dutch Hoge Raad, one by the Italian Corte di Cassazione and one by the German
Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof) without demonstrating the need for a preliminary reference
and sometimes even without invoking the exceptions from the obligation to refer. We can
only second guess whether the CJEU’s approach would have been different if the questions
had been referred to it, at least in some of these cases. It is for instance not beyond doubt that
the CJEU would have found similarly in the Zamolo case,20 in which a French citizen invoked
in France the provisions of a collective agreement favouring German citizens falling within
the scope of EU law.
III Non-discrimination as a General Principle of EU Law 
as Analysed Under Chapter 5
Chapter 5 is devoted to the general principles of EU law. They are grouped – according to their
nature – into four subchapters: general principles of public law nature, the principle of non-
discrimination, abuse of rights and the principle of unjust enrichment. Non-discrimination
is thus examined in second place in subchapter II. Again, at the very beginning of the
subchapter the reader is well instructed by the author on how to conceive the principle of
equality as enshrined in EU law and why it behaves differently in an EU context than at
national level. The specific nature of general principles in EU law also matters: their main
purpose is to fill in the existing gaps in national legislation and their meaning is determined
on the basis of the Charter.21
Although non-discrimination as a  general principle cannot be invoked directly in
horizontal relationships, it played a major role in the recent case-law of the CJEU in the
leading Mangold22 and Kücükdeveci23 cases, where the Court ruled that national legislation
in conflict with the principle must be disapplied or, as in the judgment Test-Achats24 where
an EU directive was annulled by the Court for being in breach of the principle of non-
discrimination.
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The national cases are grouped into the same four categories as is found in Chapter 4,
although the first category this time remains unfilled due to the absence of the principle’s
horizontal direct effect. The author underlines however that, in Chapter 5 she gives a rather
broad meaning to the second category of cases, where the technique of harmonious
interpretation is used by involving all those national decisions in which the open norms of
private law (such as fairness, reasonableness, generally accepted conduct etc.) have been
reconstrued through the prism of the general principle of non-discrimination.25
The cases analysed under this subchapter are mainly hybrid cases of Mangold and
Kücükdeveci and emanate primarily from German courts. What do these follow-up cases
tell us? The systematic presentation of the cases, as carried out in this book, actually tells us
a lot. It must be underlined that both Mangold and Kücükdeveci concerned labour law and
employment or termination terms not respecting the non-discrimination principle based on
age. On the one hand, they demonstrate that a new, pioneer interpretation of the CJEU in
sensitive areas such as labour law will trigger subsequent new cases at national level that
might be seen as subcategories of an already decided case (whether the interpretation also
applies to agreements entered into prior to the judgment of the CJEU26 or how the
interpretation should be applied in certain sensitive sectors where age discrimination is in
principle justified by the nature of the work, as in the case of flight attendants and pilots27).
National courts are able to cope with some of these new aspects but are not always completely
sure and convinced. If they are not, they refer further questions to the CJEU. On the other
hand, pioneer judgments might bring those who do not agree with them to their national
constitutional court, asking it to scrutinise the eventual ultra vires effect of the pioneer CJEU
judgment. Such an effect was denied by the German Constitutional Court performing the
ultra vires test in a European-friendly and cooperative way,28 but it cannot be ruled out that
it would be recognised by some others, as was shown in the Czech Constitutional Court
finding the ruling of the Court in the Landtova case to be ultra vires.29
The conclusions of the subchapter confirm the thesis that non-discrimination as a general
principle might indeed have a considerable impact on private law relationships. This is clearly
demonstrated by the various legal consequences national courts applied in different contexts.
The author identifies eight different categories of these consequences,30 based on the case-
law analysed but these are of course not exclusive and there could be other specific cases
where the horizontal relationship is altered in a different way. All in all, the main conclusion
of the author is that national courts were able to find suitable remedies in cases of
infringement of EU law, sometimes even using inventive and creative ways.31
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IV On the Importance of the Casebook Again
Reading through the two chapters, it can be clearly stated that the rich national case-law
analysed by them brings us to the very heart of EU law, to the national level, which is not
covered in the literature unless thorough research of this kind is conducted. The cases,
summarised in a very precise and focused manner and accompanied by short but entirely
relevant notes, are not only of great value for academics and scholars but can and should be
integrated into the teaching material in order to illustrate how EU law can be interpreted in
a  uniform but still legal system-specific way throughout the Union and how classical
horizontal private law relationships are altered by national judges as a consequence of applying
EU norms or principles.
Moreover, as the author of the Chapters herself underlines, the description of national
cases in areas where there is insufficient case-law available yet – such as the invocation of
non-discrimination as a general principle in private law relationships – may assist students,
scholars, judges and lawyers in structuring their arguments in future cases.32 The book is
therefore not only informative but at the same time inspiring.
I also hope that the invitation of Prof. Sieburgh, addressed to the readers to report national
cases where the principle of non-discrimination was applied, will find echoes, and that this
extraordinary work of collecting national cases will continue and will progressively extend to
other Member States’ jurisprudence as well.
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I The Raison d’Être of Chapter 6 and 7
This brief paper is dedicated to Chapter 61 and Chapter 72 of the Ius Commune Casebook on
European Law and Private Law. They provide an in-depth discussion of both the impact of
directives and the effect of ex officio application of EU law provisions on national private
laws; that is, on private relationships. As the Casebook is prominently devoted to the
discussion and assessment of the impact of primary EU law on national private law regimes,
the inclusion of these fields is certainly not self-evident, and so the reasons for this editorial
decision have to be explained first. 
With regard to directives, a main source of secondary EU law, the key question of their
application in the Member States is the problem of effectiveness. As for effectiveness, the
opportunities of national courts to comply with the directives’ provisions – if difficulties may
have occurred in the process of implementation they are always handled by the Member
States – have a crucial relevance. Needless to say, the various legal techniques developed by
national courts in order to handle these deficiencies of implementation have a decisive impact
on private legal disputes, as they may enable the parties to invoke provisions of EU law that
are contrary to the inappropriate national law implementation of a given directive. From
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another perspective, deficiencies in the national legislation with respect to the implementation
of EU law provisions may be overcome by some judicial techniques to provide a more perfect
judicial protection for the citizens of the Union.3
On the other hand, the national courts’ opportunities to invoke EU law, even if the parties
did not refer to them in their claims, may also have a decisive relevance for private law
relationships. First, these options may have a key role in the direct effect of EU law being
realised, as these judicial techniques may give power to EU law to influence or alter private
legal relationships directly, by overriding potentially conflicting national provisions. Second,
the ex officio application of EU law norms may also lead to the unenforceability or invalidity
of private agreements and thus may again seriously affect private contractual relations.4
In sum, Chapter 6 and 7 definitely have their role when mapping the impact of EU law in
the development of national private laws. Both the judicial techniques of applying directives
in the event of deficient implementation and the possibilities of national courts to refer ex
officio to EU law provisions instead of the parties are to be regarded as two essential channels
of EU law that have a direct and perceptible impact on the everyday life of European citizens.
II The Backbones of Chapter 6 and 7
As a second step, this paper would draft an overview of these chapters, being slightly longer
than 100 pages. Chapter 6 was prepared by Sander van Look, and Professor Ilse Samoy, both
of whom are members of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven academic community, and
Professor Jerzy Pizuliński, the Dean of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the
Jagellonian University in Cracow. The authors of Chapter 7 are from Italy – Anna Maria
Mancaleoni, associate professor at the University of Cagiari – and Hungary – Balázs Fekete,
research fellow of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences and senior
lecturer at the ELTE Faculty of Law. 
In general, as for structure, Chapter 6 is composed of eight subchapters and Chapter 7 has
four major subsections. In addition, in line with the general attitude of the Ius Commune
casebooks, both chapters contain numerous excerpts from primary EU law sources, the case
law of European Court of Justice, national judicial decisions, and leading EU law manuals
besides the original scholarly contribution of the authors. This alloy of authoritative sources
– either of a legal or a scholarly nature – and scholarly discussion helps the reader to gain
insight into the various and sometimes divergent views on the issues presented. Overall, these
chapters are a good presentation of the discursive and diverse reality of EU law.
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Chapter 6 begins with (i) a brief introduction to set the scene and it contains some general
remarks on the scope and the terminology used. Then, it analyses in detail the (ii) Member
States’ obligation to implement directives. This subchapter put an emphasis on the vital
question of how to interpret the concept of Member State, which may be a decisive point in
a horizontal legal dispute on many occasions. The next (iii) subchapter focuses on the duty
of national courts to interpret national law provisions in harmony with the provisions of
directives, if necessary, and both the scope of this duty and its inherent limits – with special
regard to the prohibition of contra legem interpretation – are analysed. As a next step, 
(iv) subchapter four focuses on those delicate cases when national courts go further than
indicated by EU law. These are the special cases when a harmonious interpretation is not
imposed by EU law but national courts decide to rely on certain provisions in a directive at
their own discretion. Thereafter, (v) subchapter five is about the so-called ultima ratio option
of national courts if they want to refer to a directive provision: the review of national law
provisions against EU law directives. A classic problem of the application of directives is set
forth in (vi) subchapter six, as the liability of Member States for the non-implementation of
directives is also analysed. Perhaps the most relevant part of this chapter is (vii) subchapter
seven, where the authors identify those cases when a directive is implemented more broadly
than was originally requested by the EU legislative. Needless to say, the so-called spill-over
effect of directives having a considerable impact on a national legal system originates from this
phenomenon of voluntary broader implementation. Last, as (viii) a conclusion, the authors
emphasise that improperly implemented directives still cannot be invoked in pure horizontal
relationships;5 however, a broad interpretation of the concept of Member State and the duty
of harmonious interpretation may be able to bridge, at least partly, this lacuna in the judicial
protection of EU citizens. 
Compared to Chapter 6 Chapter 7 has a simpler structure. The (i) introduction discusses
the issue of national procedural autonomy with respect the general requirements of the EU
legal order (the principles of equivalence and effectiveness). The EU law background of ex
officio application of EU law provisions is presented in the (ii) next subchapter. It drafts the
legal basis of EU law with special regard to the so-called Van Schijndel line of case law;6 to
the impact of Article 101 TFEU and its public policy nature, as argued in the famous Manfredi
decision;7 and, finally, to the key role of the consumer contract directive on unfair terms
(93/13/EEC). It is widely known that article 6 and 7 of this directive paved the way for national
courts to intervene on their own motion and assess contractual clauses in consumer law cases.
To illustrate these (iii) the third subchapter is dedicated to the comparative analysis of national
case laws and three major patterns by which national courts try to manage the issue of the
intervention of certain EU law provisions in the cases at hand are identified. Finally, some (iv)
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conclusive thoughts close the chapter: these argue that direct ex officio references to EU law,
even though these are only used as illustrative points in the courts’ reasoning in many cases,
have begun to become an increasingly settled practice in some fields of law in Europe (for
instance in the field of consumer protection).
III The Main Findings
The first main output of Chapter 6 is the analysis of national courts’ practice with respect to
directives. The rule, as developed by the European Court of Justice, on the prohibition of the
horizontal effect of directives, namely that directives cannot have a horizontal effect even
though the requirements of effective judicial protection of citizens’ interests may legitimately
justify setting aside this provision, is still in force. However, the European Court of Justice
has a certain set of exceptions, indicating that it has an empathetic view of this vital issue. Due
to this, it is easy to argue that this lack of horizontal effect of directives is a key question in
the protection of private law relationships, as it prohibits relying on some directive provisions
if a directive is either not implemented properly in time or in affairs in which government
actors are not involved. 
However, there are three potent ways to cope with this problem, at least to a limited
extent. The first one is the unusually broad interpretation of the concept of Member State. The
European Court of Justice confirmed that the concept of Member State cannot be limited to
the body or bodies having public authority, and it can also be invoked if it acts as a public
employer.8 In practice, it means that some purely horizontal private relationships, mostly
labour or similar contracts, are transformed into quasi-vertical relationships in a legal sense,
and an improperly implemented directive might have some relevance in these cases. Second,
certainly the most powerful tool of national courts to apply directive provisions in horizontal
disputes is that they are empowered by the European Court of Justice to interpret national law
provisions in harmony with the directives’ provisions if it is needed due to some deficiencies
in implementation. As a result, as early as 1984, a German court submitted that the conven -
tional ways of interpretation, such as a systematic and historic approach, were trumped by this
obligation to interpret national law in harmony with the provisions of a directive.9 Finally and
as a last resort, national courts have the opportunity to set aside national law provisions if they
conflict with a directive, and, exceptionally, it may even occur in horizontal relationships if
legal liability is at stake.
Another important channel where directives may have an impact on national private laws
is if they are intentionally applied outside their scope to other – non-harmonised – areas of
law. This is the so-called spill-over effect of directives, and the extent of this impact on national
private laws cannot be underestimated. This effect may occur through a voluntary broader
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implementation by the legislator, and this form of spontaneous harmonisation might be
regarded as typical in Germany. For instance, the doorstep selling directive’s provisions were
implemented with a broader scope, as the implementing German law was also applicable to
types of contracts that were not made in a doorstep situation but this kind of situation played
a role in making the agreement. This practice was also reinforced by the case-law of German
courts. One may be fairly sure that similar developments have occurred in many other
Member States – as for instance, when the new Hungarian Civil Code was drafted – too. As
such, directives may have had a certain impact on areas of law that were not strictly under
their scope. This so-called spill-over effect may also have a key role in the formation of a real
ius commune europaeum, which may take a final shape in the very near future.
As for ex officio application of EU law provisions by the national courts, one must point
out that several, sometimes even divergent, solutions exist for the national courts to do so,
even when a national procedural provision may impede this in general. In this way the veil of
national civil procedural regimes is definitely pierced by EU law and so exhaustive national
procedural autonomy is nothing more than a  simple illusion in Europe (although the
approximation of civil procedures has not been in the focus of the legal harmonisation
activities of the European Union thus far). However, the degree of this supranational
intervention varies from an area of law to another one, as for instance when consumer
contracts – that is, the protection of consumers in a broader sense – are at stake, the Member
States’ national procedural autonomy is remarkably limited. This is due to the attitude of the
European Court of Justice, which puts the principle of effectiveness in first place when
assessing provisions of national civil procedure that may impede the application of EU
consumer protection rules, with special regard to the unfair terms clause. Furthermore, the
principle of equivalence is also applied to override those national procedural provisions that
are part of other procedures, as for instance with the enforcement of arbitration awards or
appeal procedures.10 Moreover, if an EU law provision is interpreted by the European Court
of Justice as having a public policy character, as is the case in Article 101 TFEU, this also
establishes a strong constraint on national procedural regimes. In sum, national procedural
autonomy has been considerably eroded in general by the developments in the field of ex-
officio application of certain EU law provisions.
Finally, one may conclude – based on Arthur Hartkamp’s summary – that six general
grounds can be identified when an EU law provision has to be applied by the national courts,
irrespective of whether or not the parties invoked them in their submissions.
– If there is an express legal provision that requires the national courts to apply a given EU
law norm – either in EU law or in national law.
– If the European Court of Justice interprets that an EU law provision must be applied
automatically.
– If an article from EU law is interpreted by the European Court of Justice as having a public
policy character.
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– If the application of the principle of effectiveness requires it when assessing a national law
provision.
– If the application of the principle of equivalence requires it when assessing a national law
provision.
– And the so-called ‘may is must’ rule also applies, if national courts may apply a rule of
national law on their own motion, they must apply on their own motion the corresponding
rule of EU law, too.11
As is obvious from this extensive list, both the European Court of Justice and national
courts are to be regarded as key actors when shaping – or, from another angle, when
narrowing – the borders of national procedural autonomy. And, undoubtedly, national
procedural autonomy is under a heavy siege in those areas of law where the EU has a great
bulk of substantive rules, as for instance with consumer protection or competition law.
IV Future Perspectives
As for directives, Chapter 6 seems to be perfect and exhaustive. However, there is one issue
really worthy of an even more detailed study. This is the spill-over effect of the directives. 
I would add here that a more extended study would be needed with special regard to the post-
transitory private law legislation of the Central European EU Member States. It should not be
forgotten that these countries had to reconstruct their private laws almost completely following
the political transition in 1989, and I’m deeply convinced that they used up and relied on many
EU law patterns when doing so, even ‘long’ before their accession to the European Union. This
may be a very exciting comparative law exercise with respect to the problem of legal transplants
and transfers,12 on the one hand, and it may also be able to reveal a lot on the integration of
EU law provisions into legal cultures with a partly divergent socio-historical and cultural
background.13
Secondly, as for the ex officio application of EU law provisions, the perspective of the
discussion on national procedural autonomy should be reversed. It would also be an
interesting topic for a scholarly analysis of those ways and solutions whereby national courts
and legislators try to preserve certain segments of national procedural autonomy – as it is
a logical effort in order to preserve some specificities of national legal orders. Future research
in this field should therefore also be interested in the ‘self-defence’ of national procedural
regimes that may stem from either the acts of the legislature or the actions of the judiciary.
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The book devotes a  complete chapter to directives (Chapter 6) and another one to the
question of ex officio application of EU law (Chapter 7). The two chapters overlap to the
extent that there are directives which Courts of Member States have to apply on their own
initiative. The most important of these is Directive no. 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in
consumer contracts (hereinafter the ‘Unfair Contract Terms Directive’), which may easily be
one of the most frequently applied pieces of EU legislation in Hungary, at least as far as private
law disputes are concerned. What follows are a few remarks related to these two chapters
from the point of view of a Hungarian lawyer.
One of the topics discussed in Chapter 6, which any Hungarian may find interesting and
useful, is the so-called ‘spillover effect’ of directives. According to the definition given by the
book, ‘spillover effects of directives [occur] where directive provisions are applied outside
the directive’s scope, in other (non-harmonised) areas of national law. Most common is the
situation where a national legislature adjusts its national law beyond what is required by the
directive.’1 While the expression ‘spillover effect’ may not sound familiar to all Hungarian
lawyers (in fact there is not even a generally understood Hungarian translation for it), the
phenomenon itself is immediately recognisable. There are many instances where the
Hungarian legislator opted to implement directives in a broader manner than was strictly
necessary. The reason is almost always that the legislator’s aim was to create a coherent system
of general norms, rather than a fragmented collection of specific ones. 
To mention only a few examples, the Consumer Sales Directive (1999/44/EC) applies to
the sale of consumer goods and contains provisions protecting the consumer. Nevertheless,
when the Hungarian legislator transposed the rules of the directive, it made a  double
generalisation. First, the transposing rules apply not only with regard to consumer contracts
but also in B2B relations. Second, they apply to all kinds of contracts, not only to sale and
purchase agreements. In this way, the Consumer Sales Directive in effect created general
Hungarian contract law rules.2 Another example would be the Unfair Contract Terms
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Directive, certain provisions of which (e.g. the definition of unfairness) are also applicable to
B2B contracts.3 Finally and most interestingly, when the Hungarian legislator adopted the
new Civil Code in 2013, it introduced direct producers’ liability.4 The important rules of this
new legal institution (e.g. the grounds of exemption for the producer) were simply copied
from the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC).5
While creating a  concept to describe a  certain phenomenon may be satisfying for
theoretical thinking and reading the relevant chapter of the book may result in a ‘eureka
moment’ for the reader, the practical implications are equally significant. The spillover effect
raises the following difficult question: how should the national rule transposing the directive
be interpreted outside the scope of the directive? Should the national judge follow the
interpretation given by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) for cases falling
within the directive’s scope or may it (or even should it) adopt a different interpretation? EU
law does not provide any answer, as the Member States are free to determine their legal norms
in cases not covered by a given directive. Consequently, this question must be answered by
the national courts. It is therefore a great virtue of the book that it reports national case-law
and demonstrates what kind of different approaches national courts adopted to handle this
problem. Without going into the details of this complicated question, it is enlightening to
read that the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) took the liberty of departing from
a  CJEU ruling by basically saying that it disagrees with it (the doctrine of ‘gespaltene
Auslegung’).6 My personal takeaway from the two German cases reported in the book is that
the more unlikely or surprising the CJEU’s interpretation is, the less likely it is that courts will
also apply it in cases not covered by the given directive. It is doubtful whether such an
interpretation ought to be applied in the case of B2B contracts, especially if the CJ mainly
bases its interpretation on the need to protect consumers.
The other topic which I would like to briefly touch upon is the ex officio application of
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. This issue is highly relevant for Hungarian lawyers, as
consumers often invoke the provisions of this directive (and/or the transposing national rules)
to challenge the contracts they concluded. Such references are extremely frequent in lawsuits
between consumers and banks, which constitute a  considerable portion of the lawsuits
involving EU law. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that two of the CJEU judgements
referred to in the book were given in Hungarian cases,7 and that a preliminary reference
procedure is currently before the CJEU which also concerns the ex officio application of the
Unfair Contract Terms Directive.8
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Under Hungarian law, one of the main problems associated with this topic is that the
provisions of Hungarian law originally transposing the Unfair Contract Terms Directive did
not allow for an ex officio application. Hungarian private law differentiates between two types
of invalidity: nullity (‘semmisség’) and contestability (‘megtámadhatóság’, similar to the
German ‘Anfechtbarkeit’). Nullity means that anybody may invoke the invalidity without time
limit, and Courts may also raise the invalidity ex officio.9 On the other hand, contestability
means that the contract becomes invalid only if the aggrieved party challenges it. This may
be done within a one year time limit, which generally starts from the conclusion of the
contract. Courts may not raise such invalidity ex officio because it is only the aggrieved party
who is entitled to challenge the contract.10
The original implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive took place by way
of Act CXLIX of 1997, which modified Section 209(1) of the Old Civil Code as follows: ‘If 
a general term is unfair, the aggrieved party may challenge such a provision.’ Hence, courts
were not allowed to investigate ex officio whether a particular general term was unfair, if the
aggrieved party did not raise this point in court. However, the Old Civil Code was amended
as of March 1 2006 by way of Act III of 2006. The amendment introduced the following new
Section 209/A(2): ‘In the case of consumer contracts, unfair general terms which become
part of the contract, as well as unfair terms that the other party determines unilaterally before
concluding the contract, and which have not been individually negotiated with the consumer,
are null and void. This nullity may only be invoked for the consumer’s benefit.’ As of this date,
the nullity sanction applies with regard to unfair general terms. The new Civil Code (Act V
of 2013), which entered into force on March 15, 2014, did not change these rules.11
It is clear that, for consumer contracts concluded after March 1, 2006, courts may find ex
officio that a certain general contract term is unfair. However, the question arises as to the
situation of contracts concluded between May 1, 2004 (when Hungary became a member of
the EU) and March 1, 2006 (the date of the amendment to the Old Civil Code). Theoretically,
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Terms Directive: ‘If the national court declares that the contractual term which places the exchange rate risk on
the consumer is unfair, is it required, when determining the legal effects in accordance with the rules of national
law, also to take into account of its own motion, while respecting the right of the parties to present argument in
inter partes proceedings, the unfairness of other contractual terms which have not been relied on by the applicants
in their action? Does the principle that the court should act of its own motion in accordance with the case-law
of the Court of Justice also apply if the applicant is a consumer or, having regard to the position occupied by the
principle of the autonomy of the parties in the whole proceedings and to the particular features of the proceedings,
does the principle that the parties have the right to delimit the subject matter of an action, in that case, preclude
examination by the court of its own motion?’
9 Section 234 of the Civil Code of 1959, Sections 6:88 and 6:108 of the Civil Code of 2013.
10 Sections 235-236 of Civil Code of 1959, Section 6:89 of the Civil Code of 2013.
11 Section 6:103(3) of the Civil Code of 2013 provides as follows: ‘Unfair contractual terms in contracts between a
consumer and an undertaking are null and void. This nullity may only be invoked for the consumer’s benefit.’ The
definition of unfair contractual terms is also included in the same provision. The concept of nullity and
contestability have not changed.
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the original wording of Section 209(1) of the Old Civil Code applies to these matters, which
does not allow courts to raise the unfairness of a general term ex officio. 
However the Hungarian court practice came to a different conclusion, as demonstrated
by the recent judgement of the Court of Appeal of Pécs (Pécsi Ítélőtábla) no. Pf.VI.20.147/
2016/4., published under no. BDT 2017. 3680. This judgement concerns a mortgage contract
concluded in 2005, i.e. during the period where Hungary was already an EU Member State,
thus Directive 93/13/EEC had to be applied. However, the relevant provision of domestic law
(the Old Civil Code) had not yet been amended to allow ex officio application of the rules of
that directive. It was also a fact of the particular case that the consumer challenged certain
general terms of the mortgage contract after the one year deadline. As such, the relevant
question for the court was whether to apply the Old Civil Code and reject the claim, since the
one year deadline for challenging the contract had expired, or to interpret the Old Civil Code
in line with the directive and allow the claim. 
The court chose the latter option. It summarised the CJEU’s case-law on the ex officio
application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and harmonious interpretation, and
concluded as follows: ‘In Case Y-000/98 O,12 the Court of Justice of the European Union
expressly stated that national courts shall interpret national law provisions “in conformity
with the directive”. Accordingly, the provisions of the Civil Code of 1959 applicable in 
a particular case must be interpreted in light of the purpose and wording of Directive
93/13/EEC in a way to meet the requirements of the effective enforcement of consumer
interests. It follows from all the above that unfair general terms, or contractual terms which
have not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as null and void in the case of
contracts concluded not only after March 1 2006 but also between May 1 2004 and February
28 2006.’13 The court’s decision followed the general guidance given by the Hungarian
Supreme Court on this particular issue.14
While this approach ensures the effectiveness of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive’s
provisions (i.e. it enables their ex officio application), it is doubtful whether the court’s
approach remained within the legitimate limits of interpretation. In effect, the court held that
the unfairness of a general term is a ground for nullity, even though the legal provision
applicable in the case expressly qualified unfairness as a ground for challenge. When dealing
with the requirement of harmonious interpretation, the book emphasises that this
requirement cannot go so far so to contradict a  clear provision of domestic law.15 Re-
characterising a ground for invalidity seems to be a contra legem interpretation of Hungarian
law.
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • MIKLÓS BORONKAY
n 44
12 While the exact case number has been redacted from the published version of the judgement, it clearly refers to
Case C-240/98 Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I-4941.
13 Judgement in case no. BDT 2017. 3680. para 15.
14 Supreme Court Opinion no. 3/2011 PK. Supreme Court Opinions are non-binding legal instruments by way of
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15 Hartkamp, Sieburgh, Devroe (n 1) 362.
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As law clerk of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, I have found the book entitled Cases,
Materials and Text on European Law and Private Law1 very inspiring for at least two reasons.
The first one can be labelled as ‘institutional’: the Constitutional Court faces the very same
challenges today which are the key expressions of the book.2 (I) Furthermore, the second
reason is a  more ‘dogmatic’ aspect, namely the nature and accordingly the relationship
between the fundamental freedoms of the European internal market on the one hand, and
human rights on the other hand. (II) In addition, this paper aims to present how the
Constitutional Court of Hungary dealt with a similar issue.
I.
When someone thinks about European law, they generally refer to public law questions. The
engine of strengthening the European legal order has been the Court of Justice of the European
Union which has developed many important concepts, such as supremacy,3 direct effect,4
the vertical direct effect of directives5 and the concept of indirect effect.6 However, even if
public European law might have a huge influence on private relations, the novelty of this book
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1 Arthur Hartkamp, Carla Sieburgh, Wouter Devroe (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on European Law and Private
Law (Hart 2017, Oxford and Portland Oregon).
2 ‘– If an individual may rely on a rule (including a general principle) of EU law in order to assert a subjective right
against another individual, the rule is conceived as producing ‘direct horizontal effect.’ 
– If an individual may, as against another individual, rely on a rule (including a general principle) of EU law in
order to have a national statutory provision or administrative practice reviewed for its compatibility with EU law,
that rule is conceived as having ‘indirect horizontal effect’ Arthur Hartkamp, ‘Introduction. Effects of EU Law on
Relationships between Individuals’ in Hartkamp, Sieburgh, Devroe (n 1) 18.
3 Case C-6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR. 585.
4 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos NV v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR. 1.
5 Case C-9/90 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357, Case C-14/83 Van Colson vs Land Nordrhein Westfalen [1984]
ECR 1891.
6 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] E.C.R. I-5309.
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is that it focuses purely on private relationships and proves the importance of the EU law
corpus in this sphere.
Coming to the field of constitutional law, one might think analogically to the nature of
human rights. The classical view of them states that they can solely be interpreted vertically,
between the State and the individual.7 Nevertheless, if we take a glance at the (not that) recent
development of human rights law, we may discover similar ‘horizontal effect’ issues – maybe
under some other labels, such as third-party effect or Drittwirkung8 – as those raised in the
book.
And, in the field of constitutional law, not only the issue of direct horizontal effect might
appear but also its indirect counterpart, the so-called ‘harmonious interpretation’ or the claim
of interpretation conform to EU law appears similarly in the reasonings of the decisions of the
constitutional courts, namely the requirement of interpretation conform to the constitution
which is formulated toward the ordinary courts.9 The latter question brings us further to the
enforcement of the EU law and of the constitutional law, which can be detected solely through
the examination of follow-up cases from various countries, which are also presented in this
book.10
Both forms of horizontal effect have come into focus in Hungary, especially after the
entry into force of the new Fundamental Law of Hungary and the new Act on the
Constitutional Court. The reform regarding the competences of the Constitutional Court
shifted the powers of the Court toward the individual protection of human rights. The new
provisions ruled out the so-called actio popularis procedure and kept a more limited scope
for abstract judicial review. Instead, constitutional complaint procedures became the main
competences of the Court, which brings closer the Constitutional Court of Hungary to its
Spanish and German counterparts. These procedures are complaints against the legal
provisions applied in a judicial decision, complaints against legal norms which are directly
applicable and, last but not least, complaints against judicial decisions. The last type of
complaint is called, just like in Germany, the ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ constitutional complaint and
it is the most relevant complaint regarding the topic of horizontal effect. This procedure
enables persons or organisations affected by judicial decisions to submit a constitutional
complaint to the Constitutional Court if the decision made regarding the merits of the case
or another decision terminating the judicial proceedings violates their rights laid down in the
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Fundamental Law. This means that even a lawsuit between private parties might end up at the
Constitutional Court, which will ultimately decide the case through human rights law
argumentation, even if it is not willing to acknowledge expressis verbis the horizontal effect
of human rights.
Until now, none of the judgments of the Constitutional Court of Hungary has mentioned
expressly the concept of the horizontal effect of human rights but it has appeared in the
wording of concurring and dissenting opinions.11 Nevertheless, many cases where the Court
had to face the issue of applying human rights between private parties can be mentioned.12
As typical examples, we can mention cases on defamation and the enforcement of freedom
of speech13 or cases on the freedom of assembly, where the Court detected its collision with
the right to privacy.14 The reason for this phenomena is quite clear: as regards the different
human rights, the State does not only have a so-called ‘negative’ obligation to refrain from
infringing the citizens’ fundamental rights, but also a ‘positive’ obligation to safeguard the
exercise of those rights, both towards the State and other citizens. This can be achieved
through law-making but this might be the task of the ordinary courts as well, when they are
interpreting the law in the light of the constitution. The latter type of indirect horizontal effect
has been appraised in a recent decision as the duty of the ordinary courts to reconcile or to
balance the human rights positions of the private parties.15
II.
Creating the internal market with the free movement of goods, people, services and capital is
one of the biggest achievements of the European Union. Nevertheless, all results have their
problematic concerns and such an aspect has come up, namely the possible conflict between
the four basic freedoms and the human rights of European citizens. Or, to put it another way,
even if the EU has been created for economic reasons, the question is how human rights can
be protected in its larger and larger legal order.16 Accordingly, besides the so-called institutional
and sociological democratic deficit17 a human rights deficit has also come into existence.18
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11 Concurring opinion of Tamás Sulyok in Decision no. 34/2014 CC and Decision no. 5/2016 CC; Dissenting
opinion of László Kiss in Decision no. 3046/2016 CC; and see also Dissenting opinion of Béla Pokol who rejects
the horizontal effect of human rights in Decision no. 3/2015 CC.
12 As regards the earlier Hungarian approach, see: Gábor Halmai, ‘The Third Party Effect in Hungarian
Constitutional Adjudication’ in Sajó, Uitz (n 8) 104–114.
13 Decision no. 13/2014 CC, Decision no. 5/2015 CC.
14 Decision no. 13/2016 CC, Decision no. 14/2016 CC.
15 Decision no. 3192/2017 CC.
16 Harmathy Attila, ‘Az EU tagállamok közös alkotmányos hagyományai és a nemzeti polgári jog’ in Sajó András (ed),
Alkotmányosság a magánjogban (Complex 2006, Budapest, 17–41) 27.
17 Győri Enikő, A nemzeti parlamentek szerepe az európai integrációban, (PhD-értekezés, Budapest 1999).
<http://phd.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/112/> 34–52.
18 Chronowski Nóra, Zeller Judit, ‘Luxemburg – Strasbourg – alapjogvédelem’ (2006) 6 (5) Európai Jog 14–23, 14.
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The question already emerged before realizing the unified market and the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) solved the issue with the invention of the concept of human
rights as general principles of EU law and later as ‘constitutional traditions common to the
Member States’.19 As regards the case law the Nold,20 the Hauer21 and the International
Handelsgesellschaft22 decisions have to be outlined, the last of which led to the famous
Solange decisions in Germany. Finally, the concept entered into the wording of the Lisbon
Treaty as well, together with a reference to the European Convention of Human Rights,23 and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights has also entered into force.24
As regards the free movement of goods, people, services and capital, the Treaty contains
the declaration of the freedoms and also a couple of exemptions. For example, Article 28
TFEU rules the free movement of goods, while Article 36 enables the justification of
prohibitions or restrictions on the grounds of public morality, public policy, public security,
the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of national
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, or the protection of industrial
and commercial property. Similarly, Article 45 declares the free movement of workers,
together with the exemption of public services, while paragraph (3) enables limitations
justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
Nevertheless, if one steps a bit closer to the case law of the CJEU the picture is not as
simple. On the one hand, the CJEU (with the help of the test of proportionality) examines
from case to case on whether to accept the references to the exemptions of the Treaty. On the
other hand, the usage of the test of proportionality has been introduced as well for other
limitations named as ‘mandatory requirements,’ which are not listed in the Treaty.25 As
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ENDRE ORBÁN
n 48
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(Szent István Társulat 2008, Budapest) 365–371; Paul Craig, Gráinne de Búrca, EU law: Text, cases and materials
(Oxford University Press 2008, Oxford) 381–383, 386–389; Josephine Steiner, Lorna Woods, Christian Twigg-
Flesner, EU law (Oxford University Press 2008, Oxford – New York) 117–118.
20 Case C-4/73 J. Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491.
21 Case C-44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727.
22 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125.
23 Article 6 paragraph (3) TEU.
24 ‘Contrary to the prevailing opinion in a number of Member States regarding provisions of national Constitutions, it
is clear that provisions of the Charter may have direct horizontal effect. This is true in particular for Article 15(2)
of the Charter, which repeats three fundamental freedoms (freedoms of movement, establishment and services) that
have been accorded such effect by the CJ, and for Articles 16 (freedom to conduct a business) and 17 (right to property),
which in recent cases seem to have been recognised as grounds on which a claim or a defence in litigation between
private parties may be based. It may be equally true for other provisions. In this respect, there would seem to be no
difference between the Charter and those general provisions of EU law that have been transposed into Charter
provisions.’ Hartkamp, Sieburgh, Devroe (n 1) 13.
25 The concept of ‘mandatory requirements’ has been developed in the Cassis de Dijon case where the CJ mentioned
as examples the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial
transactions and the protection of consumers. See: Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR
649. Later, the list has been broadened with other elements such as the protection of the environment (Case 
C-302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR.460.), road safety (Case C-54/05 Commission v Finland [2007]
ECR I-2473), press diversity (Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689) and so on.
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a consequence, the restriction of the fundamental freedoms is possible in two different
categories, those provided as exemptions in the wording of the Treaty, and the ones that were
accepted as justified limitations in the case law of the CJEU. 
The question now is what happens if fundamental freedoms ‘meet’ in a case with human
rights. Theoretically, three different outcomes can exist. First of all, the human right might go
hand in hand with the fundamental freedom and they strengthen each other (Type1). Second,
it might be possible that the human right could serve as a ground limiting the fundamental
freedom, and so a  fundamental right might become a  ‘mandatory requirement’, or an
‘overriding reason relating to the public interest’ (Type2). And finally, the CJEU could try to
balance between them without giving priority to either of them (Type3). Lately, the Court
had to face similar cases many times, which led to various judgments. The aim of this chapter
is to present the different outcomes of these horizontal issues.
There are examples of all three theoretical outcomes. A case where fundamental freedoms
and human rights are in line with each other would be the Carpenter case.26 Mrs. Carpenter
was originally from the Republic of the Philippines and she was the spouse of a  United
Kingdom national who ran a business selling advertising space in medical and scientific
periodicals in other Member States too. The Secretary of State decided to make a deportation
order against her because she had overstayed her original leave to enter. Mrs. Carpenter
appealed against the decision, arguing that her husband’s business required him to travel
around other Member States and he could do so more easily as she was looking after his
children from his first marriage. The CJEU pointed out that the Community legislature has
recognised the importance of ensuring the protection of the family life of nationals of the
Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the EC Treaty, and stated that the separation of Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter by her
deportation would be detrimental to their family life and to the conditions under which Mr.
Carpenter exercised his fundamental freedom to provide services as well. Therefore, the CJ
concluded that ‘Article 49 EC, read in the light of the fundamental right to respect for family
life, is to be interpreted as precluding, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings,
a refusal, by the Member State of origin of a provider of services established in that Member
State who provides services to recipients established in other Member States, of the right to
reside in its territory to that provider’s spouse, who is a national of a third country.’
In other cases, human rights serve as grounds for the justification of restricting
fundamental freedoms. This would be the case of Schmidberger.27 Schmidberger ran
a trucking company and claimed damages for losses caused by an environmental protest
group who had prevented the company from taking goods to Austria by lorry, as the group
carried out a 30-hour-long anti-traffic protest blocking a major motorway in Austria. The
CJEU delineated the case from the ‘Spanish Strawberries’ case:28 ‘By comparison with the
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28 Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959.
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points of fact referred to by the Court at paragraphs 38 to 53 of the judgment in Commission
v France, cited above, it should be noted, first, that the demonstration at issue in the main
proceedings took place following a request for authorisation presented on the basis of national
law and after the competent authorities had decided not to ban it. Second, because of the
presence of demonstrators on the Brenner motorway, traffic by road was obstructed on 
a single route, on a single occasion and during a period of almost 30 hours. Furthermore, the
obstacle to the free movement of goods resulting from that demonstration was limited by
comparison with both the geographic scale and the intrinsic seriousness of the disruption
caused in the case giving rise to the judgment in Commission v France, cited above.’ 29 As
a result, the CJEU accepted the temporary restriction of the fundamental freedom on the
grounds of freedom of assembly.
In addition in a few cases, the CJEU recognised the importance of human rights but tried
to establish a fair balance between them and the fundamental freedoms. An example would
be the Viking case30 where the principle of proportionality was employed to reconcile the
freedom of establishment and trade unions’ collective right to strike. Viking Line, a Finnish
shipping company, gave notice to the Finnish Seamen’s Union of its intention to reflag its
ferry called Rosella by registering it in Estonia in order to be able to enter into a new collective
agreement with a trade union established in that State and to employ an Estonian crew, whose
wages were lower than those paid in Finland. Following this, the International Transport
Workers’ Federation asked its members to refrain from entering into negotiations with Viking
Line, while the Finnish Seamen’s Union announced its intention to strike, demanding that
Viking Line continue to comply with Finnish employment law and not lay off the crew. The
CJ acknowledged that ‘the right to take collective action, including the right to strike, must
therefore be recognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general
principles of Community law the observance of which the Court ensures, the exercise of that
right may none the less be subject to certain restrictions.’ 31 However, ‘[t]hat restriction may,
in principle, be justified by an overriding reason of public interest, such as the protection of
workers, provided that it is established that the restriction is suitable for ensuring the
attainment of the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve that objective.’ 32
As it can be seen, there is no uniform solution to the relationship structure of fundamental
freedoms and human rights and it seems that the CJEU solves these legal issues on a case by
case basis, in which the test of proportionality will continue to be the rule to follow.
Such a ‘meeting’ between fundamental freedoms of the internal market and human rights
might arise also before the Constitutional Court of Hungary. However, it should be noted
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31 Para 44.
32 Para 90.
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that the Constitutional Court generally refrains from applying EU law and therefore different
techniques can be detected as the Court circumvents the real EU law-related issues.33
However, as an example of a Type1 correlation the case of university student scholarships
can be cited.34 A government decree claimed that those students who received at least
a partial waiver of their tuition fee must work in Hungary for twice the duration of the length
of the scholarship within twenty years of obtaining their diplomas, otherwise the students
had to pay back the sum of the scholarship. The Constitutional Court detected the EU law
relevance of the case35 but disregarded it and applied a  formalistic solution: the Court
annulled the decree because such an issue should have been regulated in an Act of Parliament.
While this solution – the usage of formal analysis as a first step – is compatible with the case
law of the Constitutional Court, it is unclear why EU law relevance36 was even mentioned, if
it remained at only a decorative level.
Nevertheless, new cases might occur also in the future, where fundamental freedoms
‘meet’ human rights. At this point a new decision of the Constitutional Court37 has to be
emphasised, which interpreted Article E) paragraph (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary
and which states that the Constitutional Court may examine – upon a relevant petition –
in the course of exercising its competences – whether the joint exercise of powers under
Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law would violate human dignity, another fundamental
right, the sovereignty of Hungary or its identity based on the country’s historical consti -
tution.38 The judgment itself does not say anything about the potential legal consequences;39
however, it emphasises several times the importance of constitutional dialogue, which might
mean that the Constitutional Court would solve emerging similar legal issues by initiating
a preliminary ruling procedure, as other Constitutional Courts in Europe have done so far.40
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33 Vincze Attila, ‘Odahull az eszme és a valóság közé az árnyék’ (2014) 3 MTA Law Working Papers 4. Vincze shows
that the Constitutional Court takes into consideration the EU law only when it does not have any impact on the
final decision.
34 Decision no. 32/2012 CC.
35 Paras [41]-[44].
36 Láncos Petra Lea, ‘A kötelező hallgatói szerződések értékelése az uniós jog szemszögéből’ (2011) 39 Pazmany
Law Working Papers.
37 Decision no. 22/2016 CC.
38 The decision received many criticism: Chronowski Nóra, Vincze Attila, ‘Önazonosság és európai integráció – az
Alkotmánybíróság az identitáskeresés útján’ (2017) 72 Jogtudományi Közlöny 117–132; Drinóczi Tímea, 
‘A 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB határozat: mit (nem) tartalmaz, és mi következik belőle. Az identitásvizsgálat és az ultra
vires közös hatáskörgyakorlás összehasonlító elemzésben’ (2017) 1 MTA Law Working Papers; Kéri Veronika,
Pozsár-Szentmiklósy Zoltán, ‘Az Alkotmánybíróság határozata az Alaptörvény E) cikkének értelmezéséről’ (2017)
8 JEMA 5–15.
39 Drinóczi (n 38) 12, 18.
40 Sulyok Tamás, Orbán Endre, ‘Az európai alkotmányos tér és az alkotmányos párbeszéd forgatókönyve’ in
Chronowski Nóra, Pozsár-Szentmiklósy Zoltán, Smuk Péter, Szabó Zsolt (eds), A szabadságszerető embernek.
Liber Amicorum István Kukorelli (Gondolat 2017, Budapest, 116–125) 122.
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I Introduction
In an article published in the previous volume of this journal, I presented the legislative rules
and the jurisprudence in the Member States concerning state liability for violation of EU law
by national supreme courts.1 I arrived at the conclusion that even in Member States where
Köbler liability2 is accepted theoretically, it is neither a frequently used nor an efficient method
of making good the damages caused to individuals by a final judgment of a national supreme
court.3
In view of these conclusions, I find it interesting to examine whether other remedies exist
in the national legal systems available to individuals in cases of violation of EU law by the
national supreme court.4 This article focuses on the remedy of retrial.5
Zsófia Varga*
Retrial in the Member States on the Ground 
of Violation of EU Law
55 n
* Zsófia Varga (PhD) Legal Knowledge Manager, NautaDutilh Avocats Luxembourg. All views expressed are
personal. Any comments are welcome at the author’s email address: zsofia.varga@hotmail.com
1 See Varga Zsófia, ‘The Application of the Köbler Doctrine by Member State Courts’ (2016) 4 (2) ELTE Law Journal.
2 (CJEU) Case C–224/01 Köbler ECLI:EU:C:2003:513 [2003] ECR I-10239. In Köbler, the CJEU held, for the first
time, that the principle of state liability for breaches of EU law also applies when a breach is attributable to 
a Member State court. The Köbler judgment was therefore an extension of the already established state liability
doctrine to violations of EU law by Member State supreme courts. See (CJEU) Joint cases C–6/90 and C–9/90
Francovich and others ECLI:EU:C:1991:428 [1991] ECR I-05357.
3 According to the research conducted, there have been about thirty-five reported cases based on the Köbler
principle for violation of EU law by national courts since the pronouncement of the CJEU judgment in 2003. Of
them, damages have been awarded only in four occasions so far. For further analysis on this matter see Varga
Zsófia, ‘Why the Köbler liability is not Applied in Practice’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law 984–1008.
4 Besides the remedy of retrial, the constitutional complaint for alleged violation of the right to a lawful judge can
also be taken into account, introduced on the ground that the supreme court breached its obligation to make 
a preliminary reference to the CJEU. For further analysis on this matter see Varga Zsófia, ‘National Remedies in
the Case of Violation of EU Law by Member State Courts’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 51–80.
5 For the sake of unified terminology and mutual understanding, the use of several terms been harmonised in this
paper. The term ‘retrial’ covers procedural means that allow for a case already decided by the court of final instance
to be ‘reopened’, and for a final judicial decision that has acquired res judicata to be ‘revised’. The term ‘revocation’
refers to public authorities’ powers to revoke their own acts, whether confirmed or not by the administrative
court.
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It is noteworthy that, during the codification of the new Hungarian Act on Civil
Procedure (Pp.),6 the question emerged whether retrial should be granted on the ground of
violation of EU law by a final judgment.7 In the end, the idea was rejected; and this possibility
does not appear in the new act which entered into force on 1 January 2018.8 Hence, the new
Pp. did not amend the provisions of the previous act, and does not grant retrial based on
violation of EU law by a final judgment.9
Nevertheless, in several Member States, there is a possibility for an individual whose
rights have been infringed by a final judgment to invoke the violation of EU law as a ground
for retrial. It is usually a subsequent CJEU judgment on the same question of law which reveals
the inconsistency of the national judgment with the EU norm.10
In this article, I present and analyse the national rules and cases concering retrial based
on violation of EU law. As for the national judicial practice, the research is based on published
case-law on retrial cases before Member State courts for violation of EU law by national
courts.11 Before analysing the national case-law, a brief presentation of the CJEU judgments
and the ECtHR jurisprudence regarding retrial on the ground of violation of EU law by
Member State courts is offered. Then, at the end of the paper, I present my conclusions
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6 The Concept of the new Hungarian Civil Procedure Act (approved by the Government on 14 January 2015),
available on the Internet site of the Government <http://www.kormany.hu> accessed 1 January 2017.
7 The Concept of the New Hungarian Civil Procedure Act, annex VI, point VII.
8 A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 2016. évi CXXX. törvény (New Act on Civil Procedure Code) s 394.
9 A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi III. törvény (Act on Civil Procedure Code) s 260 on perújítás (retrial).
10 Nevertheless, it may also be a CJEU judgment anterior to the contested decision which makes the infringement
evident. In this case, the question arises to what extent the erroneous judgment is attributable to the national
court who have not considered the CJEU case or to the party at the proceedings who have not invoked it.
11 The main sources for the identification of national cases are the following: 
– ACA Europe. National reports, ‘Consequences of incompatibility with EC law for final administrative decisions
and final judgments of administrative courts in the Member States’ 21st colloquium, Warsaw, 15 June 2008
<http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/colloquies-top-en/244-21st-colloquium-in-warsaw-from-15-to-16-
june-2008> accessed 1 January 2017;
– the Commission’s Annual Reports to the European Parliament on Monitoring the Application of EU Law
(Annex VI: Application of Community law by national courts: a survey) <http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-
eu-law/index_en.htm> accessed 1 January 2017;
– bulletin Reflets: Informations rapides sur les développements juridiques présentant un intérêt communautaire
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7063/> accessed 1 January 2017; translation in English of the issues
published after 2008 are available at <http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/reflets-en> accessed 1 January 2017;
– the Internet site of the Associations of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the
European Union, especially the databases Jurifast <http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/jurifast-en> accessed
1 January 2017 and Dec.Nat <http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/dec-nat-en> accessed 1 January 2017;
– the Internet site of the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Court of the European Union
<http://www.network-presidents.eu/> accessed 1 January 2017.
See also the cases referred to in Laurent Coutron and Jean-Claude Bonichot, L’obligation de renvoi préjudiciel à
la Cour de justice: une obligation sanctionnée? (Bruylant 2014, Bruxelles).
An obvious limitation of this study is that it is based on cases that have been made publicly accessible either
through databases or in other forms such as collections and digests of case-law. This means that there may be 
a limited number of judgments which were never reported and therefore were not considered.
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regarding the role and the place of retrial in the system of remedies against violation of EU
law by Member State courts.
II Retrial on the Ground of Violation of EU Law
1 The CJEU Case-law 
The EU law does not require a mandatory reopening of domestic procedures following CJEU
judgments. According to the CJEU, such a general possibility would endanger the corollary
principles of res judicata and legal certainty. Hence, under EU law, retrial is exceptional and
conditional upon the special circumstances of the case. It holds true, even for cases where
reopening would make it possible to remedy an infringement of EU law by the judgment in
question.12
Referring to Kornezov, res judicata and retrial are considered as two sides of the same coin
for the purposes of the present analysis. The main connection between them is that if
a previously adjudged issue is contrary to EU law and comes within the scope of res judicata,
it can be remedied only though retrial.13 Therefore, retrial is an exceptional measure, with the
result of setting aside the effects of res judicata of final judgments under special circumstances.
Due to this connection between the two concepts, CJEU case-law regarding res judicata is
briefly presented here.
The judgment in Kühne & Heitz14 concerned the infringement of EU law by an
administrative decision, which was confirmed by the administrative court with the result of
attaching res judicata to the matter under dispute.15 The CJEU declared that the revocation of
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12 See (CJEU) Case C-234/04 Kapferer ECLI:EU:C:2006:17 [2006] ECR I-2585, paras 20–22; Case C-2/08 Fallimento
Olimpiclub ECLI:EU:C:2009:506 [2009] ECR I-7501, paras 22–23; Case C-507/08 Commission v Slovakia
ECLI:EU:C:2010:802 [2010] ECR I-13489, paras 59–60; Case C-213/13 Impresa Pizzarotti ECLI:EU:C:2014:2067
ECR, paras 54, 59, 62, 64; Case C-69/14 Târșia ECLI:EU:C:2015:662 ECR, paras 28–29; and Case C-505/14
Klausner Holz Niedersachsen ECLI:EU:C:2015:742 ECR, paras 38–39. 
For further analysis on this matter see Xavier Groussot and Timo Minssen, ‘Res judicata in the Court of Justice
case-law: balancing legal certainty with legality?’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 385–417; Koen
Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis and Kathleen Gutman, EU procedural law (Janek Tomasz edn, Oxford University Press
2014, Oxford) 148–150; Guglielmo Maisto, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness’ in Céline Brokelind (ed), Principles of
Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law (IBDF 2014, Amsterdam) 163–182; Takis Tridimas, The General
Principles of EU law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006, Oxford) 164–171, 423–427.
13 On a more detailed presentation of differences between the two concepts see Alexander Kornezov, ‘Res Judicata
of National Judgments Incompatible with EU Law: Time for a Major Rethink?’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law
Review 812–814.
14 (CJEU) Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz ECLI:EU:C:2004:17 [2004] ECR I-837.
15 As Hofstötter points out, even if the judgment in Kühne & Heitz concerned in the first place a mistake of an
administrative authority, the case dealt, however, with a violation of EU law by the administrative court which
confirmed the administrative decision. See Bernard Hofstötter, Non-Compliance of National Courts: Remedies
in European Community Law and Beyond (TMC Asser Press 2005, The Hague) 179–180.
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such a decision by the administrative authority is required only if several conditions are fulfilled.
First, the national court of last instance reached the wrong decision without having submitted
a request for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. Moreover, the national administrative authority had
the power, under national law, to revoke its own decisions. Furthermore, a subsequent CJEU
judgment revealed the inconsistency of the decision with EU law. Finally, the aggrieved party
complained to the administrative authority immediately after becoming aware of that decision
of the CJEU.16 This principle has been confirmed in the order in i-21 Germany and Arcor.17
The above two cases concerned the revocation by the administrative authority of
a previous administrative decision, confirmed by the administrative court. As such, these
judgments concerned erroneous final judicial decisions only indirectly. However, several CJEU
judgments have directly dealt with the issue of reopening judicial proceedings by the court.
In the judgment in Lucchini18 the CJEU concluded, albeit in a highly specific situation,
that the principle of res judicata had to be set aside, ensuring that the case would be reopened
by the court itself. The judgment concerned the recovery of state aid granted in breach of EU
law.19 The national court that handed down the final judgment manifestly lacked jurisdiction
as to the substance of the case, as the Commission has exclusive competence to assess
a  national state aid measure’s compatibility with EU law. According to some legal
commentators, due to this circumstance, the national judgment should have been considered
null and therefore lacking the authority of res judicata.20
The Klausner Holz Niedersachsen case concerned the application of EU rules on state aid as
well.21 The national rules on res judicata prevented the national court from drawing all
consequence of a breach of EU rules on state aid because of a previous, final judicial decision.
Specifically, this previous decision had been given in a dispute which did not have the same subject
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16 (CJEU) Kühne & Heitz (n 14), para 28.
17 (CJEU) Joint Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor ECLI:EU:C:2004:836 [2006] ECR I-8559. However,
contrary to the undertaking Kühne & Heitz, which had exhausted all legal remedies available to it, i-21 and Arcor did not
avail themselves of their right to appeal against the fee assessments issued to them. Accordingly, the judgment in Kühne
& Heitz has not finally been relevant for the purposes of determining whether, in the situation of i-21 and Arcor, an
administrative body is under an obligation to review decisions which have become final. (See order, paras 53–54).
18 (CJEU) Case C-119/05 Lucchini ECLI:EU:C:2007:434 [2007] ECR I-6199.
19 The facts at the origin of the judgment are as follows. Lucchini hoped to benefit from state aid in Italy. Before the
Commission could decide on the compatibility of the aid with the internal market, Lucchini brought an action
before an Italian civil court in order to establish its right to the payment of aid. In the meantime, the Commission
declared the aid incompatible with the internal market. The national court held, nonetheless, that Lucchini was
entitled to the aid in question and ordered the competent authorities to pay the amounts claimed. The judgment
was confirmed on appeal and was not challenged any further. It thus acquired the authority of res judicata under
Italian law. Consequently, aid was disbursed to Lucchini. Upon the Commission’s protest, the Italian authorities
ordered Lucchini to reimburse the aid. The matter was brought before the Consiglio di Stato, which found the
question was res judicata, but conceded that this would breach the primacy of EU law. It thus decided to refer 
the question to Luxembourg. See also Kornezov (n 13) 820–821.
20 For further analysis see Kornezov (n 13) 821–822. He points out that, although the CJEU has made no explicit
reference to the concept of void judgments, the latter seems to transpire throughout its reasoning. See also the CJEU’s
own interpretation of Lucchini in Fallimento Olimpiclub (n 12), para 25; and in Impresa Pizzarotti (n 12), para 61.
21 (CJEU) Klausner Holz Niedersachsen (n 12).
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matter and which did not concern, either principally or incidentally, the state aide characteristics
of the contracts at issue. The CJEU found these rules incompatible with the principle of
effectiveness; and emphasised that a principle as fundamental as that of the control of state aid
cannot be justified either by the principle of res judicata or by the principle of legal certainty.22
In the judgment in Fallimento Olimpiclub,23 the CJEU found the application of the
principle res judicata incompatible with the effectiveness of EU law once again, in the scope
and with the effect at issue in the specific case.24 As the CJEU pointed out, the way the res
judicata was construed under Italian law25 not only prevented a final judicial decision from
being reopened, but also prevented judicial scrutiny in the context of a different tax year of
any finding on a fundamental issue contained in a final judicial decision. This resulted in
a recurring violation of EU law, without the possibility to remedy the breach.
As Kornezov concludes, the CJEU favours a narrow concept of res judicata, which, on the
one hand, requires the identity of the subject-matter and, on the other hand, only covers the
operative part of a judgment.26 National rules on res judicata appear to infringe EU law only
where they have a wider scope of application.
The judgment in Kapferer27 is sometimes cited as an example of leaving the authority of
a final judgment’s res judicata unfettered, despite its alleged inconsistency with EU law. The
case concerned pending appeal proceedings, in which one of the issues – the lower court’s
jurisdiction – was not appealed before the appellate court. The question was whether the
principle of loyal cooperation required the appellate court to examine ex officio the lower
court’s jurisdiction.28 The CJEU held that the principle of cooperation does not require
a national court to set aside its internal rules of procedure in order to review and set aside
a final judicial decision if that decision should be contrary to EU law.29 The same principle was
confirmed by the CJEU in its judgment in Commission v Slovakia.30
It is however noteworthy that, according to Kornezov, in Kapferer the core issue was more
the scope of review in appeal proceedings in a pending case than the retrial. He concludes that
even if the judgment in Kapferer could admittedly be relevant in the context of retrial, the
CJEU has clearly left the question of whether the applicable national rules were compatible
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22 (CJEU) Klausner Holz Niedersachsen (n 12), paras 45–46.
23 (CJEU) Fallimento Olimpiclub (n 12).
24 This case concerned a tax dispute, where res judicata attached also to findings made in previous final judgments,
notwithstanding the fact that they had been made in relation to a different tax period. The wide scope of
application of the principle of res judicata prevented the national court to take into consideration EU rules
concerning abusive practice in the field of VAT, even if they relate to a tax year for which no final judgment has
yet been delivered.
25 (IT) Codice Civile (Civil Code), Art. 2909 on Cosa giudicata (res judicata).
26 Kornezov (n 12) 823–824, 826.
27 (CJEU) Kapferer (n 12).
28 See also Kornezov (n 13) 833.
29 (CJEU) Kapferer (n 12) para 20.
30 (CJEU) Commission v Slovakia (n 12), paras 59–60. This case concerned measures chosen by the Member State
to ensure the recovery of unlawfully allocated state aid. See further analysis see Maciej Taborowski, ‘Infringement
proceedings and non-compliant national courts’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1881–1914.
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with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness unanswered, since this was not raised in
the main proceedings. It could therefore be inferred that national rules on retrial must, in
any event, be in conformity with these principles.31
In Impresa Pizzarotti, concerning rules on a public works contract, the CJEU confirmed
the above principle again;32 and supplemented it with a new point. As a result, if the applicable
domestic rules provide the possibility for a national court to go back on its decision in order
to render the situation compatible with national law, there must also be the possibility for the
situation at issue to be brought back into line with EU legislation.33 Accordingly, to the extent
that it is authorised to do so, a national court which has given a ruling at last instance, without
a  reference having first been made to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU, must either
supplement or go back on that definitive ruling to take into account any interpretation of that
legislation provided by the CJEU subsequently.34 This duty is the result of the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness.
In short, the CJEU accepts the procedural limitations to reopening a finally adjudicated
case in national laws, notwithstanding its violation of EU law. However, it requires reopening
if such a possibility exists in national laws, or if the scope of application of res judicata under
the national legal order is wider than the meaning of res judicata under EU law.
2 Judgment of the ECHR in the Dangeville Case
It is noteworthy that the ECtHR found in its judgment of 16 April 2002, rendered in the case
of Dangeville SA, that the principle of res judicata cannot jeopardise the right to the recovery
of unduly paid taxes.35
This case concerned a company which, after having paid VAT under French law, invoked
an exemption granted in the VAT Directive. Relying on its rights conferred by EU law, the
company sought reimbursement of the overpaid VAT. However, the French authorities,
including the Conseil d’État, denied such exemption. They argued that the directive, having
not yet been implemented into national law, could not be relied on before the national
courts.36 At that time, the Conseil d’État had not yet recognised the direct effect of EU
directives. After the refusal, the company made a further claim, seeking compensation on the
ground that the French State was liable for VAT unduly paid.37 Although by then the Conseil
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31 Kornezov (n 13) 833.
32 (CJEU) Impresa Pizzarotti (n 12) para 60.
33 (CJEU) Impresa Pizzarotti (n 12) para 62.
34 (CJEU) Impresa Pizzarotti (n 12) para 64.
35 (ECtHR) S.A. Dangeville v France judgment of 16 April 2002, no. 36677/97, ECHR 2002-III § 71.
36 (FR) Conseil d’État, Assemblée, arrêt, 30/10/1996, S.A. Cabinet Revert et Badelon, 45126, publié au recueil Lebon.
37 The Cour administrative d’appel de Paris in first instance held the state liable for the non-implementation of the
Directive. However, this judgment was quashed in second instance by the Conseil d’État, which dismissed the
claimant’s action. See (FR) Cour administrative d’appel de Paris, Section plénière, arrêt, 01/07/1992, SA Cabinet
Jacques Dangeville, A.J.D.A. 1992, at 768. See also Georgios Anagnostaras, ‘The Allocation of Responsibility in State
Liability Actions for Breach of Community Law: A Modern Gordian Knot?’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 148.
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d’État had recognised the principle of direct effect, it refused to revise its original judgment
because of the principle of res judicata.38 The Conseil d’État argued that the matter
constituted a res judicata, since the recovery claim had already been rejected at last instance.39
Having been refused the recovery of the overpaid tax by the French courts, the company
claimed to the ECtHR that it had been deprived of its possessions within the meaning of
Article 1 of Protocol I of the ECHR. The company argued that it was a creditor of the state
but had been definitively deprived of the possibility of enforcing its debt because of the
decisions of the Conseil d’État dismissing its claims.40
In its judgment, the ECtHR qualified the right to restitution of the unduly paid tax as
a possession within the meaning of the ECHR. Hence, it concluded unanimously that the
refusal of such restitution constituted an infringement of the property right, despite the principle
of res judicata. The applicant was therefore awarded the pecuniary damage claimed.41
3 Member States’ Position
a) Overview of the legislative provisions
In several Member States it is indeed possible to reopen final judgments because of their
incompatibility with EU law. Three groups of states can be distinguished in this regard.
First, finally adjudicated cases can be reopened42 by reason of a manifest breach of law
in six Member States (Denmark,43 Malta,44 Finland,45 Sweden,46 the UK,47 and, in
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38 However, in a judgment of the same date concerning an application brought by another company, the business
activity and claims of which were initially identical to those of the applicant, the Conseil d’État departed from its
earlier decision and upheld that company’s claim for a refund by the state of sums wrongly paid.
39 (FR) Conseil d’État, Assemblée, arrêt 30/10/1996, Ministre du Budget/SA Jacques Dangeville.
40 It also complained of a breach of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR, combined with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, on the ground that companies which had not paid VAT had been in an advantageous position compared
to taxpayers who had spontaneously filed their VAT returns and that another company had benefited from a departure
from the earlier decision and obtained a VAT refund despite the fact that their situations were identical.
41 It it noteworthy that this judgment is a good illustration of a situation where the recovery of unduly paid tax and
the compensation of damage suffered lead to the same result.
42 It is noteworthy that detailed procedural rules on retrial may differ in each Member State. As such, the exact
expressions used in national laws may also vary. For the sake of a unified terminology and mutual understanding,
the use of these terms has been harmonised in this paper, according to the rules presented under n 5.
43 (DN) Retsplejeloven (Administration of Justice Act), § 399 on ekstraordinær genoptagelse og anke (revision and
appeal). See also ACA (n 11), National report of Denmark, Question 8b.
44 (MT) Code of Organization and Civil Procedure, Cap. 12 of the Laws of Malta, Art. 811 (e) on grounds for new trial.
45 (FI) Hallintolainkäyttölaki (Administrative Judicial Procedure Act), 11 luku, 63 § (1) (2) on Purku (annulment);
and Oikeudenkäymiskaari (Code of Judicial Procedure), 31 luku, 7–10 § on Lainvoiman saaneen tuomion
purkaminen (reversal of final judgments).
46 (SE) Förvaltningsprocesslag (Administrative Court Procedure Act), 37b § on Resning (relief for a substantive defect
in the judgment); and Rättegångsbalken (Civil Court Procedure Act), 58. kap, § 1 on resning (relief for a substantive
defect in the judgment).
47 (UK) Civil Procedure Rules, Part 52.17.
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administrative matters in Lithuania48). In these Member States, retrial can theoretically be
granted regardless of whether the violation concerns EU or national law – however, the breach
must be manifest. This latter requirement sets a similar condition to the ‘manifest breach’ in
terms of the Köbler judgment.
Second, retrial is possible in three Member States49 (Latvia,50 Portugal51 and, in admin-
is trative matters, in Poland52) on the ground that an international agreement or the incon sis-
 tency of the national judgment with the decision of an international court requires it. It is not
obvious, however, whether retrial is restricted to the case in which the international jurisdiction
has delivered its judgment, or it can also be applied to other national judgments concerned
with the same matter of law.53
Third, legislative provisions have been introduced to procedural codes in order to
recognise the violation of EU law as a specific ground for retrial in three Member States
(Croatia,54 Romania55 and Slovakia56). However, in Croatia, such a revision is not possible
concerning final judgments rendered by the supreme court.57 On the contrary, in Romanian
administrative and Slovakian civil procedural law, a single violation of law is sufficient to
reopen finally adjudicated cases, and the identity of the parties is not required either.
Therefore, even if the scope of application of these two latter provisions is narrow, they
provide generous protection.58
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48 (LT) Lietuvos Respublikos Administracinių Bylų Teisenos Įstatymo Pakeitimo Įstatymas (Law of the Republic of
Lithuania on Administrative Proceedings), 153 straipsnis on Proceso atnaujinimas (reopening of proceedings).
49 In fact, there is a similar provision in Czech law, which provides for the possibility to ask for the case to be
reopened before the Constitutional Court on the ground of a judgment of an international court delivered in the
same case. However, this remedy seems to apply primarily to ECtHR judgments. See (CZ) Zákon o Ústavním
soudu (Act on the Constitutional Court), § 119, on obnova řízení (retrial).
50 (LV) Administratīvā procesa likums (Administrative Procedure Law), 353. pants 6) on lietas jauna izskatīšana
(rehearing); and Civilprocesa likums (Civil Procedure Law), 479. pants 6), on Lietas jauna izskatīšana sakarā ar
jaunatklātiem apstākļiem – Jaunatklātie apstākļi (rehearing of cases due to newly discovered circumstances –
newly discovered facts).
51 (PT) Código de Processo Civil (Civil Procedure Code), Artigo 696.º f ), on Revisão (review); and Código de Processo
nos Tribunais Administrativos (Administrative Court Procedure Code), Artigo 154.º, with reference to the
disposition of the Civil Procedure Code.
52 (PL) Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (Regulations of Proceedings in Administrative
Court), Art. 270–274, 279 on Wznowienie postępowania (retrial); and Kodeks postępowania karnego (Code of
Criminal Procedure), Art. 540, § 3 on Wznowienie postępowania (retrial).
53 In Latvia, the jurisprudence interprets the provision as requiring that the CJEU judgment be made in the same
case that is concerned by the motion of retrial. The position of the Portuguese and Polish courts is not known in
the absence of any relevant case-law. See (LV) Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas, Senāta Administratīvo lietu
departamenta, spriedums, 14/11/2011, n° SJA – 35/2011.
54 (HR) Zakon o parničnom postupku (Civil procedure Act), članak 382 (2) (3) on Revizija.
55 (RO) Constituţia României (Constitution of Romania), Art. 20 (2), and 148 (2); and Legea Nr. 554/2004
contenciosului administrative (Law on Administrative Disputes), Art. 21 (2) on Revizuirea (retrial).
56 (SK) Občiansky súdny poriadok (Code of Civil Procedures), § 228 (1) e) on Obnova konania (retrial).
57 (HR) Zakon o parničnom postupku (n 54), članak 382.a (1).
58 It is true irrespectively to the uncertainty in Slovakia regarding the application of the time limit to introduce a
motion for retrial.
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However, there is no clear position on the issue at hand in two Member States (Bulgaria
and Cyprus). As for Bulgarian law, both procedural codes and case-law have until today
remained silent on whether a  CJEU judgment may offer a  ground for retrial. The legal
scholarship, however, does not exclude the possibility that new CJEU case-law could
eventually be considered as a new fact, and could serve as a ground for a retrial.59 In Cyprus,
the Supreme Constitutional Court holds the right to adjudicate finally on a recourse made to
it on a complaint that a decision of an organ of the state is contrary to law. There is no case-
law available on how to interpret this rule in the context of violation of EU law.60
In addition, administrative authorities in two Member States (Estonia and Poland) hold
the right to revoke their own decisions if contrary to EU law. In Poland, this possibility is
granted regardless of whether the administrative decision has become final following the
approval of the administrative court.61 This possibility appears to be given to Estonian
administrative authorities under the general rules,62 even if there is no available case-law from
the field of EU law.
On the contrary, in five Member States, available case-law has explicitly excluded re-
trial on the ground of inconsistency between the final decision and a prior or later CJEU
judgment (Italy,63 Hungary,64 Netherlands65 and Austria,66 as well as in civil matters in
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59 See the analysis by Fartunova of the two following cases rendered on the basis of the relevant provisions of the
Civil and Administrative Procedure Codes on Otmiana (retrial): First, (BG) Varhoven kasatsionen sad, Reshenie,
09/02/2012, n° 1155/2011, rendered on the basis of Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (Code of Civil Procedure),
Art. 303 on Otmiana (retrial). Second, Varhoven administrativen sad, Reshenie, 03/07/2012, n° 9588, rendered
on the basis of Aministrativen protsesualen kodeks (Administrative Procedure Code), Art. 239 on Otmiana
(retrial). Both cases have been reported by Maria Fartunova, ‘Rapport bulgare’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11)
159–160, and 161.
60 (CY) Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Art. 146.6.
61 In Poland, the reopening of the proceedings before the administrative judge on the ground of infringement of an
international agreement is also accepted. See (PL) Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi
(n 52), Art. 270–274, 279.
62 (EE) Haldusmenetluse seadus (Administrative Procedure Act), §§ 64–70 on Haldusakti muutmine ja kehtetuks
tunnistamine (administrative amendment and repeal) and §§ 71–74 on Vaidemenetlus (internal review).
63 (IT) Codice Civile (n 25), Art. 2909; Codice di procedura civile (Civil Procedure Code), Art. 395 on Revocazione
(retrial); and Tribunale di Roma, Seconda sezione civile, Sentenza, 23/03/2011, no 639, Lucchini spa/Ministero
Attività produttive, reported by Bruno Gencarelli, ‘Rapport italien’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 273.
64 (HU) Alkotmánybíróság, végzés, 07/07/2014, n° 3203/2014. (VII. 14.), reported in Reflets n° 3/2014 27. See also
A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 2016. évi CXXX. törvény (n 8), 394. § on perújítás (retrial).
65 (NL) Hoge Raad, Uitspraak, 24/06/2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9272, reported by Tony P Marguery and Herman
van Harten, ‘Rapport néerlandais’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 348 regarding Herroeping or herziening van
vonnissen (revocation or review of decisions); Centrale Raad van Beroep, 17/11/2006, AB 2007, 7, reported in
ACA (n 11), National report of the Netherlands, Question 8; Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State,
27/10/2004, AB 2004, 427, reported in ACA (n 11), National report of the Netherlands, Question 8. See Algemene
wet bestuursrecht (General Administrative Law Act), Artikel 8:119 on Herziening (retrial); and Wetboek van
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Code of Civil Procedure), Artikel 382.
66 For the exclusion of the reopening of a final administrative judgment on these grounds, see (AT) Verwaltungs -
gerichtshof, Erkenntnis, 21/09/2009, 2008/16/0148, VwSlg 8471 F/2009, reported by Alexander Pelzl, ‘Rapport
autrichien’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 97, rendered on the interpretation of Allgemeines Verwaltungs-
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Poland).67 In terms of these decisions, a subsequent CJEU judgment on the interpretation of
the EU norm is not a reason under national laws to reopen finally adjudicated cases.
Similarly, the inconsistency of the final judgment with EU law is not a basis for reopening
the case under the legislation of ten Member States (Belgium,68 Czech Republic,69 Germany,70
Ireland,71 Greece,72 Spain,73 France,74 Luxembourg75 and Slovenia,76 as well as in civil cases
in Lithuania).
Under the last fifteen regimes, retrial is considered as an extraordinary remedy, the use
of which is exhaustively listed in national legislations. According to Kornezov, the conditions
for retrial may vary between civil, administrative, and criminal law, but could be loosely fitted
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verfahrensgesetz (General Administrative Procedure Act), § 69 on Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens (reopening of
proceedings). As for civil matters, see OGH, Beschluss, 12/06/2012, 4Ob83/12b, RS0127996,
ECLI:AT:OGH0002:2012:0040OB00083.12B.0612.000, reported by Pelzl (n 67) 100, rendered on the basis of
Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure), Art. 530–531 on Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens (reopening 
of proceedings). For fiscal matters, see Bundesabgabenordnung (Federal Tax Act), § 303 on Wiederaufnahme des
Verfahrens (reopening of proceedings).
67 (PL) Sąd Najwyższy, Postanowienie, 22/10/2009, I UZ 64/09, reported by Przemysław Mikłaszewicz, ‘Rapport
polonais’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 377, on the interpretation of the ground for reopening a final civil
judgment. See also Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Code of Civil Procedure), Art. 403 on wznowienie
postępowania (retrial).
68 (BE) Arrêté du Régent déterminant la procédure devant la section du contentieux administratif du Conseil d’État,
Art. 50bis à 50sexies on recours en révision (revision); and Code judiciaire (Judicial Code), Art. 2, 015, version
applicable à partir du 01/11/2015, Art. 23.
69 (CZ) Nejvyšší správní soud, rozsudek, 27/10/2010, 7 Afs 79/2010-94, reported by David Petrlík, ‘Rapport tchèque’
in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 420, 425; and Občanský soudní řád (Code of Civil Justice), § 159a (4) on the
principle res judicata.
70 (DE) Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO) (Code of Administrative Court Procedure), § 153 on Restitutionsklage
(action for retrial); Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (Code of Civil Procedure), § 580 on Restitutionsklage (action for
retrial); and Oberlandesgericht Köln, 6 U 158/03, NJOZ 2004, p. 2764.
71 (IR) Blackhall v Grehan [1995] 3 IR 208 and L.P. v M.P. [2002] 1 IR 219, reported by Marie-Luce Paris, ‘Rapport
irlandais’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 260.
72 (EL) Άρειος Πάγος (Areios Pagos), 16/03/2011, 484/2011, NOMOS on επανάληψη της διαδικασίας (demande
de repetition de procedure or revision); Άρειος Πάγος (Areios Pagos), 14/12/2004, 1845/2005, NOMOS; Άρειος
Πάγος, 24/02/2012 353/2012, NOMOS; Κώδικας Πολιτικής Δικονομίας (Code of Civil Procedure), Art. 538-551
on Αναψηλάφηση (retrial); and Κώδικας Διοικητικής Δικονομίας (Code of Administrative Procedure), on
Δεδικασμένο (res judicata).
73 (ES) Ley 29/1998, de 13 de julio, reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-administrativa (Law on administrative
judicial procedures), Art. 102, on Revisión de sentencias (retrial); Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento
Civil (Civil Procedure Code), Art. 509 on Revisión de sentencias firmes (retrial of final judgments); and Real decreto
de 14 de septiembre de 1882 por el que se aprueba la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal (Criminal procedure code),
Art. 954 on Recurso de revisión (action for retrial).
74 Under French law, it is not possible either to compromise the res judicata of a final judgment by reason of an
erroneous interpretation of law. Therefore, retrial is not possible on the ground of breach of EU law, neither in
administrative, nor in civil matters. See also Olivier Dubos, David Katz, and Philippe Mollard, ‘Rapport francais’
in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 210–217.
75 (LU) Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile (New Civil Procedure Code), Art. 617 on rétractation.
76 (SI) Zakon o upravnem sporu (Administrative Dispute Act), 96. člen on obnova postopka (reopened proceedings).
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into four main groups: discovery of fresh evidence or of the fact that the evidence had been
falsified or involved fraud; default judgments; contradictory judgments; or grave legal errors.77
Erroneous interpretation of the law is therefore not a reason to make use of this extraordinary
remedy.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, in several Member States a judgment by the ECtHR
is a ground in its own right to reopen cases.78 In this regard, the Council of Europe has even
published a recommendation on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic
level following judgments of the ECtHR.79 In this document, the panel invites the Contracting
Parties to ensure that there exist, at national level, adequate possibilities to achieve, as far as
possible, restitutio in integrum; for example by way of reopening cases. Such provisions can
be found in the criminal procedural code of most Member States of the EU, and in the civil
or administrative procedure in Bulgaria,80 Germany,81 Estonia,82 Lithuania,83 Netherlands84
and Romania,85 for example. It is noteworthy, however, that the possibility of retrial based on
breach of the ECHR is usually limited to specific cases in which the ECtHR has rendered its
judgment.
b) Application of the regime to violations of EU law
Austria
National rules on retrial
There are two judgments reported from Austria confirming that, under this regime,
a  subsequent CJEU judgment on the interpretation of the EU norm is not a  reason for
reopening proceedings.
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77 Kornezov (n 13) 829.
78 It is noteworthy that, in the event of reopening of the final judgment on the ground of breach of the ECHR, the
breach must usually be established by the ECtHR in the same case, and the reopening concerns only the main
proceedings at issue.
79 (ECHR) Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination
or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgements of the European Court of Human Rights
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 January 2000 at the 694th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
80 (BG) Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art. 303, § 1, 7); and Aministrativen protsesualen kodeks (n 59), 
Art. 239.
81 (DE) Zivilprozessordnung (n 70), § 580, Nr. 8. Even if it was debated before the legislation whether to extend the
scope of retrial to situations of inconsistency with the CJEU judgments, this proposal was eventually rejected. See
(DE) Bundestag-Drucksache, 13/3594, 29/01/1996.
82 (EE) Halduskohtumenetluse seadustik (Code of Administrative Court Procedure), § 240(2) 8) on Teistmine
(retrial); and Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik (Code of Civil Procedure), § 702(2) 8) on Teistmine (retrial). See also
ACA (n 11), National report of Estonia, Question 14.
83 (LT) Civilinio proceso kodeksas (Civil Procedure Code), XVIII Skyrius, 366 straipsnis 1. 1.) on Proceso atnaujinimas
(reopening of proceedings); and Lietuvos Respublikos Administracinių Bylų Teisenos Įstatymo Pakeitimo Įstatymas
(n 48) 153 straipsnis 2.1.
84 (NL) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (n 65), Artikel 382 on Herroeping van vonnissen (revocation of
judgments).
85 (RO) Codul de procedură civilă (Civil Procedure Code), Art. 509 (1) 10. This provision is applicable in adminis -
trative matters as well; and Legea Nr. 554/2004 contenciosului administrative (n 55), Art. 21, § 1.
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Judgment of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof of 2009
In this regard, according to the judgment of the VwGH rendered on 21 September 2009, there
is no provision in the General Administrative Procedure Act to allow retrial on this ground.86
Judgment of the Oberster Gerichtshof of 2012
As for civil matters, the OGH rendered a similar decision regarding the interpretation of the
Code of Civil Procedure on 12 June 2012.87 Moreover, the same rule applies equally to fiscal
matters.88
Belgium
Under Belgian procedural laws, misinterpretation of law in a final judgment cannot serve as
a ground for retrial, regardless of whether the breach concerns national or EU rules.89
Bulgaria
National rules on retrial
As for Bulgarian law, both procedural codes and case-law have remained silent on whether
a  CJEU judgment may offer a  ground for retrial.90 Retrial is granted, inter alia, where
a subsequent judgment by the ECtHR makes it necessary,91 and where new facts that could
have had an influence on the final decision have been discovered.92
The legal literature does not exclude the possibility that a  new CJEU case-law could
eventually be considered as a new fact, and could serve as a ground for retrial. In this respect,
Fartunova relies on two decisions of the Bulgarian highest courts to conclude that such reopening
might eventually be possible in the event of violation of EU law, under certain conditions.93
Decision of the Varhoven kasatsionen sad of 2012
In the first decision, rendered on 9 February 2012, the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme
Court of Cassation, Bulgaria) refused the motion for retrial as it had not found any connection
between the underlying case and EU law.
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86 For the exclusion of the reopening of a final administrative judgment on these grounds, see (AT) Verwaltungs -
gerichtshof, Erkenntnis, 21/09/2009, 2008/16/0148, VwSlg 8471 F/2009, declaring that there is no applicable
provision for retrial in the Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (n 67), § 69. For fiscal matters, see also
Bundesabgabenordnung (n 67), § 303, and Pelzl (n 67) 98–104.
87 For the exclusion of the reopening of a final civil judgment see (AT) OGH, Beschluss, 12/06/2012 (n 67), rendered
on the basis of Zivilprozessordnung (n 67), Art. 530–531.
88 (AT) Bundesabgabenordnung (n 67), § 303, and Pelzl (n 67) 98–104.
89 (BE) Arrêté du Régent déterminant la procédure devant la section du contentieux administratif du Conseil d’État
(n 68) Art. 50bis à 50sexies; and Code judiciaire (n 68), Art. 23. In Belgium, the revocation of the final decision
by the administration is not possible if the administrative court has already confirmed the decision. See also Yves
Houyet, ‘Rapport belge’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 123, 126–127.
90 (BG) Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art. 303; and Aministrativen protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art. 239.
91 (BG) Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art. 303, § 1, 7); and Aministrativen protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art.
99, § 1, 7) and 239 § (6).
92 (BG) Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art. 303, § 1, 5); and Aministrativen protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art.
239.
93 Fartunova (n 59) 161.
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In fact, the applicant argued that the supreme court had infringed its obligation to submit
a request for preliminary ruling to the CJEU in the preliminary proceedings. However, for
the Varhoven kasatsionen sad, the questions proposed by the applicant did not concern the
interpretation of EU law, and therefore the request for retrial was dismissed.
According to Fartunova’s interpretation of this judgment, the situation would have been
different had the case concerned EU law. In such a hypothetical situation, the infringement
of the obligation to refer a question to the CJEU would have had the result of preventing the
discovery of new facts having a potential influence on the final judgment.94
Decision of the Varhoven administrativen sad of 3 July 2012
In the second case, the Varhoven administrativen sad (Supreme Administative Court,
Bulgaria) pronounced on the relationship between the violation of EU law and the national
rules on retrial concerning an administrative dispute. In its decision of 3 July 2012, it found
that the conditions for retrial had not been met in the case.95
The applicant introduced a request for retrial because, in the preliminary proceedings, the
Varhoven administrativen sad had not considered a judgment of the CJEU, and rendered
a decision contrary to EU law. In this regard, he referred to a case before the CJEU in which
he had also been party, and in which the judgment had been pronounced after the contested
national decision was made. Under these circumstances, the Varhoven administrativen sad
found that the judgment of the CJEU could not be considered as a new fact or new circum -
stance in terms of the rules on retrial. That is because the applicant had already known about
the proceedings before the CJEU at the time of the primary proceedings.
Fartunova considers that a judgment of the CJEU can, however, constitute a new fact or
circumstance justifying the reopening of the case if the applicant had only received knowledge
of it after the contested decision was made.96
Assessment
In short, even if the opinion of legal scholarship is in favour of an interpretation of national
rules allowing retrial on the ground of infringement of EU law in Bulgaria, it remains to be
seen whether the courts will follow this reasoning.
Croatia
In Croatia, although the civil procedure act provides for a revision against a second instance
decision when necessary in the light of the jurisprudence of the CJEU,97 revision is excluded
against the second instance decisions of the national supreme court.98
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94 (BG) Varhoven kasatsionen sad, Reshenie, 09/02/2012 (n 59).
95 (BG) Varhoven administrativen sad, Reshenie, 03/07/2012 (n 59).
96 Fartunova (n 59) 161.
97 (HR) Zakon o parničnom postupku (n 54), članak 382 (2) (3) on Revizija.
98 (HR) Zakon o parničnom postupku (n 54), članak 382.a (1).
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Cyprus
In Cyprus, the Supreme Constitutional Court has the final decision on a complaint that
a decision of a state body is contrary to the law. There is, however, no case-law available on
the application of this rule to violations of EU law.99
Czech Republic
National rules on retrial
The Czech civil procedure code does not allow for the reopening of cases on the ground of
breach of national or EU rules, because of the principle of res judicata.100
However, it is possible to ask for the reopening of the case before the Ústavní soud (Czech
Constitutional Court), if an international court has subsequently delivered a judgment in the
same case, which contradicts the national decision. Nevertheless, this remedy appears to
apply to ECtHR judgments, and not to CJEU decisions.101 Moreover, such an application for
retrial is inadmissible if the consequences of the violation of human rights have been
sufficiently remedied, e.g. by providing just satisfaction via compensation.102
Judgment of the Nejvyšší správní soud of 2010
In addition, in terms of a judgment of the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Supreme Adminis -
trative Court) of 27 October 2010, a subsequent CJEU judgment on the interpretation of the
EU norm is not a reason to revoke administrative decisions already confirmed by the admin -
istrative court.103
This judgment concerned a Kühne & Heitz situation, i.e. a review of an administrative
decision which acquired res judicata. However, as the Nejvyšší správní soud found that as
this extraordinary remedy serves to correct factual mistakes and not the erroneous
interpretation of law, it dismissed the claim.104
Denmark
In Denmark, cases can be reopened in extraordinary situations.105 Due to the general scope
of application of this provision, it appears suitable for providing remedy for violation of EU
law as well. However, there is no case-law available to confirm this assumption.
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99 (CY) ACA (n 11), National report of Cyprus, Question 14.
100 Petrlík (n 69) 427. See also (CZ) Občanský soudní řád (n 69), § 159a (4).
101 (CZ) Zákon o Ústavním soudu (n 49), § 119.
102 (CZ) Zákon o Ústavním soudu (n 49), § 119.
103 (CZ) Nejvyšší správní soud, rozsudek, 27/10/2010 (n 69).
104 (CZ) Zákon správní řád (Code of Administrative Procedure), §§ 100–102 on obnova řízení (review of
proceedings); and Zákon daňový řád (Code of Fiscal Procedure), §§ 117–120 on obnova řízení.
Moreover, another procedure under Czech law, e.g. the revision (přezkumné řízení) is not suitable either, for
different reasons, to revoke erroneous administrative decisions on the basis of the Kühne doctrine. See (CZ)
Zákon správní řád, §§ 94–99 on přezkummé řízení (revision); and (CZ) Zákon daňový řád, §§ 121–124a on
přezkummé řízení; as well as Petrlík (n 69) 421–424.
105 (DN) Retsplejeloven (n 43), § 399. See also ACA (n 11), National report of Denmark, Question 8b.
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Estonia
Concerning the remedial system of Estonia, legislative provisions stating the grounds for
retrial only refer to ECtHR judgments, and not to CJEU decisions.106 As such, there appears
to be no provision applicable for EU law violations.
Moreover, Estonian courts held that reopening cases is only possible if compensation for
damages is not available, since Estonian laws give priority to liability claim over retrial.107
However, as for the revocation of a final administrative decision, the authority has the
right to revoke its decision, contrary to the EU law, even if it has become final following the
approval of the administrative court. This possibility appears to be given to Estonian
administrative authorities under the general rules,108 even if there is no specific case-law
available in the field of EU law.109
Finland
National rules on retrial
In Finland, reopening a case – in the terms of the Finnish law, the ‘annulment’ of a final
judgment – is possible on the ground of a manifest breach of law.110 Specifically, in terms of
the civil and administrative procedure codes, a case can be reopened111 ‘if the final judgment
is based on manifestly erroneous application of the law or on an error which may have had
an essential effect on the decision’.
This exceptional remedy is therefore available for both national and EU law violations, but
the breach must be qualified, and the reopening must be justified by reasons of individual or
general interest.
The jurisprudence has already provided some examples for the application of these rules
in cases regarding EU law violations. Mention will therefore be made of six judgments, four
rendered by the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finnish Supreme Administrative Court), and two
delivered by the Korkein oikeus (Supreme Court of Finland).
Judgment of the Korkein hallinto-oikeus of 2009
In the first judgment of 7 December 2009, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus declared that an admin -
istrative case can be reopened by the court on the ground of manifestly erroneous application 
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106 (EE) Halduskohtumenetluse seadustik (n 82), § 240(2) 8); Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik (n 82), § 702(2) 8). See
also ACA (n 11), National report of Estonia, Question 14.
107 (EE) Riigivastutuse seadus (State Liability Act), § 15(1).
108 (EE) Haldusmenetluse seadus (n 62), §§ 64–70 and §§ 71–74.
109 ACA (n 11), National report of Estonia, Questions 1–4, 8.
110 (FI) Hallintolainkäyttölaki (n 45), 11 luku, 63 § (1) (2): ‘63 (1) A decision may be annulled: […] (2) if the decision
is based on manifestly erroneous application of the law or on an error which may have had an essential effect on
the decision […]’
(FI) Oikeudenkäymiskaari (n 45), 31 luku, 7–10 §: ‘7 § (1) A final judgment in a civil case may be reversed: [...]
(4) if the judgment is manifestly based on misapplication of the law.’
111 Even if it is not the equivalent term of the Finnish law, for the sake of terminological unity, the general term of
‘reopening’ will be used instead of ‘annulment’ of ‘revocation’.
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of EU law by the administrative authority.112 However, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus dismissed
the request, since it concluded that reopening was not necessary in the case.
The case concerned taxes paid by the applicant for a period between 1999 and 2004,
relating to foreign trade. Without having exhausted the administrative remedies available to
him, the applicant submitted a claim for reopening the decision of the fiscal authority.
The Korkein hallinto-oikeus reviewed the decisions and found that they were in
conformity with Finnish law. As for EU law, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus stated that their
compatibility with the EU rules can be called into question, since Finnish law imposed a higher
rate of tax for merchant vessels engaged in foreign trade than for those engaged in domestic
trade services. However, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus attributed importance to two
circumstances when evaluating the necessity to reopen the case. In this regard, it concluded
that the applicant had not lodged an appeal against the administrative decisions, and he could
have passed the taxes on to his clients. Therefore, after taking all circumstances into account,
the Korkein hallinto-oikeus decided that there were not sufficient reasons to reopen the case.
In the above decision, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus revised an administrative decision which
had not been the subject of an ordinary appeal before the administrative court. However, under
Finnish law, the same rules apply concerning the reopening of final administrative decisions
having or not been subject to appeal before the administrative court.113
Judgment of the Korkein hallinto-oikeus of 2010
In the second judgment of 30 June 2010, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus examined the possibility
of reopening a case, in which it had delivered a final judgment itself, on the ground of breach
of EU law. As in the above case, the court concluded that there was no specific individual or
general interest which justified such reopening,114 and so it dismissed the action.
At the origin of the case was a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Korkein
hallinto-oikeus in 2002, which concerned the Finnish tax on imported vehicles.
Following the judgment by the CJEU,115 another case emerged before the Korkein
hallinto-oikeus regarding the application of the same national tax rules in 2006.116 In these
proceedings, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus refused to make a new preliminary reference, despite
the request of the claimant. Finally, the court handed down its judgment, giving an
interpretation to the previous CJEU judgment that did not favour the applicant’s claim. In 
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112 (FI) Korkein hallinto-oikeus, 07/12/2009, 2806, KHO:2009:99, Diaarinumero: 4221/2/08, reported by Heikki
Kanninen, ‘Rapport finnois’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 195–196.
113 (FI) Hallintolainkäyttölaki (n 45), 11 luku, 63 § (1) (2). As Kanninen explains, under Finnish rules, if an adminis -
trative decision has already been subject to an appeal before the administrative court, it can only be revised on
the ground of rules governing the reopening of a final judgment. Moreover, the relevant provisions of the
Procedural Administrative Code apply also, under certain circumstances, to the re-examination of administrative
decisions which have not been the subject of appeal before the administrative court. See Kanninen (n 112) 195.
114 (FI) Korkein hallinto-oikeus, 30/06/2010, 1561, KHO:2010:44, Diaarinumero: 1043/2/09, reported by Kanninen
(n 112) 196–197.
115 (CJEU) Case C-101/00 Tulliasiamies and Siilin ECLI:EU:C:2002:505 [2002] ECR I-7487.
116 In the case at hand, the applicant sought the annulment of the final judgment rendered in this case.
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fact, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus concluded that the Finnish rules were compatible with EU
law, and consequently dismissed the request of the applicant to overturn the tax decision.
Later, in 2009, the CJEU declared in an infringement procedure that the Finnish tax was
contrary to the EU law.117 It thus became clear that the judgment of the Korkein hallinto-
oikeus in 2006 infringed EU law.
Invoking this new CJEU judgment, the applicant submitted a motion for retrial before the
Korkein hallinto-oikeus. As for the breach of the referral duty, the court found that the refusal
to request a new preliminary ruling had been justified. The court argued that the CJEU had
already handed down a judgment in 2002, following a request submitted by the same Finnish
court. Therefore, the court had all reason to think in 2006 that a  new request was not
necessary. As for the infringement of the substantive EU law, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus
argued that, even if the breach could be established, neither individual nor general interest
justified the retrial.118
Judgment of the Korkein hallinto-oikeus of 2011
In the third judgment delivered on 11 April 2011, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus reopened the
case and annulled, for the first time, one of its former final judgments on the ground of
infringement of EU law.119
The contested judgment concerned the taxation of controlled foreign companies and the
inclusion of the profits of controlled foreign companies in the tax base of the parent company.
Despite the request of the applicant, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus refused to make a preliminary
reference and handed down its judgment in 2002, giving an interpretation to the EU law which
did not favour the claim.
Following a judgment by the CJEU in 2006,120 it became clear that the interpretation of
the rules by the Korkein hallinto-oikeus had been incorrect. The applicant therefore requested
the reopening of the final judgment of 2002.
Examining the motion for retrial, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus stated that the breach of the
referral duty justified the reopening of the case. In fact, the CJEU case-law had not been
sufficiently clear at the time of the main proceedings, which means that a  request for
preliminary ruling should have been submitted by the court in 2002.
Judgment of the Korkein hallinto-oikeus of 2013
In the fourth judgment, delivered on 27 December 2013, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus
dismissed a motion for retrial concerning a case in which it had delivered a final judgment.121
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117 (CJEU) Case C-10/08 Commission v Finland ECLI:EU:C:2009:171 [2009] ECR I-39*.
118 Presented by Kanninen (n 112) 196–197.
119 (FI) Korkein hallinto-oikeus, 11/04/2011, 1018, KHO:2011:38, Diaarinumero: 3059/2/06 reported by Kanninen
(n 112) 197.
120 (CJEU) Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas ECLI:EU:C:2006:544 [2005] ECR
I-10423.
121 (FI) Korkein hallinto-oikeus, 27/12/2013, 4057, KHO:2013:199, Diaarinumero 2356/2/13, reported in database
JuriFast.
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It reached this decision after having concluded that there had been no specific reasons
justifying the reopening of the case, also because the applicant had already been given
compensation in a liability action for the damages suffered.
The facts at the basis of the dispute can be summarised as follows. The Finnish tax
administration had ordered vehicle tax and value added tax to be collected on a used car
imported by the applicant from Belgium into Finland in 2003. After exhausting all ordinary
appeals against the decision, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus
had dismissed the taxpayer’s claim that the VAT on the car be removed.
After this final administrative judgment, the CJEU declared that the Finnish rules were
contrary to EU law.122
Afterwards, in a first course of action, the taxpayer applied before the civil court for
compensation for the prejudice caused by the assessment decision. The Korkein oikeus relied
on the subsequent CJEU judgment and stated that the Finnish rules were discriminatory and
contrary to EU law. Consequently, the Korkein oikeus concluded that the infringement of
Article 110 TFEU was sufficiently demonstrated to make Finland liable, so it ordered the state
to pay compensation for the prejudice suffered.123
Notwithstanding the fact that he had already been compensated for his monetary loss, the
taxpayer initiated a second course of action. That time, he asked the revision of the unlawful
final administrative judgment before the Korkein hallinto-oikeus. The applicant referred to
the CJEU decision declaring the Finnish system contrary to EU law and to the judgment of the
Korkein oikeus in the liability action.
In this regard, the Korkein hallinto-oikeus pointed out that the possibility to ask for
compensation from the state for the tax unduly paid had to be kept separate from the
reopening of the case. The latter is subject to the provisions of the administrative procedural
code.124 As, with hindsight, the administrative judgment’s inconsistency with EU law was
established, the main condition for retrial was fulfilled. However, it was also necessary to
consider that a case can only be reopened for very significant reasons if five years have already
elapsed since the date the final judgment became final.125
The Korkein hallinto-oikeus concluded that the reopening of the case was not necessary,
even though the final judgment proved to infringe EU law. It reached this conclusion by
referring to the Köbler judgment and to the contested Finnish fiscal rules, which had in the
meantime been modified without retroactive effect.
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122 (CJEU) Tulliasiamies and Siilin (n 115); and in Commission v Finland (n 117).
123 It is interesting to note that to be able to follow up the claimant’s application, the supreme court had to set aside
the application of a legal rule concerning compensation for prejudice that limited the liability of public entities.
See (FI) Korkein oikeus, 05/07/2013, A Oy, KKO:2013:58, Diaarinumero S2012/143.
124 (FI) Hallintolainkäyttölaki (n 45), 11 luku, 63 § (1) (2).
125 (FI) Hallintolainkäyttölaki (n 45), 11 luku, 64 § (2).
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Judgment of the Korkein oikeus of 2007
As for civil matters, in the fifth judgment rendered on 2 April 2007, the Korkein oikeus
reopened the case and annulled a final judgment of a first instance court, due to the manifestly
erroneous application of EU law.126
The contested judgment concerned a liability claim regarding motor vehicle insurance.127
After the first instance court’s decision was pronounced, the CJEU handed down a judgment
which interpreted the relevant provisions of the EU directive.128 Following this judgment, the
Korkein oikeus itself changed its case-law concerning the interpretation of the EU provision
at issue.
Relying on the new case-law, the Korkein oikeus found in the retrial proceedings that the
final judgment had applied the EU provisions in a manifestly erroneous way. Hence, as the
conditions to reopen the case were satisfied, the Korkein oikeus declared the applicant’s claim
well founded.129
Judgment of the Korkein oikeus of 2007
In the sixth judgment, pronounced also on 2 April 2007, the Korkein oikeus declared
inadmissible a motion for retrial, because of the expiry of the time limit to submit such
a request.130
In that case, after the delivery of the final judgment on motor vehicle insurance, the
Korkein oikeus changed the way it interpreted the EU provision at issue in the contested
judgment. Moreover, the CJEU handed down a judgment131 which interpreted the provisions
of the EU directive in a way that was favourable to the applicant.132
However, as the motion was submitted later than one year after the contested judgment
acquired res judicata, the request was dismissed.133
Assessment
In summary, reopening a case – in terms of the Finnish rules, the ‘annulment’ of the final
judgment – by reason of violation of EU law is possible and subject to the evaluation of a case’s
specific circumstances under Finnish administrative and civil law.134 As such, the necessity
to set aside the res judicata is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
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126 (FI) Korkein oikeus, 02/04/2007, 626, KKO:2007:34, Diaarinumero: H2006/18, reported by Kanninen (n 112)
193–194.
127 (EU) Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ 8/17.
128 (CJEU) Case C-537/03 Candolin and Others ECLI:EU:C:2005:417 [2005] ECR I-5745.
129 The presentation of the case is provided after Kanninen (n 112) 194.
130 (FI) Korkein oikeus, 02/04/2007, 627, KKO:2007:35, Diaarinumero: H2006/166, reported by Kanninen (n 112)
194.
131 (CJEU) Judgment in Candolin and Others (n 128).
132 Presentation after Kanninen (n 112) 194.
133 (FI) Oikeudenkäymiskaari (n 45), 31 luku, 10 §
134 (FI) Hallintolainkäyttölaki (n 45), 11 luku, 63 § (1) (2); and Oikeudenkäymiskaari (n 45), 31 luku, 7–10 §.
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The time limit to submit a motion for retrial differs in administrative and civil matters.
As for the former, they must be presented within five years following the judgment acquired
res judicata;135 as for the latter, the time limit is only one year.136
To conclude, Finnish law does not seem to attribute importance to the distinction
whether the CJEU judgment was rendered before or after the national decision. In fact, under
Finnish rules, the mere breach of law may be sufficient to justify retrial. The question whether
the violation became apparent due to a CJEU judgment delivered before or after the decision
seems to be irrelevant.
France
Under the French law, it is not possible to compromise the res judicata of a final judgment
invoking an erroneous interpretation of law. Retrial is therefore not possible on grounds of
misinterpretation of national or EU law, neither in administrative, nor in civil matters.137
Germany
Similarly to most Member States, the inconsistency of a final judgment with national or EU
law is not a ground for retrial in terms of the German procedural rules.138
Greece
The same holds true for Greek law, which does not provide a ground for retrial in cases of
violation of national or EU rules by the final judgment.139
Even so, the Areios Pagos (Greek Supreme Court of Cassation) has ruled that an ECtHR
judgment can serve as a reason to reopen final judgments only in criminal cases.140 As for civil
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135 (FI) Hallintolainkäyttölaki (n 45), 11 luku, 64 § (2).
136 (FI) Oikeudenkäymiskaari (n 45), 31 luku, 10 §.
137 See also Dubos, Katz and Mollard (n 74) 210–217. As for the revocation of final administrative decision by the
administrative authority or the administrative court, it is possible under certain circumstances defined by the code
de procédure administrative. It should however be mentioned, that the Conseil d’État adopted a special solution
for the revision of final individual administrative decisions which has conferred rights to individuals. Despite the
general prohibition to revoke a decision favourable to the individual, this is exceptionally possible even beyond
the four-month time limit if the decision concern a state aid which had been allocated in violation of EU law. See
(FR) Code de justice administrative (Code of Administrative Justice), Art. R. 421-1 for the revision of final
individual administrative decisions by the administrative court; Conseil d’État, Assemblé, décision, 26/10/2001,
Ternon, n° 197018, ECLI:FR:CEASS:2001:197018.20011026, Publié au recueil Lebon, regarding the revision by
the administrative court itself; and Conseil d’État, 29/03/2006, Centre d’exportation du livre français et Ministre
de la culture et de la communication, n° 274923, Rec. p. 173, reported by Dubos, Katz and Mollard (n 74) 
200–210.
138 (DE) Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (n 70), § 153; and Zivilprozessordnung (n 70), § 580. See also Daniel Dittert,
‘Rapport allemande’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 66; and Oberlandesgericht Köln, 6 U 158/03 (n 70).
139 Retrial is not possible in civil matters and administrative matters. See (EL) Κώδικας Πολιτικής Δικονομίας (n 72),
Art. 538-551, 544; Κώδικας Διοικητικής Δικονομίας (n 72), Αρθρο: 197; and Άρειος Πάγος, 16/03/2011 (n 72).
See also Vassili Christianos, ‘Rapport hellénique’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 235–236.
140 (EL) Κώδικας Ποινικής Δικονομίας (Code of Criminal Procedure), on Επανάληψη της Διαδικασίας (retrial). See
also Christianos (n 139) 235–236.
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or administrative disputes, an ECtHR judgment can only give rise to compensation, but
cannot provide ground to reopen a final judgment.141
Hungary
National rules on retrial
Hungarian courts have repeatedly held that a breach of law in a final judgment is not a ground
for retrial according to the procedural rules.142
Decision of the Alkotmánybíróság of 2014
The judgment by the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest Municipal Court, Hungary) applying
the above principle in an EU-related case,143 was confirmed by the Alkotmánybíróság
(Constitutional Court) on 7 July 2014.144 In this regard, the Fővárosi Törvényszék explained
that a  subsequent judgment by the CJEU, rendered in a  distinct procedure, cannot be
considered as a new fact, and, therefore, cannot justify reopening the case. The Alkotmány -
bíróság emphasised in this regard that the CJEU judgment has only ex nunc effect.
Italy
National rules on retrial
In the Italian legal system, the res judicata principle is of paramount importance,145 hence
retrial is not an accepted method for remedying misinterpretations of law.
Judgment of the Tribunale di Roma of 2011
In the national follow-up of the Lucchini judgment,146 the Tribunale di Roma denied retrial,
even following the CJEU decision rendered in the same case.147 The court decided, the
principle of res judicata did not allow the reopening of the case, despite the preliminary ruling
by the CJEU.
Judgment of the Corte di Cassazione of 2008
On the other hand, in a judgment of 12 May 2008, the Corte Suprema di Cassazione accepted,
as a  consequence of the Lucchini judgment, that res judicata can be set aside in very
exceptional circumstances.148
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141 (EL) Άρειος Πάγος, 14/12/2004 (n 72); and Άρειος Πάγος, 24/02/2012 (n 72).
142 (HU) See judgments below, rendered on the basis of A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi III. törvény (n 9),
260. § which contain a similar provision that the A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 2016. évi CXXX. törvény (n 8),
394. §.
143 (HU) Fővárosi Törvényszék, végzés, 3.Kf.650.165/2013/3.
144 (HU) Alkotmánybíróság, végzés, 07/07/2014 (n 64).
145 (IT) Codice Civile (n 25), Art. 2909; and Codice di procedura civile (n 63), Art. 395. Moreover, the rules on the
power of the administrative authority to revoke its former decisions (autotutela) do not seem to permit to review
the erroneous decisions either. See Legge sul procedimento amministrativo (Code of the Administrative
Procedure), Art. 21-nonies on Autotutela. See also Gencarelli (n 63) 275–278.
146 (IT) Tribunale di Roma, Seconda sezione civile, Sentenza, 23/03/2011 (n 63).
147 See (CJEU) Lucchini (n 18).
148 (IT) Corte Suprema di cassazione, Cassazione civile, Sezione unite, Sentenza, 19/05/2008, n° 12641, reported
by Gencarelli (n 63) 273.
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Assessment
As in Italy retrial can be granted in very exceptional, state aid-related cases only, it cannot be
considered as a generally available remedy for violation of EU law.
Ireland
The reopening of cases in which the High Court or the Supreme Court has delivered a final
judgment is not possible in Ireland either.149
Latvia
In Latvia, the judgment of the ECtHR or other international or supranational courts can serve
as a ground for retrial – in terms of the Latvian rules, ‘adjudication of matters de novo’ – in
connection with newly discovered facts.150 The CJEU is considered to be one such
international court. However, for the application of this provision, the jurisprudence appears
to require that the judgment of the international court be made in the same case as is
concerned by the motion for retrial.151
Lithuania
National rules on retrial
Under Lithuanian law, cases before administrative courts can be reopened on condition that
the applicant submits clear evidence showing a  fundamental violation of a  substantive
provision of law that led to the illegality of the judgment.152 According to the case-law of the
Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Supreme Administrative Court, Lithuania), the
infringement is considered to be obvious when there are no reasonable doubts regarding the
erroneous interpretation of the norms.153
The above rules have general application, and both breach of substantive law connected
to EU legal rules and infringement of national law fall into this category. Administrative
proceedings can therefore be reopened where the administrative court of last instance
commits a  manifest infringement of substantive EU law.154 In fact, the Vyriausiasis
administracinis teismas has already reopened cases on these grounds.
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149 (IE) Blackhall v Grehan [1995] (n 71).
150 (LV) Administratīvā procesa likums (n 50), 353. pants 6); and Civilprocesa likums (n 50), 479. pants 6).
151 (LV) Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas, Senāta Administratīvo lietu departamenta, spriedums, 14/11/2011 
(n 53).
152 (LT) Lietuvos Respublikos Administracinių Bylų Teisenos Įstatymo Pakeitimo Įstatymas (n 48), 153 straipsnis: ‘2.
The proceedings may be resumed on the following grounds: 1) if the European Court of Human Rights rules that
a decision of the court of the Republic of Lithuania is not in conformity with the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; [...] 10) in case of submission of clear
evidence of the commission of a material violation of the norms of substantive law in the application of the
norms which could have affected the adopting of the illegal decision, ruling or order; [...] 12) when it is necessary
to ensure the formation of uniform practice of administrative courts.’ See also ACA (n 11), National report of
Lithuania, Questions 1–4, 11; and Regina Valutyté, ‘Lithuanian report’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 301. The
deadline to submit the motion for retrial is three months.
153 Valutyté (n 152) 301–302.
154 Valutyté (n 152) 301. See also ACA (n 11), National report of Lithuania, Question 3.
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However, as for civil matters, retrial based on violation of law is possible on more limited
grounds. As such, only judgments of inferior courts, which became final in the absence of
appeal against them, can be revised for this reason in retrial proceedings.155 Reopening of
cases where the judgments have been rendered by superior courts is not provided on the
ground of erroneous interpretation of law.
Moreover, both civil and administrative procedure codes provide explicit grounds for
retrial where a judgment by the ECtHR establishes the violation of the fundamental rights by
a final national decision. However, these provisions only refer to the ECtHR judgments, and
not to CJEU decisions.156
As already mentioned, the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas has already applied the
domestic rules on retrial in EU-related cases. Two judgments are worth being mentioned in
this regard.
Decision of the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas of 2008
In the first case, the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas decided on 10 April 2008 to reopen
a case due to the violation of a substantive EU provision in the primary proceedings.157
The main facts at the origin of the primary proceedings are as follows. The administrative
authority had imposed a fine on a student for failing to produce a document, when requested,
to certify his entitlement to reduced-rate public transport. In fact, the applicant, a university
student in France, had in his possession a  certificate from a  French university, but the
Lithuanian administrative body refused to accept the foreign document. The student,
contesting the refusal because of the violation of several fundamental freedoms protected by
the TFEU, asked the administrative court to overturn the administrative decision. The first
instance court accepted the complaint, but then the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas
dismissed the claim without discussing the question of the application of the EU law.
Dissatisfied with the final judgment, the student asked for the reopening of the case. He
contested, in particular, that the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas had refused to bring the
matter before the CJEU, and had failed to apply the relevant international and EU provisions
correctly.158
The Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas, deciding on the motion for retrial, concluded that
the EU provisions should have been applied in the underlyingproceedings and could have had
an impact on the outcome of the case. It therefore decided that there were sufficient grounds
to establish a fundamental infringement of substantive legal provisions in the main proceedings,
which could have affected the contested decision, and so it decided to reopen the case.
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155 (LT) Civilinio proceso kodeksas (n 83), XVIII Skyrius, 366 straipsnis 1. 9).
156 (LT) Civilinio proceso kodeksas (n 83), XVIII Skyrius, 366 straipsnis 1. 1); and Lietuvos Respublikos Administracinių
Bylų Teisenos Įstatymo Pakeitimo Įstatymas (n 48), 153 straipsnis 2.1.).
157 (LT) Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismo, 10/04/2008, nutartis administracinėje byloje Nr. P444-
129/2008.
158 The claimant had also introduced a request for compensation for the damages suffered. However, as the
proceedings were reopened, the damages claim was refused.
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Decision of the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas of 2009
In the second judgment of 31 July 2009, the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas even
established the infringement of EU law by the Konstitucinis Teismas (Constitutional Court,
Lithuania). However, the claim was finally rejected, as the applicant had not asked for a review
of the decision or compensation for damages but for the case to be reopened.159
In the case at hand, the applicant lodged a complaint before the Vyriausiasis administraci -
nis teismas against a ruling of the Konstitucinis Teismas. The applicant contested that the
ruling had been adopted without applying EU law and interpreting the Constitution in the
light of the EU rules. The applicant maintained that there was a double violation from the part
of the Constitutional Court; first, because it had not considered at all the application of EU
law; and second, it had not referred a question for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. The
applicant therefore asked for it to be declared that the state, as a legal person acting through
the Constitutional Court, infringed the EU law. Moreover, he asked the Vyriausiasis
administra cinis teismas to order the Konstitucinis Teismas to reopen proceedings and to
make a prelimi- nary reference to the CJEU.
Discussing the obligation of the Konstitucinis Teismas as a body of public administration,
the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas stressed that the latter should interpret the
Constitution in the light of EU law. Moreover, the Konstitucinis Teismas also has the
obligation to submit a preliminary question if the interpretation of EU law arises before it.
According to the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas, the Konstitucinis Teismas does not
have any discretion to refuse to apply EU law and its actions may be challenged in the same
way as the actions of other subjects of public administration.160 Nevertheless, as the
Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas could not satisfy the applicant’s claim to order the
Konstitucinis Teismas to reopen the case, the claim was dismissed in the end.
Assessment
In conclusion, retrial on the ground of manifest breach of EU law has been accepted and
applied by the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas in administrative cases.161
Based on the above information, we can draw two conclusions. First, due to the objective
condition regarding the infringement, situations where the violation became apparent, either
due to a prior or subsequent judgment of the CJEU, can provide sufficient grounds to reopen
and re-examine a final judgment. However, as the violation of EU law must be sufficiently
serious, a final judgment based on the misinterpretation of EU law can only be reopened in
the event of a serious breach of substantive law.162
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159 (LT) Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismo, 31/07/2009, nutartis administracinėje byloje S. T. v Lietuvos
Respublika, atstovaujama Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo, bylos Nr. AS502-363/2009, reported by
Valutyté (n 152) 293–295.
160 Valutyté (n 152) 293–295.
161 (LT) Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismo, 10/04/2008, nutartis administracinėje byloje Nr. P444-
129/2008 (n 157).
162 ACA (n 11), National report of Lithuania, Question 3.
ELJ_2017-1__0  2018.06.07.  16:48  Page 78
Second, in Lithuanian administrative law, the conditions for retrial and finding liability
appear to be similar. Moreover, it seems that the two types of proceedings can be undertaken
concurrently, as there is no formal link between these two remedies. In this regard, on the one
hand, the modification or the overturning of the decision in the retrial procedure can give rise
to posterior liability proceedings instituted by the party having suffered damages caused by
the illegal final judgment. On the other hand, the retrial procedure is not a precondition for
a liability claim. Apparently, it is for the applicant to decide which remedy to seek and the
Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas will decide accordingly.163
It should be emphasised that retrial on the ground of breach of EU law has yet only been
accepted by the case-law in administrative matters164 but not in civil cases.165
Luxembourg
In terms of the Luxembourgish procedural rules, the misinterpretation of national or EU law
by a final judgment is not a reason for retrial.166
Malta
National rules on retrial
In Malta, cases can be reopened because of a wrong application of the law.167 Even if there is
no case-law on the application of this rule for violation of EU law, it seems plausible to initiate
retrial proceedings on these grounds.
Judgment of the ECtHR in the San Leonard Band Club v Malta case
It may be interesting to mention in this context the judgment by the ECtHR in the case of San
Leonard Band Club v Malta from 29 July 2004 that concerned the ground for retrial relating
to a ‘wrong application of the law’. In fact, the ECtHR stated that this was similar to an appeal
on points of law, and, therefore, Article 6 ECHR had been held to be applicable to it. As, under
Maltese rules, retrial proceedings are filed before the same judge who decided the contested
case,168 courts are in fact called upon to decide whether they themselves have committed an
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163 This assumption is reinforced by another judgment of the Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas. In this case, even
though the infringement of the EU law by the ruling of the Constitutional Court had been established, neither
damages nor retrial were awarded as the applicant had not presented any requests in these regards. See (LT)
Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismo, 31/07/2009 (n 159). See also ACA (n 11), National report of
Lithuania, Question 14.
164 (LT) Lietuvos Respublikos Administracinių Bylų Teisenos Įstatymo Pakeitimo Įstatymas (n 48). See also Valutyté
(n 152) 301–302.
165 (LT) Civilinio proceso kodeksas (n 83), XVIII Skyrius, 366 straipsnis. See also Valutyté (n 152) 302–303.
166 (LU) Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile (n 75), Art. 617.
167 (MT) Code of Organization and Civil Procedure (n 44), Art. 811 (e): ‘811. A new trial of a cause decided by 
a judgment given in second instance or by the Civil Court, First Hall in its Constitutional Jurisdiction, may be
demanded by any of the parties concerned, such judgment being first set aside, in any of the following cases: 
(e) where the judgment contains a wrong application of the law’. See also ACA (n 11), National report of Malta,
Question 8.
168 (MT) Constitutional Court, judgment, 10/10/1991, Frank Cachia v the Honourable Prime Minister.
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error of legal interpretation or application in their previous decision. For that reason, the
ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of the right to fair trial.169
Netherlands
National rules on retrial
Dutch procedural rules do not provide a  legal basis for retrial on the ground of
misinterpretation of law.170
National case-law has also confirmed that, in the application of Dutch procedural rules,
a subsequent CJEU judgment on the interpretation of the EU norm is not a reason to reopen
cases.171 Two judgments can be cited as examples in this regard.
Judgment of the Hoge Raad of 2011
The first judgment was delivered by the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the
Netherlands) on 24 June 2011. In that decision, the court concluded that a subsequent CJEU
judgment cannot be considered as a fact or circumstance which occurred before, and was
unknown at the time when the contested judgment was made.172 Moreover, the Hoge Raad
emphasised the importance of legal certainty and res judicata, referring to CJEU judgments
on this matter.173
Judgment of the Raad van State of 2004
The second judgment was delivered by the Raad van State (Council of State) on 27 October
2004, which contains a similar reasoning as the above decision.174
Assessment
There is no legal basis for retrial in the event of violation of EU law by a final judgment in the
Netherlands. Consequently, Netherlands’ courts refuse motions for retrial submitted on these
grounds. Moreover, the Tweede Camer (Lower House) argued that there was no reason to
adopt legislative amendments allowing the reopening of cases following CJEU and ECtHR
judgments. In this regard, the panel pointed out that state liability for judicial errors has
already been recognised and it was sufficient to remedy these violations.175
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169 (ECtHR) San Leonard Band Club v Malta, Judgment of 29 July 2004, no. 77562/01, ECHR 2004-IX, §§ 43 and 64.
170 (NL) Algemene wet bestuursrecht (n 65), Artikel 8:119: ‘1. At the request of a party, the district court may review
a final judgment on the grounds of facts or circumstances: (a) which took place before the judgment, (b) of
which the one who asked for a review had no knowledge, and could not reasonably have had any knowledge,
before the judgment, and (c) which, had they been known to the district court previously, might have led to 
a different judgment’; Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (n 65), Artikel 382. See also ACA (n 11), National
report of the Netherlands, introduction.
171 (NL) Centrale Raad van Beroep, 17/11/2006 (n 65).
172 (NL) Hoge Raad, Uitspraak, 24/06/2011 (n 65) on Herroeping van vonnissen (revocation of decisions).
173 (CJEU) Köbler (n 2), para 38; Kühne & Heitz (n 14), para 24; Kapferer (n 12), para 24.
174 (NL) Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, 27/10/2004 (n 65).
175 (NL) Tweede kamer (Lower House), 12/08/2005, 2004–2005, 29279, no. 28. The Parliament of the Netherlands
has asked the Government to consider amending article 8:88 of the General Administrative Law Act in order
to create the possibility of reviewing the judgment of an administrative court, if it follows from judgments of the 
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Poland
National rules on retrial
Misinterpretation of law is not a ground for retrial in the Polish procedural codes either.176
The Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) already decided, in a civil judgment rendered
on 22 October 2009, that the inconsistency of a final judgment with EU law is not a reason to
reopen cases.177
As for administrative matters, retrial can be granted wherever an obligation under an
international agreement requires it.178 According to the legal literature, this rule can
eventually serve as a legal basis for retrial on account of a subsequent CJEU judgment.179
However, it is not possible to be aware of how this rule is applied in practice, in the absence
of a relevant case-law.
National rules on the revocation of final administrative decisions
Nevertheless, in Poland, fiscal authorities hold the right to revoke their previous decisions which
prove to be inconsistent with EU law in the light of a subsequent CJEU judgment.180 Authorities
have this competence, even if the final decision has already been confirmed by the administrative
court.181 As such, this procedure can be considered as a method to remedy a violation of EU law
by the administrative court, confirming an erroneous administrative decision.182
However, this Kühne & Heitz remedy is only accepted in fiscal matters. The possibility
for the administrative authority to revoke its final decision because of a subsequent CJEU
judgment that has revealed the inconsistency of national judgments with EU law in
administrative matters in general is subject to doctrinal debates.183
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ECtHR or the CJEU that the national judgment is contrary to ECHR or EU law. The Cabinet held that there was
no reason for such a provision, in view of [...] the right to sue the state for errors made by the highest
administrative courts. See also ACA (n 11), National report of the Netherlands, Question 8.
176 (PL) Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (n 67), Art. 403.
177 (PL) Sąd Najwyższy, Postanowienie, 22/10/2009 (n 67).
178 (PL) Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (n 52), Art. 273, § 3. See also Mikłaszewicz (n 67)
376.
179 Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 376–378.
180 (PL) Ordynacja podatkowa (Tax Code), Art. 240, § 1, pts 9 and 11 on Wznowienie postępowania (review of tax
proceedings). See also ACA (n 11), National report of Poland, Questions 1 and 4, Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 374, Nina
Półtorak, ‘Changes in the Level of the National Judicial Protection Under the EU Influence on the Example of
the Polish Legal System’ in Michal Bobek (ed), Central European Judges Under the European Influence: The
Transformative Power of the EU Revisited (Hart Publishing 2015, Oxford – Portland) 231.
181 (PL) Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, Wyrok, 04/12/2008, I FSK 1655/07, reported by Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 374.
182 This can therefore be considered as a Kühne & Heitz situation.
183 The legal basis for such a revocation could eventually be art. 145 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, or,
as an alternative solution, art. 154 of the same code, which allows the annulment or modification of a final
administrative decision under certain circumstances. Apparently, such a possibility has not been confirmed yet,
nor excluded by the case-law. See (PL) Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego (Code of Administrative
Procedure), Art. 145 on Wznowienie postępowania administracyjnego (reopening of administrative proceedings)
and Art. 154 on Uchylenie lub zmiana decyzji administracyjnej (repeal or amend an adminstrative decision). See
also ACA (n 11), National report of Poland and Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 373 and 375, for further references.
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Judgments of the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny of 2010 to 2014
Through several judgments, the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative
Court, Poland) has clarified a few points regarding the application of this special remedy.
First, the identity of the parties before the national court and the CJEU is not a condition
for revoking the decision confirmed by the court.184 However, appellants are required to
specify the CJEU decision on which they rely in their action.185 Moreover, the CJEU case-law
must be new, in the sense that it should differ from previous case-law on the same question.186
Finally, the time limit for a motion to declare a final judgment unlawful is one month after the
publication of the CJEU judgment in the official journal.187
Assessment
As a  conclusion, the most suitable method to remedy violation of EU law by national
administrative bodies is the revocation of the contested decision by the administrative
authority in Poland. As this remedy is available where the administrative court has already
confirmed the decision, it can be considered as a method to remedy erroneous application of
EU law by the national courts as well. Moreover, this remedy seems to be an effectively used
method to provide substantive relief for violation of EU law – however, it can only be applied
in fiscal matters.
Portugal
Since 2008, Portuguese legal provisions provide a ground for reopening a case where the final
judgment is contrary to a decision of an international court. The international court must
have jurisdiction vis-à-vis Portugal188 – the CJEU qualifies as one such court. However, it is
not obvious whether the judgment of the international court must be made in the same case,
or only regarding the same matter of law. The position of Portuguese courts is not known, in
the absence of relevant case-law.
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184 (PL) Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Olsztynie, Wyrok, 19/09/2013, I SA/Ol 486/13, LEX nr 1389573;
Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Łodzi, Wyrok z 13/02/2014, I SA/Łd 1300/13, LEX nr 1510263;
Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Łodzi, Wyrok z 05/03/2014, I SA/Ld 1357/13, LEX nr 1443319;
Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Łodzi, Wyrok z 05/03/2014, I SA/Ld 1357/13, LEX nr 1443319; and
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, Wyrok, 05/08/2010, I FSK 1355/2009, Lexis.pl nr 2374744.
185 (PL) Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, Wyrok, 18/03/2011, I FSK 398/2010, Lex Polonica nr 2537725.
186 (PL) Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, Wyrok, 24/03/2010, I FSK 242/09, reported by Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 375.
However, the breach could give rise to an action for annulment for flagrant breach of law according to
Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 375. See Ordynacja podatkowa (n 180), Art. 247, § 1, pt. 3.
187 (PL) Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Rzeszowie, Wyrok, 03/12/2009, I SA/Rz 619/09, reported by
Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 375.
188 (PT) Código de Processo Civil (n 51), Artigo 696.º f ); and Código de Processo nos Tribunais Administrativos
(n 51), Artigo 154.º, with reference to the disposition of the Civil Procedure Code. See ACA (n 11), National
report of Portugal, Questions 1 and 9.
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Romania
National rules
In Romania, legislative provisions have been introduced to the administrative procedural code
to recognise the violation of EU law as a specific ground for retrial.189 Apparently, the sole
violation of law is sufficient to reopen final judgments, and the identity of the parties is not
required either. Therefore, even if the scope of application rationae materiae of this remedy
is narrow, it provides generous protection in administrative cases. Moreover, this rule has
already been applied on several occasions by the courts.
Judgments of the Curtea de Apel Timişoara of 2012
In one such judgment, dated 6 October 2012, the Curtea de Apel Timişoara (Court of Appeal,
Timişoara) reopened the case and overturned its previous final judgment. The court held
that the final judgment infringed the primacy of EU law, since it had not applied the directly
effective provisions of the VAT Directive.190
In terms of the contested judgment, the applicant company was liable to pay VAT. The
tax had been calculated without taking the company’s right to deduction into consideration.
This right was granted by the VAT Directive,191 but the Curtea de Apel Timişoara had not
recognised its direct effect at the time of this first course of action.
However, CJEU judgments made it clear that the provision of the directive, having direct
effect, should have been applied in the case.192 Therefore, the company asked for the
reopening of the case based on the Romanian procedural rules on retrial.
In this second course of action, the Curtea de Apel Timişoara pointed out that Romanian
law provides a  specific procedural path for the reopening of administrative cases. Final
judgments contradicting EU law can be revised because of their non-observance of the
primacy of EU law.193 Then, it went on to examine EU rules and relevant CJEU case-law and
concluded that Member States are obliged to implement directives into national law. In the
event of failure to transpose the directive, individuals have the right to rely on provisions that
have direct effect before the national courts. As the CJEU had already established the direct
effect of the relevant provision of the directive, the final judgment infringed the primacy of
EU law. The Curtea de Apel Timişoara therefore overturned the final judgment and the
applicant company became entitled to the reimbursement of its unduly paid VAT.
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189 (RO) Constituţia României (n 55), Art. 20 (2), and 148 (2); and Legea Nr. 554/2004 contenciosului administrative
(n 55), Art. 21 (2).
190 (RO) Curtea de Apel Timişoara, Secţia contencios administrativ şi fiscal, 06/10/2012, Decizia civilă nr. 1851.
191 (EU) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax [2006]
OJ 347/1.
192 (CJEU) Case C-392/09 Uszodaépítő ECLI:EU:C:2010:569 [2010] ECR I-8791, paras 34–35; Case C-368/09
Pannon Gép Centrum ECLI:EU:C:2010:441 [2010] ECR I-7467, para 37.
193 (RO) Constituţia României (n 55), Art. 20 (2), and 148 (2); and Legea Nr. 554/2004 contenciosului administrative
(n 55), Art. 21 (2).
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Other cases
Several final judgments, mainly in fiscal matters, have also been reopened and overturned
because of their inconsistency with EU law. More judgments were reopened following the
CJEU judgment finding Romanian rules on motor vehicle tax contrary to EU law.194 As final
judgments made on such payment obligations proved to be contrary to EU law in hindsight,
they were subject to retrial. Claims of taxpayers for retrial have been successful in a few cases
before the Tribunalul Suceava (Superior Court of Suceava, Romania).195
Assessment
Considering the CJEU case-law on state liability and on the principle of res judicata, it appears
that Romanian retrial rules grant broader protection of EU rights than it is required under EU
law. Finally adjudicated administrative cases can be reopened by relying on CJEU judgments
and there is no condition on the gravity of the breach. The mere violation of the principle of
primacy of EU law, i.e. the non- or misapplication of EU rules, is sufficient to overturn a final
administrative judgment. Moreover, there is no time limit for a motion for retrial, and the
identity of the parties in the national proceedings and in the proceedings before the CJEU is
not a precondition for relying on the CJEU’s subsequent judgment. However, retrial based on
EU law violation is limited to administrative matters – it cannot be used to reopen civil cases.196
As for the CJEU judgment providing a legal basis for retrial, it seems irrelevant whether
it had been rendered before or after the contested national judgment is made. The procedural
rules on retrial for violation of EU law do not exclude the possibility of relying on a previous
CJEU judgment. Moreover, Romanian law justifies retrial because of the principle of primacy
of EU law.197 This may suggest that the violation of the EU norm is considered to be have




Under the Slovakian rules, retrial on the ground of infringement of EU law is possible only in
civil matters. In the application of the civil procedure code, if a final civil judgment proves
contrary to CJEU case-law, this inconsistency is a special ground for retrial.198 This provision
was introduced into Slovakian law in 2008 in order to ensure coherence between the CJEU
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194 (CJEU) Case C-402/09 Tatu, ECLI:EU:C:2011:219 [2011] ECR I-2711.
195 (RO) Tribunalul Suceava, Secţia de contencios administrativ şi fiscal, 19/05/2011, Număr dosar 4671/86/2011,
confirmed in appeal by Curtea de Apel Suceava, Secţia a II-a civilă, 10/11/2011, Număr dosar 4671/86/2011; and
Tribunalul Suceava, Secţia de contencios administrativ şi fiscal, 19/05/2011, Număr dosar 4674/86/2011,
confirmed in appeal by Curtea de Apel Suceava, Secţia a II-a civilă, 13/10/2011, Număr dosar 4674/86/2011.
196 According to Advocate General Jääskinen, the non-identical grounds for deviating from the principle of res
judicata are reasonable with regard to final civil, criminal and administrative judgments. See (CJEU) opinion of
Advocate General Jääskinen in Târșia ECLI:EU:C:2015:269 ECR, paras 49–51; and Târșia (n 12), para 34.
197 (RO) Constituţia României (n 55) Art. 20 (2), and 148 (2).
198 (SK) Občiansky súdny poriadok (n 56), § 228 (1) e). The amendments entered into force on 15 October 2008.
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and national case-law in EU law matters.199 The identity of the parties in the national
procedure and before the CJEU is not relevant. It is only the subject-matter of the two cases
that needs to concern the same question of law. As there is no condition regarding the gravity
of the infringement, the mere inconsistency with CJEU case-law is sufficient for a review of
the final judgment. In that regard, national law has a wide scope of application.
However, the time limit set out by national law restricts the practical use of this remedy.
Theoretically, no problem arises if the CJEU renders a judgment on the interpretation of the
EU norm in question after the national judgment is delivered. In such a scenario, the applicant
can ask for the reopening of the case for twenty days after the date on which they have official
knowledge of the new CJEU case-law. However, if the applicant alludes to a CJEU judgment
prior to the contested national decision, the date from which the time limit starts to run is not
obvious, since national case-law is divergent in this regard.
This remedy has already been applied in several cases by various courts, mainly in
consumer law matters. As these judgements are highly similar, only the most representative
will be presented in more detail.
Decision of the Krajský súd v Banskej Bystrici of 2013
In a decision of 27 June 2013, the Krajský súd v Banskej Bystrici (Regional Court in Banská
Bystrica) dismissed a motion for retrial in a civil case, as the time limit to ask for retrial had
already expired.200
The applicant asked for a re-examination of the final judgment delivered in his case,
claiming the inconsistency of the decision with CJEU case-law. The Krajský súd v Banskej
Bystrici found, however, that the time limit for such a motion had already expired. The
regional court stated that the applicant has only twenty days after becoming aware of a CJEU
decision to introduce a request for retrial. Since the CJEU judgment concerned had already
been published before the contested national decision was delivered, the time limit had
already expired. According to the Krajský súd v Banskej Bystrici, the time limit starts on the
day when the CJEU judgment referred to is published.
Contrary to the above decision, the motion for retrial was accepted by several courts,
notwithstanding the fact that the CJEU judgment preceded the national decision.201
Assessment
In summary, the mere violation of EU law is sufficient to reopen a civil case in Slovakia, and
the identity of the parties is not required either. Therefore, even if the scope of application of
this provision is narrow, it provides generous protection.
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199 The project of the law refers to the (CJEU) Lucchini (n 18).
200 (SK) Krajský súd Banská Bystrica, Uznesenie, 18/12/2012, n° 15Co/259/2012, 6612206417, ECLI:SK:KSBB:
2012:6612206417.2; Krajský súd Banská Bystrica, Uznesenie, 27/06/2013, n° 41Cob/9/2013, 6211200027,
ECLI:SK:KSBB:2013:6211200027.4; and Krajský súd Trnava, Uznesenie, 09/07/2013, n° 24Co/196/2013,
2209209082, ECLI:SK:KSTT:2013:2209209082.1.
201 (SK) Okresný súd Prešov, Rozsudok, 08/10/2013, n° 8C/420/2012, 8112240798, ECLI:SK:OSPO:2013:
8112240798.2; and Okresný súd Rožňava, Uznesenie, 20/12/2013, n° 10C/581/2012.
ELJ_2017-1__0  2018.06.07.  16:48  Page 85
Moreover, considering the exceptional nature of retrial under EU law, conditions under
Slovakian civil law even exceed the requirements established by the CJEU. This holds true
even regarding the time limits. In fact, referring to an already established CJEU case-law as
a ground for retrial could also be evaluated in the light of the obligation of the parties to invoke
EU law in the main proceedings.202
Slovenia
Legislative provisions
In Slovenia, the reopening of the case is possible on limited grounds – linked e.g. to the
existence of new facts or a false statement by a witness – once a final judgment has been given
in the dispute. As such, the inconsistency with EU law of a final judgment is not a reason for
retrial under Slovenian procedural rules.203
As for the revocation of a final administrative decision, no act provides a legal basis for
a review of a final administrative decision based on a misinterpretation of EU law. However,
a judgment by the Upravno sodišče (Slovenian Administrative Court) of 2008 deals with this
possibility.
Judgment of the Upravno sodišče of 2008
The judgment of 17 June 2008 by the Upravno sodišče seems to suggest that administrative
authorities can revoke a final administrative decision which acquired res judicata as a result
of a  judgment based on a  misinterpretation of EU law.204 However, as Trstenjak and
Plaustajner warn, this conclusion must be treated with caution.
Following these authors,205 the facts at the origin of the dispute can be summarised as
follows. The case concerned agricultural export funds for the export of goods, which was
permitted by an administrative act in partial violation of the EU law. When the respective
export funds were not paid to the applicant following a subsequent administrative decision,
the applicant claimed that the administrative authority is bound by the first administrative
decision, i.e. the export permit. In this context, the Upravno sodišče referred to the principle
of primacy, which imposes on Member States an obligation to act so that an efficient
implementation of EU law is guaranteed. It further stressed that this can even lead to setting
aside an administrative act, the legality of which has been confirmed in the administrative
judicial procedure. In this regard, it made reference to the conditions set out by the CJEU in
the Kühne & Heitz judgment. The Upravno sodišče thus declared unfounded the allegations 
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202 It is, however, a distinct question whether these conditions assure at least equivalent protection to the one
required under the Köbler doctrine, and, therefore, whether the Slovak retrial rules can be considered an effective
alternative to Köbler liability.
203 (SI) Zakon o upravnem sporu (n 76), 96. člen. See also Verica Trstenjak and Katja Plaustajner, ‘Slovenian Rapport’
in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 463, 473.
204 (SI) Upravno sodišče Republike Slovenije, Odločba, 17/06/2008, U 14/2007, reported by Trstenjak and
Plaustajner (n 203) 470–480.
205 Trstenjak and Plaustajner (n 203) 470–480.
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by the applicant relating to the binding nature of an export permit which was issued contrary
to EU law.
This means that the Upravno sodišče used the rationale of the Kühne & Heitz judgment
to support the independence of one administrative decision from another, previous one.
In summary, the decision by the Upravno sodišče seems to suggest that a review of an
administrative decision that has become final as a result of judgment of a national court
based on a misinterpretation of EU law is recognised by the Slovenian courts. However, the
Upravno sodišče did not refer to a national legal provision in this regard, but to the judgment
of the CJEU alone. Even so, as Trstenjak and Plaustajner point out, the national court has to
interpret the national legislation consistent with the CJEU judgment only insofar as possible;
however, it is not obliged to interpret it contra legem when faced with a situation like the one
in the Kühne & Heitz judgment. In this regard, neither the legislation applicable within the
administrative procedure, nor the legislation applicable within the administrative dispute
provides an obvious legal basis for a  review of a  final administrative decision based on
a misinterpretation of EU law.206
Assessment
In conclusion, Slovenian rules do not provide a ground for retrial in the event of violation of
EU law by a final judgment.
Spain
In Spain, misinterpretation of law is not grounds to reopen cases where a final judgment has
already been delivered. The inconsistency of a final judgment with EU law is therefore, not
a reason for retrial either.207
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206 The procedural law applicable within the administrative procedure provides limited possibilities of reviewing
a final administrative decision; a new or a different administrative act may be issued within the so-called
reopened procedure (obnova postopka) only on grounds explicitly provided by the legislation, the misapplication
or misinterpretation of a certain legal provision not being one of these grounds. See (SI) Zakon o splošnem
upravnem postopku (General Administrative Procedure Act), 260. člen on obnova postopka (reopened
proceedings – in the meaning of review of proceedings); as well as Trstenjak and Plaustajner (n 203) 463.
Another administrative remedy provided in the same law, the annulment or revocation of administrative
decisions by the higher administrative organ (razveljavitev odločbe po nadzorstveni pravici) cannot be used if
the administrative decision was confirmed by the administrative court. See Zakon o splošnem upravnem postopku
(n 206) 274–277. člen on razveljavitev odločbe po nadzorstveni pravica (annulment or revocation of
administrative decisions by the higher administrative organ); as well as Trstenjak and Plaustajner (n 203) 472.
207 (ES) Ley 29/1998 reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-administrativa (n 73), Art. 102; Ley 1/2000
Enjuiciamiento Civil (n 73), Art. 509; and Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal (n 73), Art. 954. The only exception
comes from the field of state aid, where violation of EU rules is a ground for reimbursement of the illegal aide.
See Ley 38/2003, de 17 de noviembre, General de Subvenciones (Law on subventions), Art. 36–42 on Del reintegro
(refund); as well as ACA (n 11), National report of Spain; and Daniel Sarmiento, ‘Rapport espagnol’ in Coutron
and Bonichot (n 11) 175.
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Sweden
Swedish procedural laws provide a general possibility for the courts to remedy a substantive
defect in the final judgment.208 This remedy can eventually be applied to misinterpretation
of EU law by a  final judgment.209 However, there is no available case-law regarding the
application of this remedy to violations of EU law.
United Kingdom
National rules on retrial
In the UK, cases can be reopened on discretionary grounds, on condition that the party has
suffered substantive injustice as a result of unfair proceedings.210 Two judgments delivered in
cases based on an alleged violation of EU law are worth being mentioned in this regard.
Judgment of the Supreme Court of England of 2011
In the first judgment, rendered in the Edwards case on 15 December 2010, the Supreme Court
of England admitted the theoretical possibility of reopening cases due to the inconsistency of
the final judgment with the CJEU case-law. However, it denied retrial in the case at hand,
since it found that the applicant had not suffered injustice as a result of unfair proceedings.211
At the origin of the proceedings was the decision of the Environment Agency, which
approved the operation of a cement works, including waste incineration. The applicant
contested the decision in the light of environmental law, claiming that the project had not
been the subject of an environmental impact assessment. After the request was dismissed, the
applicant applied for a protective cost order in advance of her appeal. The House of Lords
rejected the application, as the panel had found that the information provided by the applicant
was insufficient to conclude that proceedings would be ‘prohibitively expensive’ for her.
Nevertheless, the applicant proceeded with her appeal. When it was dismissed, the House of
Lords ordered the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs. She contested this decision and
argued that it was contrary to the EU directives, since it rendered the litigation ‘prohibitively
expensive’ for her.212
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208 (SE) Förvaltningsprocesslag (n 46), 37b §; and Rättegångsbalken (n 46), 58. kap, § 1.
209 ACA (n 11), National report of Sweden, Questions 1, 4. However, concerning the remedy of revision of fiscal
authorities’ decisions confirmed by administrative courts, it seems that the subsequent CJEU judgment, giving a
new interpretation to the relevant EU provision, is not sufficient grounds for this remedy. Moreover, as a new
interpretation by the Regeringsrätten could result in reopening the case, the compatibility of this rule with the principle
of equivalence is not obvious. See Frida-Louise Göransson, ‘Rapport suédois’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 495.
(SE) Skattebetalningslag (Tax Law), 21 kap, § 3, Göransson (n 209) 493. The fiscal and criminal dispositions in
this regard will probably be subject to amendment following the recent judgment of the CJEU in the case
Akerberg Fransson. See (CJEU) Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 ECR.
210 (UK) Civil Procedure Rules (n 47), Part 52.17. See also ACA (n 11), National report of the United Kingdom,
Questions 8 and 14; and Kornezov (n 13) 830.
211 (UK) Supreme Court, judgment, 15/12/2010, R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment Agency [2010]
UKSC 57 [2011] 1 WLR 79, paras 34–36.
212 In the meantime, the jurisdiction of the House of Lords was transferred to the newly-established Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom. In accordance with the Supreme Court Rules 2009, the detailed assessment of the costs 
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The newly-established Supreme Court – to which the jurisdiction of the House of Lords
had been transferred – pointed out that it has the power to reopen its prior decision, if it is
necessary to correct any injustice.213 The decision to order the applicant to pay the
respondent’s costs should be reopened if it had been based on a purely subjective approach
to the question of whether litigation was ‘prohibitively expensive’ within the meaning of the
directives214 The panel also stated that the question whether the order to pay the respondents’
costs was contrary to EU law had not been examined by the House of Lords when it
considered the application for a protective costs order. In those circumstances, the Supreme
Court referred several questions on the interpretation of the term ‘prohibitively expensive’ to
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.215 Following the CJEU judgment, the Supreme Court
determined the amount that the applicant had to pay as the respondent’s costs.216
Judgment of the Court of Appeal of 2010
In the second judgment, delivered on 29 June 2010, the Court of Appeal concluded that the
principle of effectiveness does not require setting aside national rules on the conditions of
retrial.217 In this regard, the Court of Appeal specifically held that the principle of effectiveness
did not require reopening criminal convictions in order to allow the appellants to invoke the
unenforceability, by reason of violation of EU law,218 of the legislation under which their
convictions were secured. The position would only have been different if the conduct of the
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was carried out by two costs officers appointed by the President of the Supreme Court. In that context, the
applicant relied on Directives 85/337 and 96/61 to challenge the costs order that had been made against her.
The Supreme Court costs officers accepted that they had power to give effect to Article 10a of the Directive by
moderating the amount of costs payable to the respondents. The respondents appealed to a panel of five Supreme
Court judges. The Supreme Court accepted the respondent’s claim that the costs officers had acted outside their
jurisdiction. That panel delivered its decision on 15 December 2010. It found that the costs officers ought to
have confined themselves to the jurisdiction which the Supreme Court Rules 2009 conferred on them and thus
to have limited themselves to quantifying the costs. The panel took the view that the question whether the
procedure was prohibitively expensive, within the meaning of Directives 85/337 and 96/61, was within the sole
jurisdiction of the court adjudicating on the substance of the case, which may adjudicate either at the outset of
the proceedings, when determining the request for a protective costs order, or in its decision on the substance.
213 This power extends to decision of the House of Lords prior to the creation of the Supreme Court.
214 (EU) Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private
projects on the environment [1985] OJ 175/40; Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning
integrated pollution prevention and control [1996] OJ 257/26.
215 See (CJEU) Case C-260/11 Edwards and Pallikaropoulos ECLI:EU:C:2013:221 ECR.
216 (UK) Supreme Court, judgment, 11/12/2013, R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment Agency, [2013]
UKSC 78.
217 (UK) Court of Appeal, judgment, 29/06/2010, R v Budimir (Nikolas), [2011] 2 WLR 396, paras 58–72, reported
by Laure Clément-Wiltz, ‘Rapport britannique’ in Coutron and Bonichot (n 11) 450–451.
218 In particular, the national legislation would be unenforceable as a consequence of its non-notification by the
government under the EU directive. See (EU) Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying down 
a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations [1983] OJ 109/8.
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national authorities, in conjunction with the domestic limitation period, would have had the
effect of depriving the appellants of any opportunity of enforcing their EU law rights.219
In the case at hand, the appellants had been convicted under national legislation that was
subsequently found to be contrary to EU law. In fact, the government had failed to notify the
Commission, in violation of the EU directive, of the act adopted in 1984. To remedy the defect,
that act was declared unenforceable and Parliament adopted a new act in 2010. However, the
question of how to remedy the convictions under the 1984 act was left open.
The appellants, arguing that the convictions had been based on an unenforceable law,
therefore sought permission to reopen the final decisions pronouncing their conviction. The
question arose whether the failure by the government to give appropriate notification under
the EU directive had created an injustice which it was not otherwise possible to remedy.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the claims. Referring to constitutional law literature and
to CJEU and ECtHR case law, the court concluded that the convictions in these cases had not
given rise to any substantial injustice and therefore there were no grounds to set aside the
convictions. The court emphasised that, in terms of the Kapferer judgment,220 there was no
obligation under EU law to set aside the convictions. The position would only be different if
the appellants had been deprived of any opportunity of enforcing their EU law rights.
However, in the case at hand, as the appellants could have raised the argument at trial, the
principle of the effectiveness of EU law was therefore not infringed.221
It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal arrived at this conclusion on the basis of EU law,
and its argumentation is in line with the requirements set by the CJEU.
Assessment
In conclusion, under UK law, retrial is possible but subject to the condition that the applicant
suffered injustice as a result of unfair proceedings. This conclusion is in line with Kornezov’s
statement, according to which in England and Wales, while the bar created by cause of action
estoppel is, in principle, absolute, issues previously decided may be reopened where ‘special
circumstances’ make it unjust not to do so.222
In UK law, the discretionary nature of judicial review is an important factor. In the terms
of the procedural rules, the reopening of a final decision must be necessary to avoid real
injustice, and there must be no alternative effective remedy.223 Moreover, an applicant in
judicial review proceedings must obtain the permission of the court for the case to proceed 
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219 Jonathan Auburn, Jonathan Moffett and Andrew Sharland, Judicial Review: Principles and Procedure (Oxford
University Press 2013) § 4.82.
220 The judgment in Kapferer is sometimes cited as an example of leaving the authority of a final judgment’s res
judicata unfettered, despite its alleged inconsistency with EU law. See (CJEU) Kapferer (n 12).
221 See also Auburn, Moffett and Sharland (n 219) § 4.82; and David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s
Text, Cases, and Materials on Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 6–7.
222 Kornezov (n 13) 830.
223 (UK) Civil Procedure Rules (n 47), Part 52.17. See also ACA (n 11), National report of the United Kingdom,
Questions 8 and 14.
ELJ_2017-1__0  2018.06.07.  16:48  Page 90
to a full hearing, and permission will only be granted if the claim is arguable, i.e. it has a real
prospect of success. However, the process of judicial review is less formalised and is intended
to provide a speedy remedy.224
III Conclusion
1 Comparative Analysis of National Rules
Retrial on the ground of breach of EU law appears to be an effectively used remedy in
Finland,225 in Romania (in administrative matters)226 and in Slovakia (in civil matters).227 It
has also been accepted in Lithuania (in administrative cases),228 and under special circum -
stances in the UK. Moreover, in Lithuania, Finland, Romania and Slovakia, cases have been
reopened due to violation of EU law in the final judgment.
In two national laws, explicit legislative provisions had been introduced into the
procedural codes in 2008 in order to recognise the violation of EU law as a specific ground
for retrial. It has been the case in Romania, where amendments concerned the administrative
procedural code, and in Slovakia, where the civil procedural code was amended. 
In Lithuania, Finland, and the UK, the application of retrial to breaches of EU law is
possible due to the broad scope of application of this remedy. In these legal systems, retrial 
is granted in the event of manifest, substantive or extraordinary breach of law. In this regard,
legal rules in Denmark, Malta and Sweden are also similar and, therefore, also seem capable
of offering adequate protection.
Moreover, in Poland, fiscal authorities hold and exercise the right to revoke their previous
decisions on the ground of infringement of EU law themselves.229
Without criticising the politico-legislative choise of the national legislators, the Romanian
and Slovak solutions appear particularily courageous. This is mainly because the identity of
parties in the national procedure and before the ECJ is not relevant, and the only criterion is
that the subject-matter of the two cases concern the same matter of law. Moreover, the sole
violation of EU law is sufficient to reopen final judgments, and the gravity of the infringement
does not need to be considered. 
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224 ACA (n 11), National report of the United Kingdom, Question 14.
225 ACA (n 11), National report of Finland.
226 (RO) Curtea de Apel Timişoara, Secţia contencios administrativ şi fiscal, 06/10/2012 (n 190).
227 (SK) Občiansky súdny poriadok (n 56), § 228 (1) e).
228 (LT) Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismo, 10/04/2008, nutartis administracinėje byloje Nr. P444-
129/2008 (n 157); Lietuvos Respublikos Administracinių Bylų Teisenos Įstatymo Pakeitimo Įstatymas (n 48), 153
straipsnis. See also ACA (n 11), National report of Lithuania, Questions 1–4, 11; and Valutyté (n 152) 301.
229 In Poland, the reopening of the administrative procedure on the ground of breach of an international agreement
does also exist. See (PL) Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (n 52); as well as ACA (n 11),
National report of Poland, Question 1 and 4; and Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 373–375.
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This solution may probably be attributed to the willingness of the national legislator to
apply EU law correctly before the national courts – taking into account the reality that, for
external reasons, which are completely independent from their professional competencies,
judges of the new member states are often not specialists in this matter of law. In fact, this new
ground for retrial might be assimilated to the widely used criterion of ‘discovery of new facts’.230
In addition, the fact that this new ground for retrial is applicable only in civil matters in
Slovakia, and only in administrative matters in Romania may suggest that the legislative
amendments aimed to address specific inconsistencies that had been discovered, and were not
part of a strategic vision regarding national remedies in the event of a violation of EU law.
Consequently, the specific scope of application of this remedy may cause discrepancies within
the same national legal order regarding the remedies provided in different matters of law
(administrative and civil), or with regard to violating rules which have a different origin
(national, EU, international). 
The other group of member states allowing retrial based on violation of EU law appear
to use a more coherent framework. In these member states, retrial is possible in cases of
manifest, substantive or extraordinary breach of law. These criteria seem particularily suitable
to embrace violations of EU law in situations where it is necessary, because of, for example,
the gravity of violation or the extent of the prejudice suffered. It also gives the magistrates to
necessary flexibility to assess the particularities and the circumstances of the case at hand.
However, the use of such a general criterion is governed by legal traditions of the member
states.
Nevertheless, the conclusion remains that in most member states retrial is not possible
based on a violation of EU law.
2 National Procedural Autonomy and the Procedural Rule of Reason
As it has been demonstrated, the CJEU does not require Member States to allow retrial based
on violation of EU law, except for specific situations.
This position corresponds to the main rule according to which, in the decentralised
system of enforcement of EU law, substantive EU rules are applied and enforced by
national courts and authorities.231 Furthermore, in the absence of common EU procedural
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230 Nevertheless, in general, legal doctrine and the case-law seem to agree on the conclusion that an CJEU judgment
giving interpretation of an EU provision is neither a new law nor a new fact.
231 Georgios Anagnostaras, ‘State Liability v Retroactive Application of Belated Implementing Measures: Seeking
the Optimum Means in Terms of Effectiveness of EC Law’ (2000) 1 Journal of Current Legal Issues; Georgios
Anagnostaras, ‘Not as Unproblematic as You Might Think: The Establishment of Causation in Governmental
Liability Actions’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 665; Florian Becker, ‘Application of Community Law by
Member States’ Public Authorities: Between Autonomy and Effectiveness’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law
Review 1036; Nial Fennelly, ‘The National Judge as Judge of the European Union’ in Allan Rosas, Egils Levits
and Yves Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years 
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rules,232 the application of these norms is ensured through the national procedural
framework.233 This rule, called the principle of national procedural autonomy,234 is only
limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.235 Nevertheless, as far as
effectiveness is concerned, the procedural rule of reason236 may even prevail over this prin -
ciple.237
In terms of the procedural rule of reason, every case in which the question arises as to
whether a  national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or
excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure.
In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which
lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence,
the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings.238
As for the principle of res judicata, the CJEU acknowledged that, in order to ensure both
the stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is
important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have
been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer
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of Case-Law – La Cour de Justice et La Construction de l’Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de
Jurisprudence (Springer 2013) 63; John Temple Lang, ‘The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of
Cooperation of National Authorities and Community Institution under Article 10 EC’ (2007) 31 Fordham Int’l
LJ 1484; John Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’ (1997) 22
European Law Review 3. From the Hungarian literature, see Szegedi László. ‘Egyéni és kollektív uniós jogvédelem
a közigazgatási perben. A szubjektív jogsérelemhez kötött közigazgatási bírói jogvédelem uniós átalakulása’
(Thesis, Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem 2016, manuscript), chapter 2.2.1 on the europanization of the
administrative procedural law and the judicial protection of individual rights.
232 Two exceptions can be mentioned in this regard. First, in the language of the recently modified Article 19 (1)
TEU, ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered
by Union law’. However, there is no further reference on specific remedies or procedures which must be available.
Second, there are several secondary pieces of legislation which contain remedial provisions. See for further
information on the secondary legislation providing for special damages remedial rules: Folkert G Wilman, Private
enforcement of EU law before national courts: the EU legislative framework (Elgar 2015, Cheltenham) 14–19.
233 Piet Eeckhout, ‘Liability of Member States in Damages and the Community System of Remedies’ in Jack Beatson
and Takis Tridimas (eds), New Directions in European Public Law (Hart Publishing 1998, Oxford) 66; and Pieter
Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘The Confusing Constitutional Status of Positive Procedural Obligations in EU Law’ (2012)
5 Review of European Administrative Law 91.
234 (CJEU) Case 60/75 Russo ECLI:EU:C:1976:95 [1976] ECR I-45; Case 45/76 Comet ECLI:EU:C:1976:191 [1976]
ECR I-2043, paras 13 and 15; Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral ECLI:EU:C:1976:188 [1976]
ECR I-1989, para 15; Case 68/79 Just ECLI:EU:C:1980:57 [1980] ECR I-501, para 25; Case 150/83 Rewe-
Handelsgesellschaft Nord and Rewe-Markt Steffen ECLI:EU:C:1981:163 [1981] ECR I-1805; Case 199/82 San
Giorgio, ECLI:EU:C:1983:318 [1983] ECR I-3595, para 13.
235 (CJEU) Case C-32/12 Duarte Hueros ECLI:EU:C:2013:637, para 31; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck ECLI:EU:C:
1995:437 [1995] ECR I-4599, para 12; Case C-201/02 Wells ECLI:EU:C:2004:12 [2004] I-723, para 67.
236 (CJEU) Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and van Veen ECLI:EU:C:1995:441 [1995] ECR 
I-4705, para 19; Joined cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 Van der Weerd and Others ECLI:EU:C:2007:318 [2007] ECR
I-4233, para 33; Peterbroeck (n 235), para 14.
237 This is clearly demonstrated by the CJEU case-law regarding the ex officio application of EU law.
238 See, to that effect, judgments (CJEU) Kapferer (n 12), para 41, Fallimento Olimpiclub (n 12), para 27, andTârșia
(n 12), paras 36 and 37.
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be called into question.239 Accordingly, EU law does not require a national court to disapply
domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a decision, even if to do so would make it
possible to remedy an infringement of EU law on the part of the decision in question.240
One may wonder whether denying retrial in cases of breach of EU law is compatible with
the principle of equivalence, if the same remedy is offered against breaches of the ECHR or the
national constitution.241 The CJEU has not addressed this issue yet.242 As the analysis of this
question extends beyond the subject of this research, it will not be addressed here in detail.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that retrial following judgments by the ECtHR or
constitutional courts is, generally, only possible in the single case concerned by the posterior
judgment. It means that the parties in the cases before the ECtHR or the constitutional court
and before the national courts need to be identical, contrary to what is usually the situation
in the event of violation of EU law. This is because of the different role and position of the
ECtHR, the constitutional courts and the CJEU in the legal order. Consequently, allowing
retrial based on violation of the ECHR and the national constitution while denying it in cases
of violation of tEU law does not seem to be, in general, contrary to the principle of
equivalence.243
Therefore, it is in the discretionary power of Member States to decide whether they wish
to go beyond what is required in terms of the CJEU case-law. 
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239 (CJEU) Impresa Pizzarotti (n 12), para 58; Kapferer (n 12), para 20; Case C-526/08 Commission v Luxembourg
ECLI:EU:C:2010:379 [2010] ECR I-6151, para 26; and Case C-352/09 P ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission
ECLI:EU:C:2011:191 [2011] ECR I-2359, para 123.
240 (CJEU) Kapferer (n 12) para 21, Fallimento Olimpiclub (n 12) para 23.
241 Kornezov (n 13) 835. A similar question was at issue in the Târșia case. The question in this case is whether EU
law precludes national rules which allow retrial in administrative proceedings when there is an infringement of
the principle of EU law primacy and which do not allow retrial on the same basis delivered in civil proceedings.
The CJEU found that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness do not preclude a situation where there is
no possibility for a national court to revise a final decision of a court or tribunal made in the course of civil
proceedings when that decision is found to be incompatible with an interpretation of EU law upheld by the
CJEU after the date on which that decision became final, even though such a possibility exists as regards final
decisions of a court or tribunal incompatible with EU law made in the course of administrative proceedings.
See (CJEU) Târșia (n 12).
242 See, by analogy (CJEU) Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos ECLI:EU:C:2010:39 [2010] ECR I-635. In this
judgment, the CJEU drew a parallel between actions for damages based on a breach of the national constitution
and actions for damages based on a breach of EU law. However, the assimilation of the two procedures is
criticised by the doctrine. According to Plaza, the EU’s decentralised system of judicial control of Member States’
compliance with EU law justifies a diverse treatment of state liability actions based on violation of national and
on an EU law provision. See Carmen Plaza, ‘Member States Liability for Legislative Injustice. National Procedural
Autonomy and the Principle of Equivalence: Going Too Far in Transportes Urbanos?’ (2010) 3 Review of
European Administrative Law 35, 45.
243 Kornezov seems to suggest the contrary. However, in my opinion, drawing a parallel between the application of
retrial to remedy violation of rights protected under EU law, the ECHR, and the national constitutions is only
justified where the violation of EU-guaranteed fundamental rights and general principles, in the judicial
proceedings at hand, is concerned. See Kornezov (n 13) 835, 836.
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3 Necessity to Allow Retrial Under EU Law
Nevertheless, in his paper published in 2014, Kornezov argues that retrial of a final judgment
by virtue of EU law can no longer be excluded per se, and there is a genuine need to allow the
reopening of a final judgment which has proved inconsistent with EU law.244 He reaches this
conclusion based on the principle of equivalence and the right to effective judicial protections,
as well as on CJEU judgments affirming that a final arbitration award could be set aside,245
and a final administrative decision should be reviewed246 if proves to be contrary to EU law.247
Then, taking as an example the harmonisation of substantial conditions for triggering
the liability of the state for breaches of EU law, he argues that the CJEU should take the same
approach in relation to retrial.
According his proposition, retrial might be made subject to the following three
conditions: (i) the role of EU law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals;
(ii) the injured party must continue to suffer serious negative consequences from the judgment
that caused the infringement; and (iii) there must be a direct causal link between the breach
and the continuing suffering of the injured party.
4 Relationship Between State Liability and Retrial
In my opinion, the key element in Kornezov’s proposition is that second point, i.e. that the the
traditional remedies are insufficient, or they do not provide relief, leading to a situation where
the ‘injured party continues to suffer negative consequences from the judgment that caused
the infringment’. This means that the necessity to allow retrial based on a violation of EU law
needs to be assessed by taking the remedial system of the Member State into account.248
As the starting point of this paper was the aim to analyse whether there exist, in the
Member States, remedies which may substitute the use of state liability, it appears useful to
examine the relationship between these two remedies. Before doing so, it is noteworthy that,
first, retrial appears to be even more favourable for the injured parties than liability, and,
second, the conlusion that the cumulative use of them is not necessary seems to be uniform.249
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244 Kornezov (n 13) 834.
245 (CJEU) Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss ECLI:EU:C:1999:269 [1999] ECR I-3055, Case C-40/08 Asturcom
Telecommunicaciones ECLI:EU:C:2009:615 [2009] ECR I-9579.
246 (CJEU) Case C-2/06 Kempter ECLI:EU:C:2008:78 [2008] ECR I-411; Kühne & Heitz (n 14); i-21 Germany and
Arcor (n 17); Case C-249/11 Byankov ECLI:EU:C:2012:608 ECR.
247 Kornezov (n 12) 835, 836.
248 See also Varga (n 4).
249 I will not address here the issue when damages action in initiated to be given additional remedy for the damages
suffered (p. ex. interest).
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5 No Hierarchy Between the Two Remedies
In the six Member States where retrial is available on the general grounds of ‘manifest
infringement of substantive rules’ (Denmark, Malta, Finland, Sweden, the UK and Lithuania
in administrative cases), national provisions appear to be sufficiently wide to embrace
violations of EU law. The case-law of Finnish, Lithuanian, and UK courts has already
confirmed this statement. Since most of these Member States accept, at least theoretically, the
application of the Köbler principle as well, there is a possibility of double remedies. Moreover,
no hierarchy appears to exist between the two courses of action in these Member States.
Consequently, it is for the claimant to decide which remedy to seek; and there is no sign of
clear preference for the use of one or another in this regard. This can be explained by the fact
that the criteria to evaluate the gravity of the breach are very similar for the two types of
remedies.
This duplication of remedies is also a theoretical possibility in the three Member States
where retrial is guaranteed on the ground of inconsistency with judgments of international
courts (Latvia, Poland, and Portugal). However, if these rules imply requiring the identity of
parties in the national procedure and before the international court, retrial will have a much
narrower and quite different scope of application than Köbler liability.
As for the two states where specific rules have been introduced to allow retrial on the
ground of infringement of EU law (Romania, Slovakia), the duplication of remedies is not
excluded either.250
To conclude, the cumulative use of the two remedies seems unnecessary. As the
Romanian government in the Târșia251 case has suggested, it is irrelevant for EU law which
possibility is granted in the Member State, if the rights of the individual are effectively
protected.252 Therefore, where a retrial can be used to remedy a violation of the EU rights by
a final judgment, a liability claim may be superfluous and unnecessary. Moreover, in cases
where there is no need to prove a  qualified breach of law to allow a  retrial (Romanian
administrative and Slovakian civil law), this remedy offers a  higher standard of judicial
protection than the Köbler liability.
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250 However, due to absence of available information on the position of Romanian and Slovak court about the
application of Köbler liability, it is not possible to draw further consequences in this regard.
251 (CJEU) Târșia (n 12) The main facts that lie at the basis of the dispute are the following: the claimant had
purchased a car that had previously been registered in France. At that time, registration in Romania had been
contingent on the payment of a special tax on motor vehicles. After having paid the tax and having registered
the vehicle, the claimant had sought the repayment of the tax levied before the civil court, arguing the tax was
inconsistent with EU law. However, the Tribunalul Sibiu had dismissed the claim in a civil law action and the
judgment became final. In a subsequent judgment, the CJEU held that Romania’s tax on motor vehicles was
incompatible with EU law. On the ground of this case-law and the Romanian rules on retrial, the claimant argued
that he was entitled to recovery of the taxes paid due to the primacy of EU law. However, as the contested final
judgment had been rendered in a civil action and not in an administrative procedure, the reopening of the
judgment was refused to the claimant.
252 The subsidiary nature of the liability claim to the retrial seems to be accepted by the CJEU as well. See (CJEU)
Târșia (n 12) para 40.
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6 Retrial as an Exceptional Remedy
However, in most legal systems, retrial is more exceptional than a liability claim. Even the
case-law of the CJEU reflects this position.253
What is interesting for the present analysis is that several legal systems expressis verbis
establish a hierarchy between retrial and state liability. Such explicit statements have been
found in six Member States, although not necessarily in the context of EU law (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain and Netherlands).
Under Bulgarian legislative rules, retrial is only possible if it is necessary to remedy an
injustice suffered.254 In the Czech Republic, a motion for retrial on the ground of breach of
fundamental rights is inadmissible if the consequences of the violation have already been
remedied, e.g. by providing just satisfaction’.255 Similarly, Estonian law gives priority to
a liability claim over retrial.256 The Riigikohus (Supreme Court) stated, concerning ECHR
violations, that reopening cases is only possible if compensation by damages is not available.257
In Greece, the Areios Pagos pointed out that a judgment of the ECtHR can only give rise to
compensation, but not to retrial.258 In the Netherlands, the House of Representatives reasoned
that there was no reason to adopt legislative amendments allowing cases to be reopened on
the ground of their inconsistency with CJEU and ECtHR judgments. To arrive at that
conclusion, the House of Representatives emphasised that the state is already obliged to
compensate for the damages suffered.259 The Spanish Tribunal Supremo pronounced on 1
September 1991 that even if retrial was not possible, a liability claim could be lodged.260
7 Liability as a Secondary Remedy
On the other hand, in several legal systems, liability claims are considered as offering only
subsidiary, secondary relief in cases where primary actions have not succeeded.
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253 (CJEU) Kapferer (n 12) paras 20–21; Fallimento Olimpiclub (n 12) paras 22–23; Impresa Pizzarotti (n 12) paras
54, 59, 62, 64; and Commission v Slovakia, paras 59–60. See also Kornezov (n 12) 839–840.
254 (BG) Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art. 303; and Aministrativen protsesualen kodeks (n 59), Art. 239.
255 (CZ) Zákon o Ústavním soudu (n 49), § 119.
256 (EE) Riigivastutuse seadus (n 107), § 7(1), (21) on § 7 on Vastutuse alused (basis of liability).
257 (EE) Riigikohtu halduskolleegiumi, 22/02/2010, n° 3-3-2-1-10; and Riigikohtu üldkogu, 10/03/2008, n° 3-3-2-1-
07. However, as retrial is not guaranteed on the ground of infringement of EU law, available case-law comes
from the field of fundamental and constitutional rights violations.
258 (EL) Άρειος Πάγος, 24/02/2012; and Άρειος Πάγος, 14/12/2004.
259 (NL) Tweede Kamer, 12/08/2005 (n 175). The Netherlands’ Parliament has asked the Government to consider
amending article 8:88 of the General Administrative Law Act to create the possibility of reviewing the judgment
of an administrative court, if it follows from judgments of the ECtHR or the CJEU that the national judgment is
contrary to ECHR or EU law. The Cabinet held that there was no reason for such a provision, in view of [...] the
right to sue the state for errors made by the highest administrative courts. See also ACA (n 11), National report
of the Netherlands, Question 8.
260 (ES) Tribunal Supremo, Sentencia, 01/09/1991. See also Sarmiento (n 207) 170–174.
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For example, the case-law of the German BGH reflects this position.261 Similarly, in
Poland, the declaration of unlawfulness of a final judgment – which is a procedural element
of a liability claim – can only be introduced if the claimant has used all remedies available to
them before lodging the liability claim. State responsibility is therefore secondary to all other
remedies.262
8 Holistic Approach Regarding National Remedial System and the
Effective Judicial Protection
Under the EU remedial rules, state liability is the only generally available remedy for violation
of EU law by national supreme courts. 
However, in my view, there is no reason for not accepting the use of alternative remedies
by Member States, such as retrial instead of state liability. As a consequence, overly restrictive
conditions concerning Köbler claims may cause problems with regard to the right to effective
judicial protection only in Member States where the remedial structure does not provide
other effective remedy either.263 Or, from the point of view of retrial, the absence of
a possibility to reopen finally adjudicated cases which infringe EU law is only a problem if
seeking damages in a liability action is also subject to overly restrictive conditions. This means
that either retrial or state liability, or another alternative remedy need to exist in the national
legal order to remedy serious violations of EU law by the judiciary.
As such, it is neither possible nor necessary to evaluate whether a specific remedy, for
example retrial, need to be accessible where there has been a violation of EU law by a national
court.
The recent Tomášová judgment appears to point in this direction, as the CJEU confirmed
that the relationship between a liability action and other remedies available under the national
law falls within the principle of national procedural authonomy.264 Therefore, whatever
remedy is available under national law, it fulfils the requirements under EU law provided that
it assures effective judicial protection at least equivalent to what is required in terms of the
Köbler judgment.
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261 (DE) BGH, Urteil, 09/10/2003, III ZR 342/02, NJW 2004, S. 1241, reported by Dittert (n 138) 77.
262 (PL) Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (n 67), Art. 4241, § 1. See also Mikłaszewicz (n 67) 379.
263 This seems to be the situation in the following Member States: Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Cyrus, Luxembourg, and
Hungary. However, identifying these Member States is a complicated task as such evaluation not only depends
on the legal remedial system of the Member State but also on the specific circumstances of the case itself.
Naturally, in this contribution, we can only take a general look but not evaluate case per case.
264 (CJEU) Case C-168/15 Tomášová ECLI:EU:C:2016:604 ECR, paras 40–41.
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Security society, safety state,2 garrison state3 and even illiberal state4 are terms referring to
phenomena that were unavoidable in the last few years all over the globe, especially after 9/11.
Even if these terms capture different aspects of a possible outcome to which the world is
getting closer, the tendency to trivialise and under-estimate the importance of liberty seems
to be the link connecting them. As Glenn Greenwald summarised Foucault’s hypothesis in his
TED talk5 ‘surveillance creates a prison in the mind that is a much more subtle though much
more effective means of fostering compliance with social norms or with social orthodoxy,
much more effective than brute force could ever be’.
But why would Hungary, a country never really concerned by terrorism, be important
for understanding this tendency? From this very angle, Hungary seems to be a country
particularly worth dealing with as – the former happiest barrack in the socialist camp,6 the
wunderkind of the democratic transition of Soviet satellites,7 and later, the pioneer of
unorthodox economic policies and illiberalism – was always gifted at keeping up with the
zeitgeist quicker than the others. The pattern of democratic backsliding was already
successfully implemented by Poland and one can never know who will be the next. 
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Whether Hungary slides self- or even unconsciously on this slippery slope of anti-
democratisation, from now on – in particular cases – there is definitely a difference between
the level of protection provided by the European standard and the domestic institutions
responsible for fundamental rights protection in Hungary, and not in favour of the latter.
Presuming that Europe is not founded on the idea of division but of unity, to avoid such gaps
widening further in any sense is crucial for maintaining this entity we now know as Europe.8
Driven by this idea, the following short case study compares the different standards of the
Constitutional Court9 of Hungary and the European Court of Human Rights10 concerning
secret intelligence gathering – a core issue of personal liberty and security, providing an
excellent opportunity to mind (and measure) this gap.
I Privacy vs Security — the End of a Paradigm?
Balancing privacy and security, or generally speaking, the ‘balancing paradigm’11 is
a widespread approach in the field of privacy protection, especially in the context of the
emerging intensity of the threat of terrorism. The trade-off – an expression widely used in
professional literature but also in infotainment media – presents privacy and security as
competing values, which might be only realised at the expense of each other, as a kind of virtual
zero-sum game.12 In other words, the concept refers to the necessity of giving up our privacy
in the hope of being protected by the state from the danger around us, threatening our
security. In a wider sense, the trade-off not only balances privacy and security, but rather
these two values as the symbols of the best interest of the individual and society, presenting
security as the incarnation of community well-being, and privacy as the obstacle of state
actions which aim to support the community. Everyday political discourse tempted by
populism refers to this relation – the opposition of privacy and security, the individual and
the community – so naturally, as if it would be an unquestionable triviality. 
The critics of trade-off are a mixed bunch, but the reasons behind rejecting the idea are
mainly fed by two different types of arguments. The main difference between them might be
captured in that they are challenging the trade-off within the logical structure of the model,
without questioning the opposition of privacy and security, or they contest the opposition
itself. 
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8 A reference to Brexit, initiated by the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum on 23 June,
2016 shall suffice.
9 Hereinafter referred to as Constitutional Court or CC.
10 Hereinafter referred to as ECtHR or the Court.
11 Charles D. Raab, ‘From balancing to steering: new directions for data protection’ in C. J. Bennett, R. Grant, (eds),
Visions of Privacy: Policy Choices for the Digital Age (University of Toronto Press 1999, 68–93).
12 Bernadette Somody, Máté Szabó, Iván Székely, ‘Moving away from the security-privacy trade-off: The use of the
test of proportionality in decision support’ in M. Friedewald, P. Burgess, J. Cas and R. Bellanova, W. Peissl (eds),
Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Citizens’ Perspectives (PRIO New Security Studies 2017, Routledge) 155.
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The first approach – criticizing the trade-off within the trade-off – usually covers
attempts to show how the balancing paradigm relativises the importance of privacy compared
to security. Such attempts make us feel that taking a stand for the sake of privacy reflects
egoism and selfishness opposed to the noble objective of the public good. Moore13 challenges
three rival arguments undermining the importance of privacy, all of which support security
when balancing comes about. The first argument, ‘just trust us,’ tries to convince us about
letting those exercising public power decide on how to strike the balance. The second,
‘nothing to hide’, as referred to by Moore, claims that only those who are engaged in immoral
and illegal activities should worry about being monitored; and finally ‘security trumps’ holds
that security interests are weightier than privacy claims simply by their character. By present -
ing historical examples and experiences of the abuses related to, for example, the USA Patriot
Act, Moore concludes that we have no reason to trust the decision makers, claiming that
states would definitely not crave the blind trust of citizens in their surveillance politics if the
decision makers really would have ‘nothing to hide’.14 As Moore is not a constitutional lawyer,
it would be unfair to criticise him for the lack of arguments rooted deeply in constitutional
law; however, he definitely would not argue if we say that trust in the state is completely alien
from the essential nature of protecting fundamental rights. Fundamental rights – ultimately
and using all means – are rights which have to be protected from the state, even if the
protection is provided by the state itself. Later on, Moore makes a clear distinction between
sensitive personal information and information which points towards criminal activity, and
claims that sexual or medical history, for example, are simply out of the domain in which
others might have right to access information.15 As an illustration of how the two different
arguments are blended into each other, Moore’s objective is to ‘strike an appropriate balance’16
between privacy and security, which he desires to provide by introducing new safeguards,
boosting the accountability of the surveillance power. In his struggle to reach the equilibrium,
he argues that legal guarantees may promote privacy and security simultaneously, without
realising that this means, of necessity, that privacy and security are certainly not positioned
on the opposite sides of the seesaw.
Referring back to the presentation cited in the introduction of this paper, Greenwald
points out that even people who say that they have nothing to hide put passwords on their
email accounts and locks on their bathroom doors, proving with their actions that, in reality,
they instinctively understand the primal importance of privacy. Greenwald stresses that when
we are being monitored our behaviour changes dramatically. In this sense, it seems that
surveillance is not only capable of revealing past actions we would like to hide, but also deters
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25 (2) Public Affairs Quarterly 141–156.
14 Moore (n 13) 142–145.
15 Moore (n 13) 146.
16 Moore (n 13) 148.
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us from future choices, limiting our freedom of making decisions on our own (even non-
criminal) actions. The same approach comes up in Westin’s Privacy and Freedom,17 when
the author identifies the four different states of privacy, and argues that, beyond solitude, we
can behave honestly only in the state of intimacy. This honesty doesn’t refer to the readiness
to commit terrorist attacks and engage in activities against the state, but the ability to be who
we are, without the slightest urge to pretend anything. 
Adding more volume to the first group of critics, Bárd18 draws the attention to the fact
that giving up fundamental rights (in our case, privacy), is always a slippery slope, which
makes it almost impossible later to regain rights we have abandoned before. According to
her, this slippery nature is reflected in the tendency for measures interfering into privacy to
be increasingly intrusive, constantly widening the scope, time-frame and intensity of
application. In Bárd’s interpretation, actual rights are given up for the sake of perceived, future
dangers, which subjects law-making to feelings and ‘emotional demands’.19
Both groups of critics are convinced that the trade-off is false or at least grievously
misleading, but the ones who doubt that privacy and security should be balanced against each
other attack the bases of the model and definitely go farther than pointing out the
disproportionalities within the paradigm itself. Among those who question the model in its
entirety, it is widely recognized that the trade-off oversimplifies the relation between privacy
and security. Somody, Szabó, Székely20 and earlier, Regan21 pointed out that there is a dynamic
complexity between privacy and security, and a  simple opposition cannot describe the
multiple connections between the interests of these values. Borrowing a classic example, if the
safety of our homes might be achieved by installing locks on the doors, enhancing security and
privacy at the same time, who would opt for more CCTV cameras?22 As Somody, Szabó and
Székely emphasise, this tendency to trust in the false plainness of relations leads to the risk of
eroding not just privacy, but even the values the trade-off is intended to protect, including
democracy as well. 
Even though that putting the trade-off into context would be hard to bypass in any
professional discussion, the idea is surprisingly not reflected in the thinking of the general public.
People do not consider privacy and security as competing values. Analysing the acceptance of
surveillance-oriented security technologies, researchers found that, in the minds of citizens,
privacy and security are not thought to be exchangeable goods that could be traded.23
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Probably it is Raab24 who turns the trade-off upside down in the most ingenious way,
when he argues that privacy and security are not just far from being opposing values, but
they are essentially the same. According to Raab, privacy is a security value, and by necessity,
a community value as, if we consider the public interest in a broader sense, without privacy,
the public spheres and policies of democratic societies could not even function. Without
individual participation, no public issues may exist.25 On the other hand, Raab cites
Neocleous26 to illustrate that, from the end of the eighteenth century, freedom and safety
were somewhat synonymous, where safety traditionally referred to the freedom of the
individual to follow their own interests. 
Raab has got the point, but his approach is still slightly instrumental, as he argues that
privacy is important because of its usefulness in the process of democratic decision making.
Privacy has an immanent value, which – according to some voices – must be treated as the
cornerstone of the diverse structure of fundamental rights. Wachter27 goes so far as to argue
that privacy must be considered ‘as a precondition for self-development, personal fulfilment
and the free enjoyment of fundamental human rights’, which warns us to remain alert in case
there is any interference. Among other magic spells, balancing can easily serve as an ideology
for legitimising unreasonable restrictions of privacy.28
As we saw above, fresh winds blow around the relationship between privacy and security
within the academic literature. This short summary is intended to give a context for the
standards to be compared below. 
Studying the case of Szabó and Vissy v Hungary, one can get the impression that the
motivations of the effective legal regulation of secret intelligence gathering in Hungary are
rooted in the trade-off. To unveil my original hypothesis, my primal suspicion was that the
relevant domestic legislation and the approach of the Hungarian Constitutional Court
deserved to be criticised from this viewpoint. However, if we have a  closer look at the
European standard shaped mainly by the Strasbourg Court, we see that the Court basically
stands on the same ground. Even if the demise of the trade-off is increasingly obvious in
professional discussions, the ECtHR still balances privacy and security against each other, as
reflections of individual and community interests. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque seemed to
detect this obsolescence, when in his concurring opinion to Szabó and Vissy29 he stressed
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ELJ_2017-1__0  2018.06.07.  16:48  Page 103
that presuming ‘global surveillance is the deus ex machina capable of combating the scourge
of global terrorism’ is nothing more than an illusory conviction.
We definitely will have to wait until the views of Albuquerque will become the
mainstream of the European standard. However, even if the theoretical context of the Court
is not the most up-to-date, it is still better to ensure respect for privacy through balancing,
than knowingly reproducing the fear of terrorism and bypassing debates on the basis of
a single, but unfounded reference to the trade-off. 
II Szabó and Vissy — the Facts Behind
To protect democratic institutions from the threat of terrorism, states may use extraordinary
measures for surveillance. Surveillance always poses a threat for privacy rights, but the degree
of this threat depends on the nature of the exact measure taken. When we talk about
surveillance for the sake of combatting terrorism, the character and volume of surveillance
cannot be compared to when surveillance is used to foster the investigation of certain crimes.
The attempt at ‘combating terrorism’ means far more than investigating specific terrorist
activities. While in criminal investigation, data acquisition is always closely linked to the
particular case, national security-driven secret intelligence gathering aims at storing data,
acquired due its very nature and with a purpose considerably more difficult to grasp. This
problem is aggravated by the fact that the technical possibilities barely limit the use of
surveillance measures.
The effective Hungarian legal background, in the frameworks of secret intelligence
gathering driven by national security, authorises the Counter Terrorism Centre,30 the SWAT
state agency of Hungary specialised in counter-terrorism, for almost every action we can
imagine when we think about surveillance. To exercise these powers, no judicial authorisation
is needed – surveillance might be conducted based on ministerial approval, which means
that the state interference in question is not just carried out, but even granted by the executive
power.
Both the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR decided upon the issue, examining similar
implications of the same case based on the application of Szabó Máté and Vissy Beatrix,
former researchers of a Hungarian policy institute.31 The judgment of the ECtHR created
a new situation, by pointing out the weaknesses of the effective domestic regulation, and
establishing that Article 8 of the Convention has been violated. This case provides an excellent
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opportunity to evaluate the Hungarian standard assessed by the relevant decision of the
Constitutional Court, and to summarise the expectations drawn up by the case-law of the
ECtHR.
The relevant legal background specifies two types of secret intelligence-gathering. The
first one is linked to the investigation of particular crimes, while the second – secret
intelligence gathering driven by national security – isn’t. The distinction was made based on
historical factors32 bringing about the adoption of a system of divided authorisation, according
to the following. When the aim is to detect criminal offences, secret intelligence gathering is
authorised in the same way as it is regulated by Act XXXIV of 1994 on Police and Act XIX of
1998 on Criminal Proceedings. In this case, a judge, designated for this particular task, decides
upon authorisation. Concerning the second type, where national security-related secret
intelligence gathering belongs, surveillance shall be authorised by the Minister of Justice, and
the whole process is based upon the provisions of Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security. The
possible scope of the measure in question is quite opaque; the only significant guarantee applied
by the act is that secret intelligence gathering may only be carried out if the data required to
perform the statutory tasks cannot be obtained in any other manner. External control is
provided in theory, as the Parliament’s National Security Committee may exercise control
over the authorisation process itself, and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights33 can
also examine violations related to the anti-terrorist organ as well. However, as the applicants
pointed out, neither the Commissioner nor the National Security Committee had ever
brought up the underlying question (at least according to the data available to the general
public).
By way of the latter – national security-purposed secret intelligence gathering – the Counter
Terrorism Centre is entitled to conduct secret house searches, record all the data collected,
open letters and parcels, and to check and record the content of electronic communication as
well. As the use of these measures is secret, all this happens without the consent of the subject
concerned.
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33 <https://www.ajbh.hu/en/web/ajbh-en/> accessed 2 May 2018.
ELJ_2017-1__0  2018.06.07.  16:48  Page 105
III Domestic Context
1 Procedural Background – Constitutional Complaint in the Practice 
of the Constitutional Court of Hungary
Pursuant to the effective provisions of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court,
constitutional complaint procedures have three different types in Hungary. As a common
factor, these procedures have a concrete character, as all of them shall be used in cases where
the complainant is personally concerned by the violation of fundamental rights enshrined in
the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
Under Section 26 (1) a normative constitutional complaint might be launched when the
violation of fundamental rights happened due to the application of a  legal regulation in
a particular judicial procedure in a way contrary to the Fundamental Law, targeting the legal
regulation itself. 
By an individual complaint regulated by Section 27, not the norm, but the interpretation
of the legal regulation might be challenged, as the judicial decisions contrary to the
Fundamental Law can possibly be set aside by the Constitutional Court. Both complaints
governed by Section 26 (1) and 27 have an indirect nature, as the violation of the fundamental
right is transmitted by a judicial procedure. 
In the present case, the situation was different. As an exception, Section 26 (2), by
introducing the direct normative constitutional complaint procedure, provides remedy for
cases where a violation of fundamental rights happens by the mere fact of the application or
the entry into force of the particular legal regulation, which means that the constitutional
complaint procedure is not preceded by any judicial proceedings. Mr. Szabó and Ms. Vissy
founded their argumentation on Section 26 (2) in this atypical case, with the explicit intention
of testing the commitment of the Constitutional Court in Hungary to protecting the rule of
law.34
To comply with the admissibility criteria is usually not without some trouble, though.
According to Section 52 (1) of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the petition shall contain
an explicit request, which – besides other factors – requires the petitioner to certify the
existence of the preconditions for the proceedings. To illustrate the difficulty of the task, it
might be established that the majority of complaint proceedings result in the petition being
dismissed, and even complaints launched on typical issues (e.g. concerning local taxes) rarely
comply with this criteria.35 Considering the case of Szabó and Vissy, this rule would have
obliged the petitioners to verify whether the application or the entry into force of the
regulation in question had subjected them personally to a violation of their rights, which was
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practically impossible, as the Act on National Security explicitly prohibits notifying the subject
about the surveillance conducted.36
Despite all the sinister omens and regardless of the fact that it was never proved if the
applicants were subjects of secret intelligence gathering at all, their potential victim status
was accepted by the Constitutional Court of Hungary based solely on the existence of
the legislation. The petition was found admissible having regard to the ‘special nature’ of the
measure in question, with particular reference to the case law of the ECtHR.37
As secret intelligence gathering not linked to the investigation of any particular crime
might include any person without tangible restrictions, the Constitutional Court failed to
identify the possible personal scope of application. This complicated situation, together with
the circumstance that the law itself hindered the complainants from collecting information
on whether they had ever been subjected to the measure in question, entailed that even the
Constitutional Court agreed that to require the petitioners to justify their victim status would
be deeply unfair.
2 Summary of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary
In its decision no. 32/2013. (XI. 22.) AB, the Constitutional Court of Hungary dismissed the
major part of the constitutional complaint launched by the applicants, concerning the com -
pliance of the relevant legal background of secret intelligence gathering with the Fundamental
Law of Hungary. The constitutional complaint broadly aimed that surveillance activities
conducted by the Counter Terrorism Centre should be secured by similar legal guarantees
provided by the Act on Police, instead of the Act on National Security, which provides fewer
concrete safeguards.
Within the confines of the complaint claiming the lack of safeguards during the different
stages of surveillance, the Constitutional Court examined whether the authorisation of the
minister is enough to provide effective guarantees to prevent violation of the right to privacy
and the right to informational autonomy. The CC noted that secret intelligence gathering is
state interference, a serious threat to fundamental rights, therefore that the process must be
regulated under the law, the underlying legal norms must be clear and it must be subject to
external control mechanisms. 
According to the Constitutional Court, the relevant legal norms meet the requirement of
clarity, sufficiently specifying the conditions of ordering and the circumstances of executing
national security-related intelligence gathering. The most important part of the decision
concerned the question of the powers provided for the minister related to authorisation. In
this regard, the Constitutional Court set forth that the scope of national security-related tasks
is much broader than the scope of activities attached to the investigation of particular crimes.
These purposes cover combatting endeavours to commit an act of terrorism in the territory
SECRET INTELLIGENCE GATHERING – A LOW THRESHOLD STILL TOO HIGH TO REACH n
107 n
36 1995. évi CXXV. törvény a nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatokról (Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security) s 58 para (6).
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of Hungary and the protection of Hungarian nationals at risk in a foreign country. In a broader
sense, the task is to secure the sovereignty and the lawful order of the State. The CC argued
that the connected ‘events of real life’ are not examined for their criminal law relevance;
therefore the existence of a link to a particular crime is not an utmost necessity. On the basis
of this argument, the CC found that national security-related issues cannot be compared to
secret intelligence gathering linked to investigating a particular crime. This incomparability
stands for the question of authorisation as well. Without further explanation, the CC stated
that the prevention and elimination of risks to national security are decisions of a political
nature and therefore such decisions fall within the competence of the executive power,
justifying the authorisation rights granted to the minister. 
At this point, there was an aspect on which the CC agreed with the applicants. Finally, it
has been laid down in the decision as a constitutional requirement that the decision of the
minister ordering secret intelligence gathering must be supported by reasons. The underlying
argument was that, in granting the authorisation, it is the minister who must weigh the
interests of national security against the harm caused to the fundamental rights. Without
proper reasoning then, after the decision has been made, the considerations behind balancing
cannot be reviewed. This element matters from the perspective of the external control
provided by the National Security Committee and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights,
as they may only evaluate the lawfulness of the authorisation activity of the minister if the
decision contains a detailed statement of reasons. Evaluating the effectiveness of the powers
provided within the frameworks of control for the Committee and the Commissioner, the
Constitutional Court established that the scheme provided by the law is sufficient to guarantee
respect for the right to privacy.
IV The ECtHR’s Judgement in Light of the Court’s Standard
Analysing the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the context of secret
intelligence gathering, among other judgements, Klass and Others v Germany, Weber
and Saravia v Germany38 and Roman Zhakarov v Russia39 are considered to be the main
cornerstones. This selection of cases is also justified by the fact that, in Szabó and Vissy v
Hungary, even the Court itself used these cases as points of orientation. 
The Court examines all the interferences into the private sphere of the contracting party’s
nationals on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. According
to the Court, any interference can only be justified in this field if it is in accordance with the
law, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims listed by the Convention and is necessary in
a democratic society in order to achieve any such aim. Secret surveillance of citizens is
tolerable only if strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions.
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While the ECtHR’s standard definitely does not show us a clear trend, there are still some
basic developments which the Court seems to follow more or less consistently. This core
standard, is filtered down from the previously listed decisions, seems to be as follows:
a) Article 8 on the right to private and family life has the broadest possible personal scope
of application. The Court holds that the mere fact that such intrusive measures exist is
a menace to the private life of everyone who the measures might concern. No further evidence
is needed to comply with the admissibility criteria, as the harm is caused by the menace itself,
not the actual application of surveillance measures. This approach was echoed by the decision
of the Hungarian CC as well.
b) All the limitations of rights under Article 8 shall be interpreted narrowly.
c) The legal framework in effect has to clarify at least the nature of the offences in question
and provide a definition of the categories of people affected. The minimum criteria requires
a limit to be set on the duration of the measure; details to be given of the procedure to be
followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; and the clarification of the
precautions to be taken when transferring data and the circumstances in which the data must
be destroyed.
d) The interference shall be foreseeable in an abstract sense, which means that the individual
does not need to foresee when his communications are likely to be intercepted. The legal
framework has to provide a possibility for being informed of the existence of such measures,
which doesn’t even require states to list the specific offences which may give rise to
interception. 
e) To justify effective necessity in a democratic society, the Court requires a substantive
reasoning, but in fact it tends to accept almost any reason as a legitimate aim under the cloak
of national security.
f ) The effectiveness of external control mechanisms is to be evaluated as a whole. The ideal
form of control is of a judicial nature, because judicial control offers the best guarantees of
independence and proper procedure. Judicial control is required ‘at least’ as a last resort, but
involving judges doesn’t fulfil the criteria in itself. Judges must have sufficient powers to
evaluate the reasonableness of the suspicion on which the order is based, and the
proportionality and necessity of the measures taken as well. Other solutions comply with the
standard if the authority holds a sufficiently independent status, their powers are effective, it
has the competence to exercise effective control, and the control mechanism has a democratic
character in general. 
g) Notification of the subject of surveillance is desirable as soon as it can be carried out
without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction, after the termination of the measure
taken.
With regard to Szabó and Vissy, Rizzo establishes40 that the ECtHR substantially confirmed
the results achieved with the existing case-law. However, he highlights that there might be 
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a difference in the standard set for surveillance by the Zhakarov judgement and the present
case. While the Court held in Szabó and Vissy that the decision on the motion of surveillance
measures shall be based on ‘an individual suspicion regarding the target person’41, the previous
requirement of ‘reasonable suspicion’ introduced by the Zhakarov decision was a  more
advanced criteria. 
Even so, in accordance with the standard, in Szabó and Vissy the Court assessed secret
intelligence gathering as a process, distinguishing between the question of authorisation and
a posterior control of secret surveillance activities, but requiring the effectiveness of the
protection of fundamental rights on the whole. The ECtHR acknowledged the absence of
judicial supervision as a central issue common to both stages of the intelligence gathering
process. With respect to the broad scope of application of the measure in question, the Court
made it clear that the authorisation rights provided for the minister are incapable of ensuring
the requisite assessment of strict necessity, as this kind of supervision is eminently political.
Such a political nature increases the risk of abusive measures. According to the case-law,
involving a  non-judicial institution in authorisation might also be compatible with the
Convention, but it has to be ensured that such authorisation is independent from the execu -
tive power, and it needs a proper justification. The Court doesn’t consider ex ante authorisa-
tion an absolute requirement, because extensive post factum judicial oversight may counter-
balance any shortcomings of the authorisation. For the Court, in the particular case, oversight
by a politically responsible member of the executive did not provide the necessary guarantees.
The Court also established that the responsible parliamentary committee’s procedure falls
short of securing adequate public scrutiny, and there is no remedy granted by the existing
procedures, as those who are the subjects of secret surveillance are kept unaware of it, even
after the end of the surveillance itself.
According to the Court, virtually any person in Hungary might be subjected to secret
surveillance. The legislation doesn’t describe or specify the categories of possible targets, or
the underlying situations. The Court wasn’t convinced that the relevant legal regulations
provide sufficiently precise, effective and comprehensive safeguards on the ordering and
execution of secret intelligence gathering. In sum, the ordering happens based on the decision
of the executive power, without the assessment of strict necessity, and no effective remedial
measures are provided at all.
V Conclusions
According to the fragments of the case law summarised above, there are at least three factors
which might be identified as anomalous, considering the required level of fundamental rights
protection provided by the ECtHR’s standard and the Hungarian one.
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a) The required nature of control
According to the ECtHR, political control of secret surveillance activities can only be
considered as a sufficient safeguard if certain requirements are met. If the control is exclusively
political, with no legal control mechanisms available as counterbalance, the level of clarity
required for the relevant legal norms is increased. This seems a  fundamental difference
between the assessment of the ECtHR and the Constitutional Court, as the CC acknowledged
the political nature of authorisation as a natural consequence of the political nature of the
measure itself. Moreover, it could be added that not just the authorising decision but also the
a posterior control conducted by the parliamentary committee has a political character,
despite the fact that the task is to balance fundamental rights, which has an indisputable legal
nature. 
b) The meaning of ‘external’
As the ECtHR established, control is only external if it is provided by a body independent of
the executive power. The required level of independence was not evaluated by the
Constitutional Court, but the ECtHR laid down that it is the judiciary that offers the broadest
spectrum of guarantees in this field.
c) What ‘effectiveness’ stands for in practice 
In the ECtHR’s interpretation, effectiveness is the question of powers provided for the body
involved in control. The key factor in providing effectiveness is publicity – legal remedies
might only be effective if the subject is notified of the measures taken, at least afterwards,
when providing information no longer represents a risk to national security. Similarly to the
required nature of control, the CC also considered the lack of notification as a  natural
consequence flowing from the character of secret intelligence gathering, which obviously
indicates a great gap between what the CC and what the ECtHR considers as an effective legal
remedy.
The different institutional and procedural considerations listed above are at least those
that the legislator should keep in mind when amending the underlying provisions to move the
Hungarian standard towards the majority of Europe. Unfortunately, at this point some serious
doubts need to be shared.
VI Doubts
Shortly after the autumn legislative schedule42 of the National Assembly of Hungary was
published, a new draft bill came out from the Ministry of Interior, aiming to re-structure the
legislative framework of national security driven secret intelligence gathering in light of 
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the Strasbourg standard.43 Even if all the rumours and press interviews available suggest 
that the draft bill in its present form will not be able to gain the required two-thirds majority,
it is still worth having a look at the newly developed model to examine how the standard is
currently understood.
According to the draft bill, it would be still the Minister of Justice who would authorise
the application of surveillance measures, but his decision would be exposed to the ex-post
review of the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information44 within
about a week. After the decision made by the Minister, the decision would be sent to the
Authority within 48 hours, which would examine the decision within another 72 hours and
send back the result of the review to the Ministry within further 48 hours at maximum. In the
event of unlawful surveillance, the Authority would be entitled to terminate the measure
taken, otherwise it would approve the decision of the Minister. The draft bill makes an attempt
to clarify the possible personal scope of application, and introduces a remedial action called
‘surveillance complaint’, which could also be filed to the Data Protection Authority. 
It is clear even for the very first glance that the requirements of the Strasbourg standard
are a long way from being met by the draft. 
a) The nature of authorisation would still be political. Even if a legal element (the approval
of the Data Protection Authority) is introduced, this legal control – as a main rule – is only
an ex-post control, which means that in practice, surveillance measures could still be
undisturbedly taken for a whole week without any control outside the executive power. As an
undeniable stride, the draft bill made significant progression in specifying the conditions of
application, which could be a factor considered to be in harmony with the requirements.
However, as with all legal norms which require balancing, these provisions will gain their true
meaning in the course of their interpretation. That would make it immensely important to
involve the independent judiciary in the process.
b) While the approval of the Data Protection Authority is external in the sense that the
Authority is an autonomous administrative organ, the level of independence is far from the
guarantees offered by the judiciary. Judicial control would not be part of the mechanism at any
phase of the surveillance, and no justification explains the reasons.
c) The requirement of effectiveness would still not be fulfilled, as the ‘surveillance complaint’
would be introduced for persons who already believed they were subjected to intelligence
gathering, while the draft bill remains silent about compulsory subsequent notification. 
The title referred to a ‘low threshold’, reminding us that the standard of the ECtHR is self-evidently
a minimum standard, still far from what we could call ideal. A gap was demonstrated between
the actual trends in the literature and the approach of the Strasbourg Court, and moreover,
another gap seems to have opened between Europe and Hungary as well. Based on the above, it
truly seems that, for Hungary, even this low threshold currently seems too high to reach.
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